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Freedom of speech is indivisible; unless we protect it for all, we will
have it for none.1
-Harry Kalven, Jr.
If there be minority groups who hail this holding [rejecting a first
amendment challenge to a group libel statute] as their victory, they
might consider the possible relevancy of this ancient remark: "An-
other such victory and I am undone." 2
-Hugo Black, Jr.
The civil rights movement would have been vastly different without
the shield and spear of the First Amendment. The Bill of Rights... is
of particular importance to those who have been the victims of
oppression.3
-Benjamin L. Hooks
It is technically impossible to write an anti-speech code that cannot be
twisted against speech nobody means to bar. It has been tried and
tried and tried.4
-Eleanor Holmes Norton
The basic problem with all these regimes to protect various people is
that the protection incapacitates.... To think that I [as a black man]
will ... be told that white folks have the moral character to shrug off
insults, and I do not .... That is the most insidious, the most insult-
ing, the most racist statement of all!5
-Alan Keyes
Whom will we trust to censor communications and decide which ones
are "too offensive" or "too inflammatory" or too devoid of intellectual
content?... As a former president of the University of California once
said: "The University is not engaged in making ideas safe for students.
It is engaged in making students safe for ideas."'6
-Derek Bok
[R]estrictive codes... may be expedient, even grounded in conviction,
but the university cannot submit the two cherished ideals of freedom
and equality to the legal system and expect both to be returned intact.7
-Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
1. Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REV.
428, 432 (1967).
2. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
3. Statement by Benjamin Hooks, quoted in Philip Morris Companies Inc., Press Release
(May 7, 1990).
4. Gottlieb, Banning bigoted speech: Stanford weighs rules, San Jose (Cal.) Mercury-News,
Jan. 7, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
5. Stanford News, Press Release (Mar. 19, 1990) (quoting Alan Keyes, a former assistant
secretary of state and now president of Citizens Against Government Waste, criticizing Stanford
hate speech regulation).
6. Bok, Reflections on Free Speech: An Open Letter to the Harvard Community, EDUC. REC.,
Winter 1985, at 4, 6.
7. CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, A SPECIAL REPORT:
CAMPUS LIFE, IN SEARCH OF COMMUNITY 20 (1990) [hereinafter CARNEGIE FOUND. SPECIAL
REPORT].
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In the political climate that surrounds [the race] issue[ ] on campus,
principle often yields to expediency and clarity turns into ambiguity,
and this is no less true for some of our finest scholars.8
-Joseph Grano
When language wounds, the natural and immediate impulse is to take
steps to shut up those who utter the wounding words. When, as here,
that impulse is likely to be felt by those who are normally the first
amendment's staunchest defenders, free expression faces its greatest
threat. At such times, it is important for those committed to principles
of free expression to remind each other of what they have always
known regarding the long term costs of short term victories bought
through compromising first amendment principles. 9
-- Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts
As a former student activist, and as a current black militant, [I] be-
lieve[ ] that free speech is the minority's strongest weapon ...
[Platernalism [and] censorship offer the college student a tranquilizer
as the antidote to campus and societal racism. What we need is an
alarm clock. . . . What we need is free speech ...and more free
speech!10
-Michael Meyers
INTRODUCTION
Professor Lawrence has made a provocative contribution to the per-
ennial debate concerning the extent to which courts and civil libertari-
ans" should continue to construe the Constitution as protecting some
8. Grano, Free Speech v. the University of Michigan, ACADEMIC QUESTIONS, Spring 1990, at
1, 19-20.
9. Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Policy Concerning Racist and Other Group-Based
Harassing Speech Acts on Academic Campuses (adopted May 14, 1990) (principally drafted by
Charles H. Baron, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School) (available from author).
10. M.'Meyers, Banning Racist and Other Kinds of "Hate" Speech on the College Campus
(outline for a debate with john a. powell at Hofstra University, Hempstead, Long Island, January 25,
1990) (available from author). Michael Meyers is a member of the ACLU's National Board of
Directors and its Affirmative Action Officer; john a. powell is the ACLU's National Legal Director.
11. There is no single "civil libertarian" or ACLU position on many of the issues discussed in
this Article. For example, Professors Lawrence and Strossen are both avowed civil libertarians and
ACLU supporters, see Lawrence, at 434 n.20, 473, although they disagree on certain civil liberties
issues.
On October 13, 1990, the ACLU's National Board of Directors adopted a policy opposing
campus disciplinary codes against hate speech. For the text of this policy, which was adopted with-
out dissent, see infra Appendix.
In addition to the national organization, the ACLU includes 51 state-wide or regional "affili-
ates," which may all adopt their own policies. Although an affiliate's policies must be "in accord-
ance" with those of the national organization, this requirement is designed "to obtain general unity,
rather than absolute uniformity." See Policy Guide of the American Civil Liberties Union, at Policy
No. 501 (rev. ed. 1990) [hereinafter ACLU Policy Guide]. Accordingly, some ACLU affiliates may
adopt policies concerning the regulation of campus hate speech that are to some extent divergent
from each other, and from the national ACLU policy. The ACLU California affiliates have adopted
a policy that does not oppose the regulation of a limited class of campus hate speech, see Policy of
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forms of racist expression.12 This recurring issue resurfaced most re-
cently in connection with the increase of racial incidents at colleges and
universities around the country. 13 In response, many of these institutions
have adopted, or are considering, 14  regulations that curb "hate
speech"-i.e., speech that expresses hatred or bias toward members of
racial, religious, or other groups.
Civil libertarians are committed to the eradication of racial discrimi-
nation and the promotion of free speech throughout society.15 Civil lib-
ertarians have worked especially hard to combat both discrimination and
free speech restrictions in educational institutions.1 6 Educational institu-
tions should be bastions of equal opportunity and unrestricted exchange.
Therefore, we find the upsurge of both campus racism and regulation of
ACLU California Affiliates Concerning Racist and Other Group-Based Harassment on College
Campuses (adopted by ACLU of Northern California, Mar. 8, 1990; ACLU of Southern California,
Mar. 21, 1990; and ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties, May 24, 1990) (available from
author). In contrast, for example, the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts has adopted a policy
that opposes any content-based restrictions on campus speech. See supra note 9.
To reflect the fact that civil libertarians may differ about the specific issues discussed in this
Article, the term "traditional civil libertarian" is used only to describe the general view that much
hate speech is entitled to first amendment protection. All other, more specific views expressed in this
Article reflect the author's opinions. She does not purport to speak either for the national ACLU or
for civil libertarians generally.
12. Consistent with Professor Lawrence's approach, see Lawrence, at 436 n.27, this Article
focuses on racist speech, although the analysis generally applies to other forms of hate speech as
well, such as sexist and homophobic speech, and speech vilifying religious or ethnic groups.
13. See Leslie, Lessonsfrom Bigotry 101, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 1989, at 48 (documents inci-
dents at 250 colleges and universities since Fall 1986). See also CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION OF ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, POLICY BACKGROUND REPORT-CAMPUS ANTI-BIAS
CODES: A NEW FORM OF CENSORSHIP? 1 (1989) (in 1988 there were more reported incidents of
anti-Semitic harassment on United States campuses than in any prior year). For a listing of some
specific recent incidents of campus racism, see Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Consider-
ing the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2333 n.71 (1989).
For some possible explanations for this wave of campus racism, see Steele, The Recoloring of
Campus Life, HARPER'S, Feb. 1989, at 47.
14. See CARNEGIE FOUND. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 19 (60% of the chief student
affairs officers surveyed in 1989 reported that their campuses had written policies on bigotry, racial
harassment or intimidation, and another 11% said they are working on such policies).
15. See generally ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 11, at Policy Nos. 301-31 (ACLU policies
advocating equality for racial and other historically disempowered groups). For a summary of the
ACLU's efforts to implement these policies, see infra notes 16 & 334-55 and accompanying text.
16. It has long been an ACLU priority to combat racial discrimination in education. For ex-
ample, during the 1920s and 1930s, the ACLU assisted with the NAACP's formulation of a nation-
wide legal campaign against segregated education. See S. WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN
LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 88-90 (1990). The Southern California ACLU successfully
challenged school segregation as early as 1946. See id. at 239. The ACLU's recent efforts in this
category include its representation of the plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Educ,, 892 F.2d 851 (10th
Cir. 1989) (Brown III), which challenged the de facto segregation of Topeka, Kansas public schools.
See also Memorandum from john a. powell to Ira Glasser and the Executive Committee, March 10,
1990, at 3-4 [hereinafter powell, Memorandum] (listing cases in which ACLU National Legal De-
partment currently is challenging racial discrimination in education) (available from author).
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campus speech particularly disturbing, and we have undertaken efforts to
counter both. 17
Because civil libertarians have learned that free speech is an indis-
pensable instrument for the promotion of other rights and freedoms-
including racial equality-we fear that the movement to regulate campus
expression will undermine equality, as well as free speech. Combating
racial discrimination and protecting free speech should be viewed as mu-
tually reinforcing, rather than antagonistic, goals.' 8 A diminution in so-
ciety's commitment to racial equality is neither a necessary nor an
appropriate price for protecting free speech. Those who frame the debate
in terms of this false dichotomy simply drive artificial wedges between
would-be allies in what should be a common effort to promote civil rights
and civil liberties. 19
Professor Lawrence urges civil libertarians to "abandon[ ] ... over-
stated rhetorical and legal attacks on individuals who conscientiously
seek to frame a public response to racism while preserving our first
amendment liberties."' 20 I join in this invitation, and I extend a corre-
sponding one: Those individuals who espouse "new perspectives" on the
first amendment in an effort to justify hate speech regulations should
avoid overstated attacks on those who conscientiously seek to preserve
our first amendment liberties while responding to racism.
In important respects, Professor Lawrence inaccurately describes,
and unfairly criticizes, both traditional civil libertarians in general and
17. For example, the ACLU represented the plaintiff in Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F.
Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989), which successfully challenged the University of Michigan's anti-hate-
speech policy as violating the first amendment. The ACLU also has initiated a lawsuit challenging
the University of Wisconsin's hate speech regulation. See Gribble, Student Coalition Sues UW Over
Racial Harassment Rule, Milwaukee J., March 30, 1990, at 8B, col. 1. Prior to the adoption of both
rules, the ACLU sought to persuade the universities to formulate narrower restrictions. See infra
note 353. Compare Lawrence, at 477, 478 & n.162 ("Traditional civil liberties lawyers typically
have elected to stand by while universities" adopt "poorly drafted and obviously overbroad
regulations.").
See also infra note 177 (discussion of Wu v. University of Conn., Civ. H-89-649 PCD (D. Conn.
Jan. 25, 1990). The plaintiff, represented by the Connecticut ACLU affiliate, settled her lawsuit
challenging the University of Connecticut's hate speech rule pursuant to an agreement about the
wording of an alternative rule.
18. At times, Lawrence recognizes that these goals are in fact mutually reinforcing, see Law-
rence, at 435, 436 & n.27, 453 n.92, 455, 480 n.167, but at other times, he seems to view them as
incompatible, see id. at 434, 446-47, 457-58, 466-67, 471, 473-74. This is a major unresolved tension
in his article.
19. See Gale & Strossen, The RealACLU, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 161, 171-84 (1990); see
also infra text accompanying notes 422-35 (discussing interdependence of civil rights and civil liber-
ties). Some themes in the present Article were previously explored in the Gale & Strossen essay.
Professor Strossen thanks Professor Gale for her permission to draw upon this earlier piece in the
present one.
20. See Lawrence, at 481.
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the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in particular. His argument
depends on a "straw civil libertarian" who can be easily knocked down,
but who does not correspond to the flesh and blood reality.21 For exam-
ple, contrary to Professor Lawrence's assumption, traditional civil liber-
tarians do not categorically reject every effort to regulate racist speech.
The ACLU never has argued that harassing, intimidating, or assaultive
conduct should be immunized simply because it is in part based on
words.22 Accordingly, traditional civil libertarians should agree with
Professor Lawrence that some examples of racially harassing speech
should be subject to regulation consistent with first amendment princi-
ples-for example, the group of white male students pursuing a black
female student across campus shouting, "I've never tried a nigger. ' '23
Of course, traditional civil libertarians have urged that any restric-
tions on expressive activity must be drawn narrowly, and carefully ap-
plied, to avoid chilling protected speech. But, to a substantial extent,
21. In Professor Lawrence's composite view, "traditional" civil libertarians display the follow-
ing "typical" propensities. First, they argue that all speech should be absolutely protected, see Law-
rence, at 436, 438, 449, 457, 461, 473-74, 476-77, at least if it "stops short of physical violence," id.
at 449. But see infra text accompanying notes 56-77. Second, they recognize that no face-to-face
insults or fighting words are protected free speech, unless they are racial in nature, see Lawrence, at
436-37, 476. But see infra text accompanying notes 56-83. Third, they do not acknowledge that
racist speech inflicts real harm, see Lawrence, at 448, 457, 458, 478. But see infra text accompanying
notes 275-86. Fourth, they are more committed to the values reflected in the Constitution's free
speech clause than to those reflected in its equal protection clause, see Lawrence, at 448, 461, 477-78.
But see infra text accompanying notes 334-57. Fifth, they do not support, and indeed "often" op-
pose, "group expressions of condemnation" of racist speech, see Lawrence, at 477. But see infra text
accompanying notes 397-402. Sixth, they "typically... elect[ ] to stand by" while universities draft
constitutionally vulnerable hate speech regulations, see Lawrence, at 477. They "wait [to] attack
[such] poorly drafted and obviously overbroad regulations." Id. at 478 n.162. But see infra text
accompanying note 353.
The foregoing stereotypes are presented through unsupported assertions and are belied by the
facts recited throughout this Article. Professor Lawrence also makes incorrect and misleading state-
ments specifically about the ACLU and its members. See Lawrence, at 473, 478 & nn.163-64. But
see infra text accompanying notes 333-57.
Professor Lawrence qualifies his depiction of the "traditional" civil libertarian or ACLU mem-
ber in one important respect: He repeatedly suggests that civil libertarians and ACLU members who
are members of minority groups (or perhaps women) differ from others in their positions on free
speech and equal protection issues. See Lawrence, at 466 (distinguishing "[m]ost blacks" from
"many white civil libertarians"); see also id. at 458-59, 461 & n.113, 473-74, 477-78 & nn.163-64.
Such racial stereotyping is both factually inaccurate and antithetical to equality principles. The
inaccuracy is illustrated by the fact that two ACLU officials, both black, recently engaged in a public
debate against each other in which one opposed all campus hate speech regulations. See M. Meyers,
supra note 10. Both of these officials agree that the effort to shape appropriately narrow hate speech
restrictions entails an undesirable diversion of resources from the essential task of shaping underly-
ing attitudes. Interviews with Michael Meyers and john a. powell, in New York City (August 18,
1990). See also supra text accompanying notes 3-5 & 10 (quoting black leaders criticizing hate
speech regulations).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 53-77 and Appendix.
23. Lawrence, at 448 (quoting A Step Toward Civility, TIME, May 1, 1989, at 43).
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Professor Lawrence appears to endorse a similarly cautious approach.
He stresses that he supports only limited regulations and invokes the re-
cently adopted Stanford University code as a model.24
Insofar as Professor Lawrence advocates relatively narrow rules that
apply traditionally accepted limitations on expressive conduct to the
campus setting, his position should not be alarming (although it is debat-
able). In portions of his article, Professor Lawrence seems to agree with
traditional civil libertarians that only a small subset of the racist rhetoric
that abounds in our society should be regulated. 25 Although we may
disagree about the contours of such concepts as "captive audience,"
"fighting words," or "intentional infliction of emotional distress" in the
context of racist speech on campus, 26 these differences should not ob-
scure strong common goals. Surely our twin aims of civil rights and civil
liberties would be advanced more effectively by fighting together against
the common enemy of racism than by fighting against each other over
which narrow subset of one symptom of racism-namely, verbal and
symbolic expressions-should be regulated.
What is disquieting about Professor Lawrence's article is not the
relatively limited Stanford code he defends, but rather his simultaneous
defense of additional, substantially more sweeping, speech prohibitions. 27
24. See Lawrence, at 450 & n.82, 481. Stanford University recently adopted a rule defining
some expression as prohibited "harassment by vilification." Stanford University, Fundamental
Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment (June 1990) [hereinafter
Stanford Code and Comments]. The rule, which was principally drafted by Professor Thomas Grey,
is quoted infra text accompanying note 197.
At various points in his article, Professor Lawrence endorses regulations of broader scope, see
infra note 27. However, he stresses his proposed variation of the Stanford code, which would apply
to "all common areas" and would "not . . . protect[ ] persons . . . vilified on the basis of their
membership in dominant majority groups." Lawrence, at 450 n.82. Therefore, throughout the re-
mainder of this Article, references to the regulation endorsed by Professor Lawrence refer to this
formulation, unless expressly indicated otherwise.
25. See Lawrence, at 434-36, 450 & n.82, 472-73, 474 n.155, 481.
26. Civil libertarians have a range of opinions as to when, if ever, these concepts may legiti-
mately be employed to restrict speech. See infra text accompanying notes 69-87 & 116-58. For
relevant ACLU policies, see infra note 77. The only doctrinal concept advanced by Professor Law-
rence as a justification for regulating campus hate speech that the ACLU expressly and categorically
rejects is group defamation. See ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 11, at Policy No. 6(c).
27. See, e.g., Lawrence, at 450 & n.82 (supports variation on Stanford code which was broader
than the one adopted in that it would apply to all common areas); id. at 437, 456-57 (urges regula-
tion of racial epithets that do not involve face-to-face encounters, where victim is captive audience);
id. at 451 n.85 (argues that fighting words include not only those addressed face-to-face, as under
current doctrine, but should "be expanded in the case of racist verbal assaults to include those words
that are intentionally spoken in the presence of members of the denigrated group"); id. at 463 n. 119,
464 n.120 (endorses regulation of group defamation); id. at 481 n.169 ("Mari Matsuda has made a
more radical venture, which I believe may well in the long run prove more satisfactory [than Law-
rence's own proposals]. She calls for a doctrinal change that would involve an explicit content-based
rejection of narrowly defined racist speech .... ").
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The rationales that Professor Lawrence advances for the regulations he
endorses are so open-ended that, if accepted, they would appear to war-
rant the prohibition of all racist speech, and thereby would cut to the
core of our system of free expression.
Although Professor Lawrence's specific proposed code appears rela-
tively modest, his supporting rationales depend on nothing less immodest
than the abrogation of the traditional distinctions between speech and
conduct and between state action and private action. He equates private
racist speech with governmental racist conduct.28 This approach offers
no principled way to confine racist speech regulations to the particular
contours of the Stanford code, or indeed to any particular contours at all.
Professor Lawrence apparently acknowledges that, if accepted, his theo-
ries could warrant the prohibition of all private racist speech.29 More-
over, although he stresses the particular evils of racism, 30 he also says
that "much of my analysis applies to violent pornography and
homophobic hate speech. ' 31 Thus, Professor Lawrence himself demon-
strates that traditional civil libertarians are hardly paranoiac when we
fear that any specific, seemingly modest proposal to regulate speech may
in fact represent the proverbial "thin edge of the wedge" for initiating
broader regulations.
As just explained, the relatively narrow Stanford code that Professor
Lawrence endorses is incongruous with his broad theoretical rationale.
The Stanford code also is at odds with Professor Lawrence's pragmatic
rationale. The harms of racist speech that he seeks to redress largely
remain untouched by the rule. For example, Professor Lawrence mov-
ingly recounts the pain suffered by his sister's family as a result of racist
expression, 32 as well as the anxiety he endured as a boy even from the
28. See Lawrence, at 43849.
29. See id. at 449 ("This precedent [Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its
progeny] may not mean that we should advocate the government regulation of all racist
speech ....").
30. For example, Lawrence argues that racist speech and conduct are unique because of the
direct link between speech or act and harm:
I do not contend that all conduct with an expressive component should be treated as un-
protected speech. To the contrary, my suggestion that racist conduct amounts to speech is
premised upon a unique characteristic of racism-namely its reliance upon the defamatory
message of white supremacy to achieve its injurious purpose.
Id. at 440 n.42.
It is difficult to understand how racism is unique in terms of the asserted link between its
message and its harm. Surely the same connection would exist between any form of group hatred
and its resulting harm. For example, sexism relies on the message of male supremacy; homophobia
relies on the message of heterosexual supremacy.
31. Id. at 436 n.27. See also supra note 27.
32. See Lawrence, at 459-61.
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possibility of racist expression. 33 Yet the Stanford code clearly would not
apply to any of the unspoken racist expressions that may lurk beneath
the surface of much parlance in American life. Moreover, the regulation
also would not apply unless the speech was directly targeted at a specific
victim.3 4 Therefore, it would not have relieved Professor Lawrence or
his family of the traumas they experienced. Furthermore, the Stanford
code would not address the racist incident at Stanford that led to its
adoption.35 Likewise, many additional campus racist incidents cata-
logued by Professor Lawrence and others would be beyond the scope of
the Stanford code.
Two problems arise from the disharmony between the breadth of the
racist speech regulations endorsed by Professor Lawrence and the harm
that inspires them. First, this disparity underscores the rules' ineffective-
ness. The regulations do not even address much of racist speech, let
alone the innumerable other manifestations of racism which-as Profes-
sor Lawrence himself stresses36-pervade our society. Second, this dis-
harmony encourages the proponents of hate speech regulations to seek to
narrow the gap between the underlying problem and their favored solu-
tion by recommending broader regulations. For example, Professor Mari
Matsuda recently proposed a substantially more restrictive hate speech
regulation on the theory that such a regulation is needed to redress the
harm suffered by hate speech victims. 37 Professor Lawrence has indi-
cated his approval of Professor Matsuda's approach. 38 And the wedge
widens.
This Article attempts to bridge some of the gaps that Professor Law-
rence believes separate advocates of equality from advocates of free
speech. It shows that-insofar as proponents of hate speech regulations
endorse relatively narrow rules that encompass only a limited category of
racist expression-these gaps are not that significant in practical effect.
It also demonstrates that the first and fourteenth amendments are allies
rather than antagonists. Most importantly, this Article maintains that
equality will be served most effectively by continuing to apply traditional,
33. Id. at 482-83.
34. See infra text accompanying note 197 (quoting Stanford code).
35. See Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 3 (Professor Thomas Grey, who drafted the Stanford code,
said "his rule probably wouldn't apply to one of the most publicized racial incidents at Stanford,
when a white student left on a black student's door a poster of Beethoven drawn as a black carica-
ture."). The broader variation of the Stanford code which Professor Lawrence endorsed, see Law-
rence, at 450 n.82, apparently would have applied to this Stanford incident, see id. at 456 n.101, but
not to the incid6nt endured by his sister or to his boyhood ordeal.
36. See Lawrence, at 467-71. See, eg., id. at 468 ("Racism is ubiquitous. We are all racists.").
37. See Matsuda, supra note 13.
38. See Lawrence, at 481 n.169.
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speech-protective precepts to racist speech, because a robust freedom of
speech ultimately is necessary to combat racial discrimination. Professor
Lawrence points out that free speech values as well as equality values
may be promoted by regulating certain verbal harassment, and retarded
by not regulating it. 39 But it also must be recognized that equality values
may be promoted most effectively by not regulating certain hate speech
and retarded by regulating it.4°
Part I of this Article demonstrates that some traditional civil liber-
tarians agree with Professor Lawrence's point that some speech amounts
to verbal assault or harassment and may be subject to government regu-
lation. Part II shows that Professor Lawrence's conception of regulable
racist speech is broader than that permitted by established constitutional
doctrine and would endanger fundamental free speech values. Part III
explores the even greater danger to free speech values posed by Professor
Lawrence's expansive rationales.41 Of primary importance, Part III ex-
poses the flaws in Professor Lawrence's major argument-the argument
that Brown v. Board of Education 42 and other decisions that invalidate
governmental racist conduct somehow legitimize regulation of non-gov-
ernmental racist speech.
Notwithstanding my differences with Professor Lawrence about the
boundaries of regulable racist expression, it is important to place these
differences in proper perspective. Even the racist speech that he would
regulate constitutes only a small fraction of all racist speech. Thus, most
racist expression would remain untouched under both Professor Law-
rence's approach and the approach traditionally endorsed by civil liber-
tarians and the Supreme Court. More importantly, as Part IV discusses,
Professor Lawrence's proposal would not effectively address the underly-
ing problem of racism itself, of which racist speech is a symptom. Part
IV shows that suppressing racist speech could even aggravate racially
discriminatory attitudes. Thus, the goals of free speech and of eradicat-
ing racism are not incompatible, as Professor Lawrence sometimes sug-
gests.43 Rather, as he also recognizes,44 these goals are mutually
reinforcing. Although these points focus on Professor Lawrence's spe-
cific proposal, they apply as well to all other proposals to censor hate
speech.
39. See Lawrence, at 437, 453 n.92, 455, 458.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 365-96.
41. See supra notes 27-31.
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. See supra notes 18-19.
44. See id.
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Finally, Part V maintains that we should channel our efforts toward
devising means to combat racism that are consistent with the first
amendment. This method ultimately will be more effective than censor-
ship in promoting both equality and free speech. The resurgence of racist
expression on American campuses has sparked a revitalized national
dedication to promoting racial equality on college campuses and
throughout our society and the forging of creative strategies for doing
so.45 In order to counter racist speech, Professor Lawrence urges us to
"think creatively as lawyers." 46 But if we are to understand and eradi-
cate the complex root causes of racial discrimination, then we must think
creatively as more than just lawyers. 47 We must draw upon the insights
and skills of educators, sociologists, and psychologists. To draft legal
rules that address only one manifestation of these deeper problems of
racial inequality is at best ineffective, and at worst counterproductive.
I. SOME LIMITED FORMS OF CAMPUS HATE SPEECH MAY BE
REGULABLE UNDER CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE
A. General Constitutional Principles Applicable to Regulating Campus
Hate Speech
To put in proper perspective the specific points of disagreement be-
tween Professor Lawrence's analysis and traditional civil libertarian
views, the points of agreement first should be noted. Professor Lawrence
usefully rehearses the many shared understandings between advocates of
a traditional doctrine, which protects much racist speech, and advocates
of various less protective regulations. Professor Lawrence acknowledges
that there are strong reasons for sheltering even racist speech, in terms of
reinforcing society's commitment to tolerance and mobilizing its opposi-
tion to intolerance. 48 Consequently, he recognizes that to frame the de-
bate in terms of a conflict between freedom of speech and the elimination
of racism poses a false dichotomy.4 9 Accordingly, he urges civil libertari-
ans to examine not just the substance of our position on racist speech, but
45. In response to the recent wave of racist expressions on campus, many universities have
adopted programs designed to counter racism and to promote intergroup relations. See infra note
409. This development illustrates one of the advantages of refusing to censor hate speech: Society is
motivated to counter the underlying biases that it manifests. See infra text accompanying notes 391-
96.
46. Lawrence, at 480.
47. I owe this formulation to Ira Glasser, Executive Director of the ACLU (and a non-lawyer).
48. See Lawrence, at 436, 458 & n.105.
49. See id. at 435-36.
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also the way in which we enter the debate, to ensure that we condemn
racist ideas at the same time as we defend the right to utter them.50
There may be even more common ground between Professor Law-
rence and the traditional civil libertarian position than he expressly ac-
knowledges. In presenting the civil libertarian position as absolute and
uni-focused, he oversimplifies and thereby distorts it. For example, as
previously noted, Professor Lawrence sets up a "straw civil libertarian"
who purportedly would afford absolute protection to all racist speech-
or at least "all racist speech that stops short of physical violence."51 In
fact, as evidenced by ACLU policies, traditional civil libertarians do not
take such an extreme position. Indeed, some civil libertarians recently
have charged that the ACLU has maintained an insufficiently absolutist
position toward free speech in the context of campus hate speech, at the
same time that Professor Lawrence, also a civil libertarian, charges that
its position has been too absolutist.5 2 Moreover, as a matter of both pol-
icy5 3 and practice,54 the ACLU already condemns the ideas expressed by
racist and other anti-civil libertarian speakers at the same time that it
defends their right to utter them. Thus, contrary to Professor Law-
rence's implication,55 such condemnation does not constitute an
innovation.
Professor Lawrence also mischaracterizes traditional civil libertari-
ans when he asserts that they tolerate the regulation of "garden variety"
fighting words, but not racist fighting words.5 6 Some civil libertarians
might agree with the Supreme Court's formerly stated view57 that a nar-
rowly defined category of "fighting words" might not be constitutionally
50. See id at 476-77.
51. Id. at 449. See also id. at 438, 457, 461, 473-74, 476-77.
52. See, eg., Hentoff, If a Civil Liberties Union Can't Agree on Free Speech .... Wash. Post,
June 2, 1990, at A19, col. 1; Hentoff, The Different Faces of the ACLU, Wash. Post, March 31, 1990,
at A27, col. 1; Rohde, Any Limitations Are Bound to Violate the First Amendment, Los Angeles
Daily J., July 19, 1990, at 6, col. 4 ("I urge the California chapters of the ACLU to withdraw their
new policy [permitting narrow regulations on campus hate speech] and replace it with something
that's worked for nearly 200 years-the First Amendment.").
53. See ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 11, at Policy No. 46. The Policy states that: "IThe
democratic standards in which the ACLU believes and for which it fights run directly counter to the
philosophy of the Klan and other ultra-right groups"; therefore, the ACLU should deal "with the
difficult dilemma of having to defend the civil liberties of groups whose activities do fundamental
injury to civil liberties" [by] vigorously present[ing] its opposing views "while defending the group's
right to speak." See also id at Policy No. 312.
54. See infra notes 338-55.
55. See Lawrence, at 476-81.
56. Id. at 436-37.
57. But see infrd text accompanying notes 116-31 (Court has construed fighting words excep-
tion to free speech protection so narrowly that some scholars believe there no longer is such an
exception).
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protected.58 Other civil libertarians maintain that "fighting words"
should not be excluded from first amendment protection.59 They all
agree, however, that racist fighting words should receive the same degree
of protection (or nonprotection) as other fighting words.
Consistent with Professor Lawrence's free speech concerns, the cate-
gory of racist speech he seeks to regulate under the Stanford code 6O is
relatively narrow compared to other campus hate speech rules.61 In im-
portant respects, this proposal overlaps with the traditional civil liberta-
rian position. On the end of the spectrum where speech is
constitutionally protected, Professor Lawrence agrees62 with courts and
traditional civil libertarians that the first amendment should protect ra-
cist speech in a Skokie-type context. 63 The essentials of a Skokie-type
setting are that the offensive speech occurs in a public place and the event
is announced in advance. Hence, the offensive speech can be either
avoided or countered by opposing speech. Traditional civil libertarians
58. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 337-38 (1970) ("'[Fighting words'
can be considered the equivalent of knocking a chip off the shoulder-the traditional symbolic act
that puts the parties in the role of physical combatants."); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 12-10, at 852-53 (2d ed. 1988) ("[lIt is not difficult to recognize the genuine dilemma that law
enforcement officers may confront when violence is incipient; although free speech would be sup-
pressed, silencing the speaker is certainly preferable to a blood bath.").
59. See, e.g., F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY (1981). Haiman states that:
[I]t is my contention that in all of the circumstances in which antagonistic crowds or
individuals respond or threaten to respond violently to communicators, the audience
should be held responsible for its behavior, and not the speaker .... [V]iolent reaction, by
definition, is born in the psyche of the respondent. The idea to attack the communicator is
not implanted or urged by the speaker, as might an idea to commit illegal acts be initiated
and advocated by one who incites a supportive audience ....
... [I]f hostile audiences are not held responsible for their own behavior.., they will
soon learn that they have the power to exercise a "heckler's veto" over the speech of their
antagonists.
Id. at 258; see also id. at 20-23, 132-35, 253-54, 256-58.
60. See infra text accompanying note 197.
61. For example, the Stanford code applies only to intentionally insulting words "addressed
directly" to an individual or a small number of individuals. See infra text accompanying note 197.
In contrast, the Michigan rule which was recently held to violate the first amendment, see infra text
accompanying notes 208-12, did not require either that the penalized words be intentionally insult-
ing or that they be addressed to specific individuals. Moreover, the Michigan rule originally pro-
scribed speech that "[c]reates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment." See infra note
203. The same overbroad, vague language is contained in the rule recently adopted by the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Board of Regents. See UWS 17.06(2)(a)(2) (effective Sept. 1, 1990).
62. See Lawrence, at 457 & n.103.
63. The reference is to an American neo-Nazi group's efforts, in 1977-78, to gain permission to
demonstrate in Skokie, Illinois, a community with a large Jewish population, including many Holo-
caust survivors. For the judicial opinions rejecting arguments that Skokie residents should be pro-
tected from such personally odious expressions, see, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205-07
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 Ill. 2d
605, 612-18, 373 N.E.2d 21, 23-25 (1978). For an excellent account of both the specific Skokie
controversy and the general issues it raised, see A. NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN
NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979).
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recognize that this speech causes psychic pain. We nonetheless agree
with the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Skokie 64 that this pain is a
necessary price for a system of free expression, which ultimately re-
dounds to the benefit of racial and other minorities. 65 Professor Law-
rence apparently shares this view.
On the other end of the spectrum, where expression may be prohib-
ited, traditional civil libertarians agree with Professor Lawrence that the
first amendment should not necessarily protect targeted individual har-
assment just because it happens to use the vehicle of speech. The ACLU
maintains this non-absolutist position, for example, with regard to sexu-
ally harassing speech on campus or in the workplace. The ACLU re-
cently adopted a policy that specifically addresses racist harassment on
campus, 66 and it previously had adopted analogous policies concerning
sexual harassment on campus and in the workplace. These earlier poli-
cies recognize that unlawful sex discrimination can consist of words spe-
cifically directed to a particular individual-words that undermine the
individual's continued ability to function as a student or employee. With
regard to sexual harassment on campus, ACLU policy provides:
College[s] and universities should take those steps necessary to prevent
the abuse of power which occurs... where a pattern and practice of
sexual conduct or sexually demeaning or derogatory comments is di-
rected at a specific student or gender [and] has definable consequences
for the student that demonstrably hinders her or his learning experi-
ence as a student. This policy does not extend to verbal harassment
that has no other effect on its recipient than to create an unpleasant
learning environment.67
As the last sentence of this policy emphasizes, the ACLU demands
evidence that harassing speech causes verifiable harm that directly inter-
feres with a student's education in a more tangible, specific manner than
creating an "unpleasant environment." A parallel limiting concept is
embodied in the ACLU's definition of verbal sexual harassment in the
workplace as:
[E]xpression ... directed at a specific employee [that] has definable
consequences for the individual victim that demonstrably hinders or
completely prevents her or his continuing to function as an employee.
64. Collin, 578 F.2d at 1197.
65. For an elaboration of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 408-34.
I use the term "minorities" rather than "people of color" because the groups I intend to signify
include those differentiated by characteristics other than race or ethnicity, such as religion, sexual
orientation, or physical disability. I recognize, however, that the term "minorities" may "impl[y] a
certain delegitimacy in a majoritarian system" and in fact describes groups that in the aggregate are
a majority. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404 n.4 (1987).
66. See supra note 11.
67. ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 11, at Policy No. 72; see also supra note II and Appendix,
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Ordinarily these would be the sort of consequences that could give rise
to an action for civil damages or a claim for workers' compensation,
unemployment compensation or sick leave. This policy does not ex-
tend to verbal harassment that has no other effect on its recipient than
to create an unpleasant working environment.68
These ACLU policies recognize that conduct that infringes on the right
to equal educational (or employment) opportunities, regardless of gender
(or other invidious classifications) should not be condoned simply be-
cause it includes expressive elements.
To be sure, there is no clear boundary between speech that "demon-
strably hinders" a learning (or working) experience and speech that "cre-
ates an unpleasant learning" (or working) environment. Accordingly,
even civil libertarians who agree that this is the appropriate line to draw
between unprotected and protected speech in the harassment context still
would be expected to disagree about whether particular speech fell on
one side of this boundary or the other. Moreover, some civil libertarians
might endorse broader definitions of unprotected harassing speech, 69
whereas others might insist on narrower definitions. 70 However, the es-
sential underlying point still stands: In the analogous context of regulat-
ing sexually harassing speech, traditional civil libertarians share what
Professor Lawrence describes as a "moderate" perspective with regard to
racially harassing speech-i.e., that such speech should be neither abso-
lutely protected nor absolutely prohibited. 71
68. ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 11, at Policy No. 316.
69. See supra note 11.
70. See, eg., F. HAIMAN, supra note 59, at 148-56 (would limit sanctions for verbal infliction of
emotional distress to cases of injury through intentional factual misrepresentation).
71. See C. Lawrence, Presentation at ACLU Biennial Conference, supra note t, at 7. The
Supreme Court applies a more searching degree of scrutiny to race-based discrimination than to
gender-based discrimination. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) ("strict
scrutiny" standard applies to race discrimination claims) with Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
("intermediate scrutiny" standard applies to gender discrimination claims). Moreover, at least since
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court consistently has enforced the
equal protection clause with particular vigor in the context of promoting racial equality in education.
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983) ("An unbroken line of cases follow-
ing Brown v. Board of Education establishes beyond doubt this Court's view that racial discrimina-
tion in education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as well as rights of
individuals."). Therefore, the ACLU rationale for treating some verbal harassment of students as
prohibited gender-based discrimination, coupled with Supreme Court decisions, warrants treating
some expressive conduct as prohibited race-based discrimination.
Professor Lawrence inexplicably asserts that "the suggestion" that the ACLU "adopt a policy
concerning racist speech on campus .... [t]hus far.., has not found widespread support within the
ranks of the organization." Lawrence, at 478 n.163. He cites no support for this assertion, nor is
there any. Since no poll has been undertaken of the approximately 300,000 members who constitute
the ACLU's "ranks," it would be impossible to prove any generalization about their position on the
indicated suggestion. Moreover, three ACLU affiliates have adopted a policy that does not oppose
campus regulations of certain verbal harassment. See supra note 11 and Appendix.
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Specifically in the context of racist speech, the ACLU has recog-
nized that otherwise punishable conduct should not be shielded simply
because it relies in part on words. Some examples were provided by
ACLU President Norman Dorsen:
During the Skokie episode, the ACLU refused to defend a Nazi who
was prosecuted for offering a cash bounty for killing a Jew. The re-
ward linked the speech to action in an impermissible way. Nor would
we defend a Nazi (or anyone else) whose speech interfered with a Jew-
ish religious service, or who said, "There's a Jew; let's get him." 72
The foregoing ACLU positions are informed by established princi-
ples that govern the protectibility of speech. Under these principles,
speech may be regulated if it is an essential element of violent or unlawful
conduct, 73 if it is likely to cause an immediate injury by its very utter-
ance,74 and if it is addressed to a "captive audience" unable to avoid
assaultive messages.7 5 It should be stressed that each of these criteria is
ambiguous and difficult to apply in particular situations. Accordingly,
the ACLU would insist that these exceptions to free speech be strictly
construed and would probably find them to be satisfied only in rare fac-
tual circumstances. 76 Nevertheless, ACLU policies expressly recognize
that if certain speech fits within these narrow parameters, then it could
be regulable.77
72. Dorsen, Is There a Right to Stop Offensive Speech? The Case of the Nazis in Skokie, in
CIVIL LmERTIES IN CONFLTCT 133-34 (L. Gostin ed. 1988); see also A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 89.
90.
73. The law may sanction crimes and torts accomplished by words without violating the first
amendment, although it is sometimes hard to distinguish between protected expression advocating
the commission of criminal or civil offenses and unprotected expression that actually constitutes an
element of such offenses. See generally Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J.
645 (examining the tension between the protective approach to advocacy of crime taken by the
Supreme Court and criminal code solicitation provisions). Crimes and torts that may consist pri-
marily of words include bribery, fraud, and libel. See infra note 321 (sex-designated advertisements
for jobs or housing are unprotected, as integral elements of proscribed discriminatory conduct).
74. This category is illustrated by Oliver Wendell Holmes' proverbial example of "falsely
shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
This theory also is invoked to justify regulating "fighting words" and group defamation. See infra
text accompanying notes 116-51 & 165-75. Although the ACLU has no policy expressly addressing
the fighting words doctrine, it explicitly rejects group defamation laws as inconsistent with the first
amendment. See ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 11, at Policy No. 6(c).
75. See L. TRIBE, supra note 58, § 12-18, at 941.
76. There is no basis for Professor Lawrence's implication that traditional civil libertarians
might support "less protection [for captive audiences] when they are held captive by racist speak-
ers." Lawrence, at 438. Compare supra text accompanying notes 56-59 (Professor Lawrence incor-
rectly suggests that traditional civil libertarians would support less constitutional protection for
racist fighting words than for other fighting words).
77. Regarding speech that is an essential element of unlawful conduct, the ACLU Policy
Guide, supra note 11, at Policy No. 16, states that, "[Tihere is ... [a] need for the regulation of
selling practices to minimize fraud, deception, and misrepresentations .... If the sale or transaction
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The captive audience concept in particular is an elusive and chal-
lenging one to apply. As Professor Tribe cautioned, this concept "is dan-
gerously encompassing, and the Court has properly been reluctant to
accept its implications whenever a regulation is not content-neutral. 78
Noting that we are "often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home
and subject to objectionable speech," 79 the Court has ruled that, in public
places, we bear the burden of averting our attention from expression we
find offensive.80 Otherwise, the Court explained, "a majority [could] si-
lence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections." 81 The
Court has been less reluctant to apply the captive audience concept to
is one that can be validly regulated or prohibited, then communications that are an integral part of
such a sale or transaction can be regulated."
Regarding speech that can cause an immediate injury by its very utterance, see ACLU Policy
Guide, supra note 11, at Policy No. 6 (accepts limitations on expression -that creates "clear and
present danger" of immediate unlawful action); id. at Policy No. 37 (recognizing that, under strictly
limited circumstances, certain lawsuits may be brought for libel and invasion of privacy through
speech without violating first amendment).
Regarding captive audiences, the ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 11, at Policy No. 43, states
that:
[The First Amendment is not inconsistent with reasonable regulations designed to restrict
sensory intrusions so intense as to be assaultive. Reasonable regulations are those that
apply only to time, place and manner without regard to content.... What constitutes a
"reasonable" regulation will necessarily vary depending upon such factors as (1) the size of
the... area involved, (2) the duration [or] frequency with which an individual is in the
area .... or (3) the extent to which alternatives exist so that the individual can reasonably
be called upon to avoid the area. . . . Assaultive sensory intrusions are those that are
objectionable to the average person because of an excessive degree of intensity, e.g., volume
or brightness, and which cannot be avoided.
In larger public spaces... all communication is permitted unless it interferes with the
primary purpose of the space ....
In open public areas... people are able to move away from communication which
they consider offensive. So long as there is ample public space[ ] where communication is
unrestricted, the government may creat[sic] and maintain reasonably limited sanctuaries in
public places where people can go for quiet and contemplation.
78. L. TRIBE, supra note 58, § 12-19, at 949-50 n.24. For an argument that the captive audi-
ence concept should be construed narrowly, see Haiman, Speech v. Privacy" Is There a Right Not to
be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 153, 184 (1972). Haiman argues that:
[H]uman beings have a significant ability mentally to reject many assaultive stimuli. The
process known as "selective perception" enables us to generally choose what we wish to
assimilate from the multitude of sensory bombardments surrounding us.... [W]e also
have a strong tendency to screen out or distort messages that are inconsistent with.., our
current beliefs.
Given these tendencies . . . . one might argue that the possibilities of unwelcome
messages penetrating the psychological armor of unwilling audiences are so small that we
ought to be worrying more about how to help unpopular communicators get through to
reluctant listeners than how to give further protection from speech to those who already
know too well how to isolate themselves from alien ideas.
79. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
80. See, eg., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (ordinance banning movies
showing nudity on drive-in screens visible from street could not be upheld to protect sensibilities of
involuntary passers-by); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (Individuals offended by expres-
sion on defendant's jacket worn in courthouse corridor "could effectively avoid further bombard-
ment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.").
81. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
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private homes.82 However, the Court has held that even in the home,
free speech values may outweigh privacy concerns, requiring individuals
to receive certain unwanted communications. 83
The Court's application of the captive audience doctrine illustrates
the general notion that an important factor in determining the protection
granted to speech is the place where it occurs.84 At one extreme, certain
public places-such as public parks-have been deemed "public fo-
rums," where freedom of expression should be especially protected. 5 At
the other extreme, some private domains-such as residential build-
ings-have been deemed places where freedom of expression should be
subject to restriction in order to guard the occupants' privacy and tran-
quillity.8 6 In between these two poles, certain public areas might be held
not to be public forums because the people who occupy them might be
viewed as "captive. 87
The foregoing principles that govern the permissibility of speech
regulations in general should guide our analysis of the permissibility of
particular speech regulations in the academic setting. The Supreme
Court has declared that within the academic environment freedom of
expression should receive heightened protection8 8 and that "a university
82. See, eg., Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737 (upholding addressee's statutory right to compel mailer of
material which is deemed erotic, at addressee's sole discretion, to remove addressee's name from
mailing list and stop all future mailings); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (upholding
ordinance proscribing use of sound trucks in "loud and raucous" manner, in part because individual
in his home is "practically helpless to escape" noise).
83. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (Court
rejected captive audience objection to utility company's insertion of materials advocating nuclear
power development in its billings, reasoning that customers could "escape exposure to the objection-
able material simply by transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket").
84. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1177-
1201, 1267-73 (1986).
85. See L. TRIBE, supra note 58, § 12-20, at 955-65.
86. See supra note 82; see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) ("Preserving the
sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the tribula-
tions of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value.... Protecting the well-being, tranquility,
and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.").
87. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (plurality opinion) (transit
system advertising space not public forums, because users were captive audience); id. at 306-07
(Douglas, J., concurring). But see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (residential neighbor-
hood streets are public forum).
88. See, eg., Sweeney v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("Teachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understand-
ing; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die."). See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (the classroom is "peculiarly the marketplace of ideas"); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (nowhere are constitutional freedoms more vital than in American schools).
In University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990), the Court said that these earlier cases did
not protect a university from disclosing to the EEOC confidential peer review materials regarding
the tenure candidacy of a former faculty member who allegedly had suffered race- and gender-based
discrimination. However, the Court acknowledged "the crucial role universities play in the dissemi-
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campus... possesses many of the characteristics of a traditional public
forum."8' 9 These considerations would suggest that hate speech should
receive special protection within the university community. Conversely,
Professor Mari Matsuda argues that equality guarantees and other prin-
ciples that might weigh in favor of prohibiting racist speech also are par-
ticularly important in the academic contextY0
The appropriate analysis is more complex than either set of general-
izations assumes. In weighing the constitutional concerns of free speech,
equality, and privacy that hate speech regulations implicate, deci-
sionmakers must take into account the particular context within the uni-
versity in which the speech occurs. For example, the Court's
generalizations about the heightened protection due free speech in the
academic world certainly are applicable to some campus areas, such as
parks, malls, or other traditional gathering places. The generalizations,
however, may not be applicable to other areas, such as students' dormi-
tory rooms. These rooms constitute the students' homes. Accordingly,
under established free speech tenets, students should have the right to
avoid being exposed to others' expression by seeking refuge in their
rooms.
9 1
Some areas on campus present difficult problems concerning the ap-
propriate level of speech protection because they share characteristics of
both private homes and public forums. For example, one could argue
that hallways, common rooms, and other common areas in dormitory
buildings constitute extensions of the individual students' rooms. 92 On
the other hand, one could argue that these common areas constitute
traditional gathering places and should be regarded as public forums,
open to expressive activities at least by all dormitory residents if not by
nation of ideas in our society," id at 585, and it reaffirmed an "academic-freedom right against
governmental attempts to influence the content of academic speech," id. at 586.
89. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985); see also
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 & n.5 (1981) (through policy of accommodating students'
meetings, public university created open forum for student groups).
90. See Matsuda, supra note 13. Professor Matsuda states that:
Many of the new adults who come to live and study at the major universities are away from
home for the first time, and at a vulnerable stage of psychological development. Students
are particularly dependent on the university for community, for intellectual development,
and for self-definition. Official tolerance of racist speech in this setting is more harmful
than generalized tolerance in the community-at-large. It is harmful to student perpetrators
in that it is a lesson in getting-away-with-it that will have lifelong repercussions. It is
harmful to targets, who perceive the university as taking sides through inaction, and who
are left to their own resources in coping with the damage wrought. Finally, it is a harm to
the goals of inclusion, education, development of knowledge, and ethics that universities
exist and stand for. Lessons of cynicism and hate replace lessons in critical thought and
inquiry.
Id. at 2370-71 (footnotes omitted).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
92. Professor Lawrence so argues, see Lawrence, at 456.
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the broader community. Such an argument would derive general sup-
port from Supreme Court decisions that uphold the free speech rights of
demonstrators in residential neighborhoods on the theory that an indi-
vidual resident's right of stopping "the flow of information into [his or
her] household" does not allow him to impede the flow of this same in-
formation to his neighbors. 93 The Supreme Court, however, recently de-
clined to resolve the specific issue of whether university dormitories
constitute public fo.-ums for free speech purposes.94
Even in the areas of the university reserved for academic activities,
such as classrooms, the calculus to determine the level of speech protec-
tion is complex. On the one hand, the classroom is the quintessential
"marketplace of ideas," 95 which should be open to the vigorous and ro-
bust exchange of even insulting or offensive words, on the theory that
such an exchange ultimately will benefit not only the academic commu-
nity, but also the larger community, in its pursuit of knowledge and
understanding.96
On the other hand, some minority students 97 contend that in the
long run, the academic dialogue might be stultified rather than stimu-
lated by the inclusion of racist speech. They maintain that such speech
not only interferes with equal educational opportunities, but also deters
the exercise of other freedoms, including those secured by the first
93. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,420 (1971) (invalidating injunction
against leafletting in suburban residential areas as unjustified prior restraint); see also Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (in upholding ordinance regulating residential picketing, Court
stressed that it prohibited only focused picketing in front of single residence; no broader-gauged
picketing was prohibited).
94. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3031 n.2 (1989). The district court in the
same case had characterized these dormitories as "limited public forums." Fox v. Board of Trustees,
649 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
95. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
96. See Schmidt, Freedom of Thought: A Principle in Peril?, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Oct. 1989,
at 66 ("On some other campuses in this country, values of civility and community have been offered
by some as paramount values of the university, even to the point of superseding freedom of expres-
sion. Such a view is wrong in principle, and, if extended, disastrous to freedom of thought.").
97. It should be stressed that not all minorities take this position, or support campus hate
speech regulations. See supra note 21. In any event, even if a majority of a particular group sup-
ported a certain position, this would not necessarily mean that the position was correct in any sense,
including in the sense that it advanced the group's self-interest. Justice Brennan, in a dissenting
opinion in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2490 (1990), recently made this
point in another constitutional context:
I would hazard a guess that today's opinion will be received favorably by a majority of our
society, who would willingly suffer the minimal intrusion of a sobriety checkpoint stop in
order to prevent drunk driving. But consensus that a particular law enforcement technique
serves a laudable purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis....
.. "Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials-perhaps
even supported by a majority of citizens-may be tempted to conduct searches that sacri-
fice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the perceived evil."
Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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amendment.98 Professor Lawrence argues that, as a consequence of hate
speech, minority students are deprived of the opportunity to participate
in the academic interchange, and that the exchange is impoverished by
their exclusion.99 It must be emphasized, though, that expression subject
to regulation on this rationale would have to be narrowly defined in order
to protect the free flow of ideas that is vital to the academic community;
thus, much expression would remain unregulated-expression which
could be sufficiently upsetting to interfere with students' educational
opportunities. 100
Another factor that might weigh in favor of imposing some regula-
tions on speech in class is that students arguably constitute a captive
audience.101 This characterization is especially apt when the course is
required and class attendance is mandatory. Likewise, the case for regu-
lation becomes more compelling the more power the racist speaker
wields over the audience.' 02 For example, the law should afford students
98. See Letter from David Lee (a Stanford law student writing on behalf of Asian Law Students
Association, Black Law Students Association, Jewish Law Students Association, Native American
Law Students Association and Asian American Students Association) to Student Conduct Legisla-
tive Council (May 8, 1989), reprinted in Stanford Univ. Campus Rep., May 10, 1989, at 13. Lee
stated that:
Those most concerned about having the [university rule] cover attacks against minority
students that take the form of discriminatory speech are not advocating reduction in the
freedom of speech. Rather, they are advocating more freedom of speech, more vigorous
debate .... [R]acist speech [is] designed to silence the recipients of the speech, not to
encourage them to debate. Racist speech silences its victims by warning them that they
will suffer some kind of harm if they dare to speak up for their rights to work for economic
success, to try to get a quality education, or to take part in the political process.
See also Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2337 ("In order to avoid receiving hate messages, victims have
had to quit jobs, forgo education, leave their homes, avoid certain public places, curtail their own
exercise of speech rights, and otherwise modify their behavior and demeanor.").
99. See Lawrence, at 437, 456, 471. Professor Lawrence also makes a related point that the
marketplace of ideas is distorted, to the detriment of the entire community, by the inclusion of racist
speech. See id. at 467-71.
100. See Grano, supra note 8. Grano stated that:
One of the harms posited in the University of Michigan case was that some students found
the speech at issue so upsetting that they had difficulty concentrating on their studies. The
same harm could be posited, of course, in many other circumstances. During the Vietnam
War, for example, the frequent and often caustic antiwar protests, which sometimes even
expressed support for those whom the United States was fighting, may have extremely
upset students who had served in battle, who had lost family members or friends in the
war, or who simply believed that an unwavering loyalty was owed to their country. Simi-
larly, many students, especially on segregated campuses in the South, may have been
deeply disturbed by the civil rights protests gripping the nation and many universities dur-
ing the 1960s.
Id. at 17.
101. Professor Lawrence so argues. See Lawrence, at 456-57.
102. See, eg., Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 741, 565 P.2d 1173, 1176
(1977) (reversing lower court's dismissal of Mexican-American employee's suit claiming he had been
subject to racist slurs on the job, the court noted, "[W]hen one in a position of authority, actual or
apparent, over another has allegedly made racial slurs and jokes and comments, this abusive conduct
gives added impetus to the claim").
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special protection from racist insults directed at them by their
professors. 10
3
Even if various areas of a university are not classified as public fo-
rums, and even if occupants of such areas are designated captive audi-
ences, any speech regulations in these areas still would be invalid if they
discriminated on the basis of a speaker's viewpoint. Viewpoint-based dis-
crimination constitutes the most egregious form of censorship'0 4 and al-
most always violates the first amendment.'05 Accordingly, viewpoint
discrimination is proscribed even in regulations that govern non-public
forum government property0 6 and regulations that protect captive
audiences. 107
Many proposed or adopted campus hate speech regulations consti-
tute unconstitutional discrimination against particular views, either as
they are written or as they are applied. This is a constitutional defect of
the rule advocated by Professor Lawrence, for example.' 0 8 He endorsed
a variation on the Stanford regulation that expressly would have ex-
The ACLU's policy endorsing restrictions on a limited category of verbal sexual harassment on
campus is confined to situations that involve "the abuse of power." See supra text accompanying
note 67.
103. Speech by professors or administrators of public universities might be distinguishable from
that of other members of university communities on the ground that it is arguably government
speech, and hence subject to greater regulation. See infra text accompanying notes 299-302. How-
ever, faculty members and administrators have free speech rights of their own, which would weigh
against government regulation. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d. 566 (2d Cir 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1973); Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d. 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 392
(1973); Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Lib-
erty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59 (E. Pincoffs ed. 1975); Van Alstyne, The Consti-
tutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841. Moreover, university students
should not necessarily view the speech of such individuals as representing the government's position,
as opposed to that of the individuals. See generally Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public
university students should recognize that state does not necessarily endorse speech by school-ap-
proved student organization meeting on campus). In any event, both public and private universities
should encourage all their employees to be sensitive to the feelings and concerns of minority group
members and to voluntarily couch their speech accordingly. See infra text accompanying notes 403-
05.
104. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978); Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976).
105. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) ("a
desire... to exclude the expression of certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas" is
"plainly illegitimate" absent a demonstrated compelling state interest).
106. See, eg., United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3121 (1990); Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 43 (1983).
107. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 305 (1974); American Booksellers
Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 333 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
108. See supra note 24.
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cluded speech directed at "dominant majority groups."' 1 9 Despite the
absence of explicit viewpoint discrimination in the rule that Stanford
adopted, the chair of the committee that propounded this rule indicated
that, as applied, it would effect viewpoint discrimination.' 10 Professor
Lawrence concedes that the Stanford code is facially content discrimina-
tory,"' and, as applied, probably viewpoint discriminatory as well."12
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the question whether any
particular racist speech should be subject to regulation is a fact-specific
inquiry.1 13 We cannot define particular words as inherently off limits,
but rather we must examine every word in the overall context in which it
is uttered.' 1 4
B. Particular Speech-Limiting Doctrines Potentially Applicable to
Campus Hate Speech
In addition to the foregoing general principles, Professor Lawrence
and other proponents of campus hate speech regulation invoke three spe-
cific doctrines in an attempt to justify such rules: the fighting words doc-
trine; the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress; and the tort
of group defamation. 1 5 As the following discussion shows, the Supreme
109. Lawrence, at 450 n.82. For the problems of equality and enforceability that this exception
would cause, see infra note 387.
110. See Hentoff, Stanford and the Speech Police, Wash. Post, July 21, 1990, at A19, col. 1.
Hentoff stated that:
During a debate in the Faculty Senate, Professor Michael Bratman offered a hypothetical:
in an angry exchange with a white student, a black student calls him a "honky SOB." I
assume, said Bratman, that language would be prohibited.
"No," said Professor [Robert] Rabin [a law professor who chairs the Student Conduct
Legislative Council, which propounded the code]. The proposed speech standard takes the
position, Rabin explained, that the white majority as a whole is not in as much need of
protection from discriminatory harassing speech as are those who have suffered
discrimination.
"Calling a white a 'honky,'" Rabin said, "is not the same as calling a black a
'nigger.'"
111. The prohibition against content bias, the suppression of expression about an entire subject,
was an outgrowth of the core prohibition against viewpoint bias. See Stone, Restrictions on Speech
Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81
(1978). See also infra note 246 (discussing presumptive unconstitutionality of content-based speech
regulations).
112. See Lawrence, at 451 n.83.
113. See L. TRIBE, supra note 58, § 12-10, at 853-54 (When government suppresses what would
otherwise be constitutionally protected speech because of imminent violence, "the result is necessar-
ily sensitive to even slight variations in the facts of the particular case.").
114. See id. § 12-10, at 850 (modern Court has rejected assumption of original "fighting words"
doctrine, that certain words could be proscribed regardless of context in which they were used).
115. The University of Michigan based its rule on yet another approach, which focused on stig-
matization and victimization of students, interference with academic efforts, and the creation of an
intimidating or hostile educational environment. In Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852
(E.D. Mich. 1989), this rule was held to violate the first amendment. Accordingly, some universities
that had been considering a similar approach have apparently abandoned it in response to the Doe
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Court has recognized that each of these doctrines may well be inconsis-
tent with free speech principles. Therefore, these doctrines may not sup-
port any campus hate speech restrictions whatsoever. In any event, they
at most would support only restrictions that are both narrowly drawn
and narrowly applied.
1. Fighting Words. The fighting words doctrine is the principal
model for the Stanford code, which Professor Lawrence supports. 1 6
However, this doctrine provides a constitutionally shaky foundation for
several reasons: it has been substantially limited in scope and may no
longer be good law; even if the Supreme Court were to apply a narrowed
version of the doctrine, such an application would threaten free speech
principles; and, as actually implemented, the fighting words doctrine sup-
presses protectible speech and entails the inherent danger of discrimina-
tory application to speech by members of minority groups and dissidents.
Although the Court originally defined constitutionally regulable
fighting words in fairly broad terms in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 117
subsequent decisions have narrowed the definition to such a point that
the doctrine probably would not apply to any of the instances of campus
racist speech that Professor Lawrence and others seek to regulate. As
originally formulated in Chaplinsky, the fighting words doctrine ex-
cluded from first amendment protection "insulting or 'fighting' words,
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace."118
In light of subsequent developments, it is significant to note that the
first prong of Chaplinsky's fighting words definition, words "which by
their very utterance inflict injury," was dictum. The Court's actual hold-
ing was that the state statute at issue was justified by the state's interest
in preserving the public peace by prohibiting "words likely to cause an
average addressee to fight." 119 The Court stressed that "no words were
forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence
ruling. See Report of President's Ad Hoc Committee on Racial Harassment, University of Texas at
Austin 17 (Nov. 27, 1989) [hereinafter University of Texas Report] (authored by committee chaired
by Mark G. Yudof, Dean and James A. Elkins Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas School
of Law) ("For all of the reasons identified by the [Doe] court, [this] Committee early on abandoned
the idea of recommending a racial harassment policy grounded in the Michigan approach. After the
court's decision, a number of other universities withdrew similar policies, thus corroborating the
Committee's decision."). But see supra note 61 (University of Wisconsin adopted a rule similar to
the one adopted by the University of Michigan). For a discussion of the constitutional flaws in the
Michigan-Wisconsin approach, see infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
116. See Lawrence, at 450-51. See also infra text accompanying note 197.
117. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
118. Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 573.
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by the person to whom, individually, [they are] addressed." 120 The
Court also held that the statute had been applied appropriately to Mr.
Chaplinsky, who had called a city marshal "a God damned racketeer"
and "a damned Fascist." 121 It explained that these "epithets [are] likely
to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach
of the peace." 122
In Gooding v. Wilson, the Court substantially narrowed Chaplin-
sky's definition of fighting words by bringing that definition into line with
Chaplinsky's actual holding.1 23 In Gooding, as well as in every subse-
quent fighting words case, the Court disregarded the dictum in which the
first prong of Chaplinsky's definition was set forth and treated only those
words that "tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" as fighting
words. Consistent with this narrowed definition, the Court has invali-
dated regulations that hold certain words to be per se proscribable and
insisted that each challenged utterance be evaluated contextually. 124
Thus, under the Court's current view, even facially valid laws that re-
strict fighting words may be applied constitutionally only in circum-
stances where their utterance almost certainly will lead to immediate
violence. 125 Professor Tribe described this doctrinal development as, in
effect, incorporating the clear and present danger test into the fighting
words doctrine. 126
120. Id.
121. Id. at 569.
122. Id. at 574.
123. 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972) (where appellant had said to police officers, "White son of a bitch,
I'll kill you," "You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death," and "You son of a bitch, if you ever put
your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces," Court reversed conviction under law that it found
overbroad in light of Chaplinsky).
124. See, e.g., Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924 (1974); Rosen v. California, 416 U.S.
924 (1974); Kelly v. Ohio, 416 U.S. 923 (1974); Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974); Brown v.
Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New
Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972). Professor Lawrence twice states that Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971), quoted approvingly Chaplinsky's language that certain words could be classified as unpro-
tected fighting words per se, without regard to the circumstances in which they were uttered. See
Lawrence, at 437 n.29, 453 n.92. But this citation does not support the continuing validity of that
language, in light of the Court's subsequent rulings in Gooding and other fighting words cases.
125. See, eg., Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 699 (1974) (per curiam) (reversing contempt
of court conviction for witness' use of word "chickenshit," since there was no showing that it posed
imminent threat to administration ofjustice); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam)
(reversing disorderly conduct conviction where statement during antiwar demonstration--"We'll
take the fucking street later [or again]"-was not directed at any particular person or group and
there was no showing that violence was imminent).
126. L. TRIBE, supra note 58, § 12-18, at 929 & n.9. A strictly limited fighting words concept is
consistent with the views of Zechariah Chafee, whose writings provided the definition of "fighting
words" that the Court adopted in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572. See Z.
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 151-52 (1941). In the same book, shortly after the
passage proposing this definition, Chafee qualified his account of fighting words:
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In accordance with its narrow construction of constitutionally per-
missible prohibitions upon "fighting words," the Court has overturned
every single fighting words conviction that it has reviewed since Chaplin-
sky. 127 Moreover, in a subsequent decision, the Court overturned an in-
junction that had been based on the very word underlying the Chaplinsky
conviction. 128
For the foregoing reasons, Supreme Court Justices 129 and constitu-
tional scholars persuasively maintain that Chaplinsky's fighting words
doctrine is no longer good law.130 More importantly, constitutional
scholars have argued that this doctrine should no longer be good law, for
This breach of peace theory is peculiarly liable to abuse when applied against unpopular
expressions and practices. It makes a man a criminal simply because his neighbors have no
self-control.... Thus... these crimes of injurious words must be kept within very narrow
limits if they are not to give excessive opportunities for outlawing heterodox ideas.
Id.
127. See supra notes 124-25.
128. Compare Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943) (use of word
"fascist" is "part of the conventional give-and-take in our economic and political controversies" and
hence protected under federal labor law) with Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573-74 (conviction affirmed on
ground that words "God damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist," when addressed to police of-
ficer, were likely to provoke violent response). See also Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Lia-
bilityfor Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (1985). The
author stated that:
The principle that the advocacy of ideas is subject to regulation when such advocacy is
intended to and likely to incite immediate violence remains good law. The continued valid-
ity of the application of this principle to the facts in Chaplinsky, however, is questionable
because the addressee in Chaplinsky was a police officer. It is possible that the Court
would now hold that because of his special training, the likelihood of a police officer re-
sponding violently is too remote for words addressed to a police officer to constitute "fight-
ing" words.
Id. at 1768 n.98 (citations omitted). Accord Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring) (suggested that Court should apply separate standard when addressee of
alleged fighting words is police officer).
129. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 537 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Burger,
C.J.) ("ihe Court, despite its protestations to the contrary, is merely paying lip service to
Chaplinsky. ").
130. See, eg., Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 531, 536 (1980) (post-
Chaplinsky Supreme Court decisions have rendered fighting words doctrine "nothing more than a
quaint remnant of an earlier morality that has no place in a democratic society dedicated to the
principle of free expression"); Shea, "Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That"--Fighting
Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1975) ("majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
has gradually concluded that fighting words, no matter how narrowly defined, are a protected form
of speech"). See also Letter from Professor Gerald Gunther to Professor George Parker, Chair of
the Student Conduct Legislative Council at Stanford University (May 1, 1989), reprinted in Stanford
Univ. Campus Rep., May 3, 1989, at 18 [hereinafter Gunther letter (May 1, 1989)]. In his letter,
Professor Gunther stated that:
[T]here has been only one case in the history of the Supreme Court in which a majority of
the Justices has ever found a statement to be a punishable resort to "fighting words."
(That case was Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, a nearly 50-year-old case involving words
which would very likely not be found punishable today.) More important, in the nearly
half-century since Chaplinsky, there have been repeated appeals to the Court to recognize
the applicability of the "fighting words" exception .... [I]n every one of the subsequent
attempted reliances on that exception, the Supreme Court has refused to affirm the chal-
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reasons that are particularly weighty in the context of racist slurs.131
First, as Professor Gard concluded in a comprehensive review of both
Supreme Court and lower court decisions that apply the fighting words
doctrine, the asserted governmental interest in preventing a breach of the
peace is not logically furthered by this doctrine. He explained that:
[I]t is fallacious to believe that personally abusive epithets, even if ad-
dressed face-to-face to the object of the speaker's criticism, are likely to
arouse the ordinary law abiding person beyond mere anger to uncon-
trollable reflexive violence. Further, even if one unrealistically as-
sumes that reflexive violence will result, it is unlikely that the fighting
words doctrine can successfully deter such lawless conduct. 132
Second, just as the alleged peace-preserving purpose does not ration-
ally justify the fighting words doctrine in general, that rationale also fails
to justify the fighting words doctrine when applied to racial slurs in par-
ticular. As Professor Kalven noted, "outbursts of violence are not the
necessary consequence of such speech and, more important, such vio-
lence when it does occur is not the serious evil of the speech." a13 3 Rather,
as Professor Lawrence stresses, the serious evil of racial slurs consists of
the ugliness of the ideas they express and the psychic injury they cause to
their addressees.' 3 4 Therefore, the fighting words doctrine does not ad-
dress and will not prevent the injuries caused by campus racist speech.
Even if there were a real danger that racist or other fighting words
would cause reflexive violence, and even if that danger would be reduced
by the threat of legal sanction, the fighting words doctrine still would be
problematic in terms of free speech principles. As Professor Chafee ob-
served, this doctrine "makes a man a criminal simply because his neigh-
bors have no self-control and cannot refrain from violence."' 35 In other
contexts, the Court appropriately has refused to allow the addressees of
speech to exercise such a "heckler's veto."' 136
lenged convictions. In short, one must wonder about the strength of an exception which,
while theoretically recognized, has ever since 1942 not been found apt in practice.
131. See, eg., Note, supra note 128, at 1757 n.44 (Chaplinsky may well reflect concerns peculiar
to the decade when it was decided, rather than enduring first amendment principles).
132. See Gard, supra note 130, at 580.
133. H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 14-15 (1965).
134. See Lawrence, at 457-76.
135. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 126, at 151.
136. See, eg., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (holding that there was constitu-
tionally insufficient evidence to support disorderly conduct convictions for civil rights demonstrators
who failed to disperse upon police order; Court refused to consider evidence noted by Justice Black
in dissent that hostile crowd of 1,000 spectators was growing unmanageable in spite of efforts of 100
uniformed police officers); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550 (1965) (reversed civil rights demon-
strators' breach of peace convictions, finding insufficient evidence to support local officials' claims
that spectator violence was imminent, where there were 100 to 300 "muttering" spectators); Termi-
niello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (where race-baiting speaker attracted "angry and turbulent"
crowd, Court reversed breach of peace conviction).
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The fighting words doctrine is constitutionally flawed for the addi-
tional reasons that it suppresses much protectible speech and that the
protectible speech of minority group members is particularly vulnerable.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's limitation of the doctrine's scope,
Professor Gard's survey reveals that the lower courts apply it much more
broadly. Since the Supreme Court only reviews a fraction of such cases,
the doctrine's actual impact on free speech must be assessed in terms of
these speech-restrictive lower court rulings. Professor Gard concluded
that, in the lower courts, the fighting words doctrine "is almost uni-
formly invoked in a selective and discriminatory manner by law enforce-
ment officials to punish trivial violations of a constitutionally
impermissible interest in preventing criticism of official conduct. 1 37 In-
deed, Professor Gard reported, "it is virtually impossible to find fighting
words cases that do not involve either the expression of opinion on issues
of public policy or words directed toward a government official, usually a
police officer."13 Even more disturbing is that the reported cases indi-
cate that blacks are often prosecuted and convicted for the use of fighting
words. 139 Thus, the record of the actual implementation of the fighting
words doctrine demonstrates that-as is the case with all speech restric-
tions-it endangers principles of equality as well as free speech.14° That
record substantiates the risk that such a speech restriction will be applied
discriminatorily and disproportionately against the very minority group
members whom it is intended to protect.141
137. Gard, supra note 130, at 580.
138. Id. at 548. Accord id at 568. Compare Lawrence, at 437 n.29 ("[T]here is no evidence that
the continued usage of [the fighting words doctrine] has led down the slippery slope to rampant
censorship.").
139. See, eg., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (state court upheld conviction
on basis of fighting words doctrine in situation in which police officer said to young suspect's mother,
"[g]et your black ass in the goddamned car," and she responded, "you god damn mother fucking
police-I am going to [the Superintendent of Police] about this."); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969) (black man who protested against shooting of civil rights leader James Meredith by burning
American flag and saying, "If they let that happen to Meredith we don't need an American flag,"
was convicted under statute that criminalized words casting contempt on United States flag;
Supreme Court rejected contention that conviction could be justified on fighting words rationale, id.
at 592); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (state court upheld convictions of civil
rights demonstrators for holding placards stating "I am proud to be a Negro" and "Down with
Segregation"; Supreme Court rejected contention that convictions could be justified on fighting
words doctrine); Waller v. City of St. Petersburg, 245 So. 2d 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), rev'd,
City of St. Petersburg v. Waller, 261 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1972) (black man was convicted for shouting
"pig" at passing police car, and state supreme court upheld conviction based on fighting words
doctrine).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 365-96.
141. See Gard, supra note 130, at 566 ("Many commentators have recognized that [the] problem
of discriminatory enforcement is particularly acute in the fighting words context. [One very real]
danger is . . . that the penal law will be selectively invoked against members of racial or other
minority groups and speakers who espouse ideological views unpopular with enforcement officials.")
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Professor Lawrence himself notes that many Supreme Court deci-
sions that overruled fighting words convictions involved a "potentially
offended party [who] was in a position of relative power when compared
with the speaker." 142 As Professor Gard demonstrated, for each such
conviction that was reviewed and overturned by the Supreme Court,
many others were not. 143 Thus, Professor Lawrence and other propo-
nents of Stanford's fighting words code must believe that the officials who
enforce that code will do so in a manner that differs from the general
enforcement pattern of similar regulations. They must have faith that
Stanford officials, as opposed to other officials, are unusually sensitive to
free speech rights in general, and to the free speech rights of minority
group members and dissidents in particular.
Based on his analysis of the actual application of the fighting words
doctrine, Professor Gard adheres to no such faith in the discretion of
officials. In response to another legal academic's suggestion that the
fighting words doctrine could be invoked to protect the aged and infirm
from "the vilest personal verbal abuse," 14 Professor Gard said that this
was "a romantic vision that exists only in the imagination of a law pro-
fessor." 145 Even assuming that Stanford officials might be unusually at-
tentive to free speech values when implementing the fighting words
doctrine, Stanford's use of that doctrine could fuel an increased use by
other officials, who might well fail to implement it in a speech-sensitive
fashion.146
Because of the problems with the fighting words doctrine, the com-
mittee that proposed a hate speech policy for the University of Texas
expressly declined to use it as a model. 47 Likewise, recognizing the
weakness of the public peace rationale, the proponents of the Stanford
code have attempted to reinvigorate the other rationale that the Supreme
Court enunciated in its Chaplinsky dictum, but has since abandoned-
the notion that such words inflict psychic or emotional injury by their
(footnote omitted). See also id at 571 (doctrine creates danger that the common meaning ascribed
to words by certain subcultures will be punished based on "myopic ethnocentricity" of officials who
enforce rules); Karst, Equality as a Central Prnciple in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 20,
38 (1975) ("[S]tatutes proscribing abusive words are applied to members of racial and political mi-
norities more frequently than can be wholly explained by any special proclivity of those people to
speak abusively.").
142. Lawrence, at 453 n.92.
143. See Gard, supra note 130, at 564.
144. Shea, supra note 130, at 22.
145. Gard, supra note 130, at 564.
146. Professor Lawrence recognizes the potential danger that any speech-restricting precedent
"would pose for the speech of all dissenters," and that such a dangerous precedent "might...
include general societal tolerance for the suppression of speech." Lawrence, at 458 & n.106.
147. See University of Texas Report, supra note 115, at 16-20.
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very utterance.1 48 But this attempted "solution" to the problems flowing
from the breach of the peace rationale causes another set of problems.
First, the Supreme Court has never relied upon Chaplinsky's psychic
harm dictum to sustain a fighting words conviction.1 49 Second, after it
pronounced that dictum, the Court issued a line of decisions protecting
speech that was allegedly offensive and that assertedly could have caused
emotional or psychic injury. 150 Consequently, as Professor Gard stated,
to revive Chaplinsky's long-since discredited second rationale "would
turn the constitutional clock back at least [fifty] years." 15'
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. A committee re-
port that the University of Texas is currently considering recommends
the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a
basis for regulating campus hate speech. 152 This doctrinal approach has
148. See Stanford Code and Comments, supra note 24, at 3. The pertinent part of the Stanford
Code and Comments states that:
The Supreme Court's phrase [in Chaplinsky] "insulting or 'fighting' words" is often short-
ened to simply "fighting words," an expression which... may... have certain misleading
connotations. First, the expression may imply that violence is considered an acceptable
response to discriminatory vilification .... Second, exclusive focus on the actual likeli-
hood of violence might suggest that opponents of controversial speech can transform it into
forbidden "fighting words" by plausibly threatening violent response to it.... Finally, the
"fighting words" terminology might be thought to imply that extreme forms of personal
abuse become protected speech simply bechuse the victims are, for example, such disci-
plined practitioners of non-violence... that they do not... pose an actual and imminent
threat of violent retaliation. Such a limitation might be appropriate under a breach of
peace statute, whose sole purpose is to prevent violence, but does not make sense in an anti-
discrimination provision such as this one.
149. See Gard, supra note 130, at 577.
150. See, eg., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409 (1990) (prosecution for burning
American flag in violation of Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777, held
inconsistent with First Amendment protection of expressive conduct); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46 (1988) (first and fourteenth amendments prohibit public figures from recovering dam-
ages for intentional infliction of emotional distress due to caricature publication without showing
false statements of fact made with "actual malice"); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)
(conviction for hanging flag upside down with peace symbol taped on held invalid; statute held to be
impermissible infringement on protected expression); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (first
and fourteenth amendments require state to show compelling reason to make public display of four-
letter expletive a criminal offense); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (Court reversed breach of peace conviction where race-baiting speaker
attracted "angry and turbulent" crowd). See also infra text accompanying note 164 (quoting pas-
sage from Hustler referring to Court's "longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because
the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience").
151. Gard, supra note 130, at 577.
152. See University of Texas Report, supra note 115, at 7 (defines prohibited "racial harass-
ment" as "extreme or outrageous acts or communications that are intended to harass, intimidate, or
humiliate a student or students on account of race, color, or national origin and that reasonably
cause them to suffer severe emotional distress").
The Report's proposal includes the following limitations on the availability of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress theory for barring speech: "racial harassment by communication
usually will require repeated verbal conduct," id.; liability should be found "only where the conduct
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a logical appeal because it focuses on the type of harm potentially caused
by racist speech that universities are most concerned with alleviating-
namely, emotional or psychological harm that interferes with studies. In
contrast, the harm at which the fighting words doctrine aims-potential
violence by the addressee against the speaker-is of less concern to most
universities.153
Traditional civil libertarians caution that the intentional infliction of
emotional distress theory should almost never apply to verbal harass-
ment.154 A major problem with this approach is that,
the innate vagueness of the interest in preventing emotional injury to
listeners suggests that any attempt at judicial enforcement will inevita-
bly result in the imposition of judges' subjective linguistic preferences
on society, discrimination against ethnic and racial minorities, and ulti-
mately the misuse of the rationale to justify the censorship of the ideo-
logical content of the speaker's message.' 55
Again, as was true for the fighting words doctrine, there is a particular
danger that this speech restrictive doctrine also will be enforced to the
detriment of the very minority groups whom it is designed to protect.
The general problems with the intentional inffiction of emotional
distress theory counsel against application in the campus context specifi-
has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community," id. at 14
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965)); "[t]he factual context is
critical to the judgment as to what acts and words are extreme and outrageous," id; the rule applies
"only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure
it," id. at 15 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965)); and the rule
would not apply to either "[a]bstract statements not addressed to particular listeners," id. at 20, or
"the assertion of opinions," id at 21.
153. See, eg., id. at 19-20. The Report stated that:
[S]evere emotional distress may be present even where the victim is unlikely to respond
with violence, and violence may occur even where the emotional harm is slight.
... [Under] the "fighting words" approach.... there is an incongruity between the
real reason for the policy (avoidance of racially discriminatory humiliation and emotional
distress) and the constitutional reason (avoidance of violence), the doctrinal box into which
the draftsmen are attempting to make the real reason fit. It is much preferable for a racial
harassment policy to focus on the real injury of severe emotional distress.
154. See F. HAIMAN, supra note 59, at 152-56. According to Franklyn Haiman, the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress endangers free speech: it involves "boundless subjectiv-
ity," id. at 152; subjects people to punishment because they violate "changing sensitivities" of partic-
ular community at particular time, id; perpetuates stereotyping, invites "radically unpredictable"
judicial decisionmaking, id at 153; and incorrectly assumes that all members of racial or other
groups have monolithic responses to challenged stimuli. Haiman recommends limiting such actions
to knowingly false communication. See also Note, supra note 128, at 1749-50 (extreme and outra-
geous language should be object of tort liability only when such language constitutes fighting words
or invades private area such as home; even latter speech should not be basis for tort recovery by
public official or public figure unless defendant made it impossible for such person to avert
attention).
155. Gard, supra note 130, at 578 (emphasis added).
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cally. 1 56 Citing these reasons, Stanford University declined to base its
hate speech regulation on this tort model.1 57 Moreover, even though the
University of Texas committee report concluded that the emotional dis-
tress approach was less problematical than the fighting words approach,
it cautioned: "[T]here can be no guarantee as to the constitutionality of
any university rule bearing on racial harassment and sensitive matters of
freedom of expression." 158
The position that the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort
should virtually never apply to words recently received support in Hus-
tler Magazine v. Falwell. 159 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unani-
mous Court, reversed a jury verdict which had awarded damages to the
nationally-known minister, Jerry Falwell, for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The Court held that a public figure may not "recover
damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an ad parody
offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of
most." 16 The Court further ruled that public figures and public officials
may not recover for this tort unless they could show that the publication
contains a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice,"
i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disre-
gard as to whether or not it was false. 161 In other words, the Court re-
quired public officials or public figures who claim intentional infliction of
156. See Report of Workshop on Racist and Sexist Speech on College and University Campuses,
Annenberg Washington Program of Northwestern University, Washington, D.C., at 3 (Apr. 12,
1990) [hereinafter Report of Annenberg Workshop] (available from author). The Report of the
Annenberg Workshop stated that:
Most members of the group had difficulty with the subjectivity involved in making judg-
ments on the basis of the emotional pain suffered by the targets of [hate speech]. No one
denied that real pain is often suffered and no one was unconcerned about the possible
personal consequences of such pain or its negative impact on equality of educational oppor-
tunity. But the prevailing view seemed to be that emotional pain, by itself, cannot be
measured with the precision and objectivity required of any rule restricting speech.
157. See Stanford Code and Comments, supra note 24, at 4. The pertinent part of the Code and
Comments stated that:
[The "emotional distress" rubric.... has drawbacks as the legal basis for a discriminatory
harassment regulation. It is less well established in free speech law than is the fighting
words concept. Further, taken as it is from tort law, it focuses primarily on the victim's
reaction to abuse .... We think it better in defining a disciplinary offense to focus on the
prohibited conduct; we prefer not to require the victims of personal vilification to display
their psychic scars in order to establish that an offense has been committed.
Notwithstanding its recognition of the constitutional weaknesses of the emotional distress approach,
Stanford adopted a rule that is modeled on the Chaplinsky dictum that also sought to protect against
emotional distress. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
158. University of Texas Report, supra note 115, at 13.
159. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
160. Id. at 50.
161. Id. at 56.
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emotional distress to satisfy the same heavy burden of proof it imposes
upon such individuals who bring defamation claims.1 62
Although the specific Falwell holding focused on public figure plain-
tiffs, much of the Court's language indicated that, because of first amend-
ment concerns, it would strictly construe the intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort in general, even when pursued by non-public
plaintiffs. For example, the Court said, to require a statement to be "out-
rageous" as a prerequisite for imposing liability did not sufficiently pro-
tect first amendment values. Because the "outrageousness" of the
challenged statement is a typical element of the tort (it is included in the
Restatement definition1 63) the Court's indication that it is constitution-
ally suspect has ramifications beyond the sphere of public figure actions.
The Court warned:
"Outrageousness" in the area of political and social discourse has an
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An "outrageousness"
standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages
to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience. 164
For the reasons signalled by the unanimous Supreme Court in Falwell,
any cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress that
arises from words must be narrowly framed and strictly applied in order
to satisfy first amendment dictates.
3. Group Defamation. Professor Lawrence does not elaborate on
either the constitutionality or efficacy of the group defamation concept,
yet he approvingly notes others' alleged support for it.165 The group def-
amation concept, however, has been thoroughly discredited by others.' 66
162. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
163. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 46 (1965).
164. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55.
165. See Lawrence, at 464 n. 124. But see Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the
First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629, 661-66 (1985) (argues that group defamation
statutes are unconstitutional except for face-to-face harassment of individual or small group, similar
to fighting words situation).
166. See, eg., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 271 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (the sugar-
coated label "group libel law" does not make censorship less deadly); id. at 284 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (regulation of speech must always meet clear and present danger test); see also id. at 277 (Reed,
J., dissenting); id. at 287 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 261
(1950); Comment, Race Defamation and the First Amendment, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 653 (1966). It
also is noteworthy that Professor Riesman, who wrote an influential series of articles advocating
group defamation laws in 1942, subsequently changed his position. See Riesman, Democracy and
Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment H, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1282 (1942); Riesman, Democ-
racy and Defamation; Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (1942); Riesman,
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First, group defamation regulations are unconstitutional in terms of
both Supreme Court doctrine and free speech principles. To be sure, the
Supreme Court's only decision that expressly reviewed the issue, Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 167 upheld a group libel statute against a first amend-
ment challenge. However, that 5-4 decision was issued almost forty
years ago, at a relatively early point in the Court's developing free speech
jurisprudence. Beauharnais is widely assumed no longer to be good law
in light of the Court's subsequent speech-protective decisions on related
issues, notably its holdings that strictly limit individual defamation ac-
tions so as not to chill free speech.168
Statements that defame groups convey opinions or ideas on matters
of public concern, t69 and therefore should be protected even if those
statements also injure reputations or feelings. t 70 The Supreme Court re-
cently reaffirmed this principle in the context of an individual defamation
action, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 171
Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 727 (1942). But see S.
WALKER, supra note 16, at 330 n.23, 437.
167. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
168. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978)
(citing cases expressing "doubt, which we share, that Beauharnais remains good law at all after the
constitutional libel cases"). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 58, § 12-17, at 926-27 (In particular, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), "seemed to some to eclipse Beauharnais' sensitivity
to... group defamation claims... because New York Times required public officials bringing libel
suits to prove that a defamatory statement was directed at the official personally, and not simply at a
unit of government.").
169. The fact that statements that defame groups convey ideas concerning issues of public im-
portance is illustrated by Beauharnais itself. The statements that were the basis for the defendant's
conviction were set out on a petition addressed to city officials and seeking readers' signatures. See
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 267, 276 (Black, J., dissenting).
170. See Letter from Professor William Cohen to Professor George Parker, chair of the Student
Conduct Legislative Council of Stanford University (March 10, 1989), reprinted in Stanford Univ.
Campus Rep., March 15, 1989, at 18 [hereinafter Cohen letter (March 10, 1989)J. In his letter,
Professor Cohen stated that:
I have been asked why it is so important to draw a distinction between personal abuse-
where I concede the possibility of regulation-and similar speech that is more generally
distributed. If there is harm in being the target of an individual racial epithet, is not the
harm the same, or greater, when the epithet is addressed to a broader audience? Indeed, it
is.... [Hiowever, it is not appropriate to look only to one side of the balance. The problem
is that there are larger interests in freedom of expression that loom when speech enters the
public arena. These are interests that can not be rejected in the case of speech considered
by the community to be erroneous, dangerous and harmful without limiting permissible
expression to the true and the relatively harmless.
171. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990). Although the Court declined "to create a wholesale defamation
exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion,'" id. at 2705, it stressed that statements
would only be actionable in defamation suits if a reasonable factfinder could conclude that they
"imply an assertion" of fact. Id. The Court also summarized the various existing doctrines limiting
defamation actions which are designed to ensure that expressions of ideas or opinions would not be
chilled:
Hepps ensures that a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does
not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection.
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In addition to flouting constitutional doctrine and free speech prin-
ciples, rules sanctioning group defamation are ineffective in curbing the
specific class of hate speech that Professor Lawrence advocates re-
straining. Even Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the narrow Beauhar-
nais majority repeatedly expressed doubt about the wisdom or efficacy of
group libel laws. Justice Frankfurter stressed that the Court upheld the
Illinois law in question only because of judicial deference to the state
legislature's judgment about the law's effectiveness. 172
The concept of defamation encompasses only false statements of fact
that are made without a good faith belief in their truth. Therefore, any
disparaging or insulting statement would be immune from this doctrine,
unless it were factual in nature, demonstrably false in content, and made
in bad faith. Members of minority groups that are disparaged by an al-
legedly libelous statement would hardly have their reputations or psyches
enhanced by a process in which the maker of the statement sought to
prove his good faith belief in its truth, and they were required to demon-
strate the absence thereof. 73
Next, the Bresler-Letter Carriers-Falwell line of cases provide protection for state-
ments that cannot "reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts" about an individual
(citation omitted). This provides assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of...
the "rhetorical hyperbole" which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our
Nation.
The New York Times-Butts and Gerz culpability requirements further ensure that
debate on public issues remains "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Thus, where a
statement of "opinion" on a matter of public concern reasonably implies false and defama-
tory facts regarding... a private figure on a matter of public concern, a plaintiff must
show that the false connotations were made with some level of fault as required by Gertz.
Finally, the enhanced appellate review required by Bose Corp., provides assurance that the
foregoing determinations will be made in a manner so as not to "constitute a forbidden
intrusion of the field of free expression."
Id. at 2706-07 (footnotes omitted).
172. See Beauharnai, 343 U.S. at 261-62. In Beauharnais the Supreme Court stated that: "It
may be argued, and weightily, that this legislation will not help matters; that tension and on occasion
violence between racial and religious groups must be traced to causes more deeply embedded in our
society than the rantings of modern Know-Nothings." Later in the opinion, the Supreme Court
stated that: "[I]t bears repeating... that our finding that the law is not constitutionally objectiona-
ble carries no implication of approval of the wisdom of the legislation or of its efficacy. These ques-
tions may raise doubts in our minds as well as in others." Id. at 267.
173. See, eg., Tanenhaus, supra note 166, at 299. In his article, Tanenhaus stated that:
The defendant in his effort to convince the jury that his grounds for belief were reasonable
would be justified in introducing into evidence every piece of hate-literature he could find.
The courtroom would in effect be turned into a public forum for his views. Considering the
countless tons of defamatory literature available, it is hard to think of anything that a jury
might not be convinced was reasonably and honestly believed.
Professor Lawrence's recommendation that a group defamation cause of action contain "the
equivalent of an actual malice requirement," Lawrence, at 463 n. 119, would exacerbate the foregoing
problems. See id. ("Discussions that attempt to explore an issue of public concern would be pro-
tected, but group defamations that intentionally vilify a group or individual for purposes of harass-
ment or intimidation would receive no protection.").
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One additional problem with group defamation statutes as a model
for rules sanctioning campus hate speech should be noted. As with the
other speech-restrictive doctrines asserted to justify such rules, group
defamation laws introduce the risk that the rules will be enforced at the
expense of the very minority groups sought to be protected. The Illinois
statute17 4 upheld in Beauharnais is illustrative. According to a leading
article on group libel laws, during the 1940s, the Illinois statute was "a
weapon for harassment of the Jehovah's Witnesses," who were then "a
minority... very much more in need of protection than most. 17 5 Thus,
a rule based on the group defamation theory provides no guarantee that
it will not be used against minorities.
C. Even a Narrow Regulation Could Have a Negative Symbolic
Impact on Constitutional Values
Taking into account the constraints imposed by free speech princi-
ples and doctrines potentially applicable to the regulation of campus hate
speech, it might be possible-although difficult-to frame a sufficiently
narrow rule to withstand a facial first amendment challenge. The federal
judge who invalidated the University of Michigan's anti-hate speech reg-
ulation as overbroad and vague expressly noted this possibility.176
ACLU affiliates that have challenged particular campus hate speech re-
strictions have proposed alternative policies that might pass constitu-
tional muster as a facial matter.177 However, it bears reemphasizing that,
174. The Illinois statute provided, in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful ... to... publish...
in any public place... any ... publication [which] ... exposes citizens of any race, color, creed or
religion to contempt, derision or obloquy." ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, para. 471 (1949).
175. Tanenhaus, supra note 166, at 279-80. See also Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 274 (1952) (Black,
J., dissenting) ("[Tihe same kind of state law that makes Beauharnais a criminal for advocating
segregation . . . can be utilized to send people to jail . . . for advocating equality and
nonsegregation.").
176. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862 (E.D. Mich. 1989) ("Under certain
circumstances racial and ethnic epithets, slurs, and insults might.., constitutionally be prohibited
[under the fighting words doctrine]. In addition, such speech may also be sufficient to state a claim
for common law intentional infliction of emotional distress.").
177. For example, the lawsuit challenging the University of Connecticut's hate speech rule was
settled pursuant to the parties' agreement about the wording of an alternative rule, which the Con.
necticut Civil Liberties Union deemed to comport with first amendment strictures. See Appendix to
Judgment, Proposed Consent Decree, Exhibit A, Wu v. University of Conn., No. Civ. H-89-649
PCD (D. Conn. Jan. 25, 1990) (prohibits face to face use of "fighting words," defined as "personally
abusive epithets which, when directly addressed to any ordinary person are, in the context used and
as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction,
whether or not they actually do so"). See also Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 9 n.9, Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 852 (No. 89-CV-71683-DT) (filed by ACLU of
Michigan; dated Aug. 24, 1989) (proposed alternative to successfully challenged rule; alternative
would prohibit "any action directed toward another student ... with the specific intention of in-
flicting emotional distress... or interfering with ... academic efforts.... The... expression of any
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as the University of Texas report stressed, "[T]here can be no guarantee
as to the constitutionality of any university rule bearing on racial harass-
ment and sensitive matters of freedom of expression."' 178
Even assuming that a regulation could be crafted with sufficient pre-
cision to survive a facial constitutional challenge, several further
problems would remain, which should give any university pause in evalu-
ating whether to adopt such a rule. Although these inherent problems
with any hate speech regulation are discussed in greater detail below, 179
they are summarized here. First, because of the discretion entailed in
enforcing any such rule, they involve an inevitable danger of arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement.18 0  Therefore, the rule's implementation
would have to be monitored to ensure that it did not exceed the bounds
of the regulations' terms or threaten content- and viewpoint-neutrality
principles.' 8 ' The experience with the University of Michigan's rule-
the only campus hate speech rule that has an enforcement record-
graphically illustrates this danger. 8 2
Second, there is an inescapable risk that any hate speech regulation,
no matter how narrowly drawn, will chill speech beyond its literal scope.
Members of the university community may well err on the side of cau-
tion to avoid being charged with a violation. For example, there is evi-
dence that the rule which the University of Wisconsin implemented in
1989 has had this effect, even though it has not yet been directly en-
forced. 8 3 A third problem inherent in any campus hate speech policy, as
Professor Lawrence concedes,18 4 is that such rules constitute a precedent
that can be used to restrict other types of speech. As the Supreme Court
idea in any form, unaccompanied by any action... directed toward another student... shall not be
violative."). See also supra note 11 (policies adopted by ACLU California affiliates do not oppose
regulation of narrowly defined campus hate speech). See also infra note 353 and accompanying text.
178. University of Texas Report, supra note 115, at 13.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 227-74.
180. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,435 (1974)
("The dangers of abuse of a particular power are, certainly, a pertinent consideration in determining
whether the power should be allowed in the first instance.").
181. See L. TRIBE, supra note 58, § 12-10, at 856 (Although the Constitution probably permits
legislation punishing words that cause hurt by their mere utterance, such legislation "would be con-
stitutionally problematic-the potential for content-specific regulation is always great.").
182. See infra text accompanying notes 203-25.
183. See Gribble, supra note 17. In his article, Gribble stated that:
Ron Novy, editor of the UWM Post [the student newspaper at the University of Wiscon-
sin-Milwaukee], said he had the feeling that since the rule was put into effect, students had
become less willing to speak frankly.
"Our letters to the editor are not quite as vehement as they've been in the past," he
said.
Novy said the rule had not "consciously" affected how the Post's writers approached
stories, "but it's in the back of your mind."
Id. at 8B, col. 1.
184. See Lawrence, at 458 n.106.
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has recognized, the long-range precedential impact of any challenged
governmental action should be a factor in evaluating its lawfulness.185
Further, in light of constitutional constraints, any campus hate
speech policy inevitably would apply to only a tiny fraction of all racist
expression, and accordingly it would have only a symbolic impact.18 6
Therefore, in deciding whether to adopt such a rule, universities must ask
whether that symbolic impact is, on balance, positive or negative in terms
of constitutional values.1 87 On the one hand, some advocates of hate
speech regulations maintain that the regulations might play a valuable
symbolic role in reaffirming our societal commitment to racial equality' 8
(although this is debatable). 189 On the other hand, we must beware of
even a symbolic or perceived diminution of our impartial commitment to
free speech. Even a limitation that has a direct impact upon only a dis-
crete category of speech may have a much more pervasive indirect im-
pact-by undermining the first amendment's moral legitimacy.190
185. See, eg., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) ("It seems
trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment ... was designed to avoid these [totalitarian]
ends by avoiding these beginnings."); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)
("[Ililegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing by slight ... deviations from
legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional
provisions... should be liberally construed.").
186. See infra Part II.
187. See Gunther letter (May 1, 1989), supra note 130. In his letter, Gunther stated that:
[Y]our entire enterprise-the recurrent effort to identify forbidden speech, now more nar-
rowly defined-does not strike me as a significant part of a campus wide effort to eliminate
discrimination and perhaps stems more from an interest in symbolic gestures rather than in
concretely effective ones. This proposed symbolic victory inevitably casts some pall over
the vigor of campus speech and beyond that may well set an unfortunate precedent for
future institutional action curbing speech even more severely.
188. See Letter from Professor William Cohen to Professor George Parker, chair of the Student
Conduct Legislative Council of Stanford University (May 1, 1989), reprinted in Stanford Univ. Cam-
pus Rep., May 3, 1989, at 18 [hereinafter Cohen letter (May 1, 1989)]. Cohen wrote that: "While
no one pretends that silencing racist remarks cures racism, there might be substantial symbolic cost
in giving up on a legislative solution to this problem after so much effort. A number of the affected
groups would reasonably see abandonment as demonstrating lack of institutional concern." See also
University of Texas Report, supra note 115, at 1 (quoting charge of President William H. Cunning-
ham of University of Texas at Austin to President's Ad Hoc Committee on Racial Harassment).
President Cunningham stated that: "[O]ne of the primary reasons for adopting racial harassment
policies is to affirm symbolically The University's commitment to tolerance and nondiscrimination-
even if the rules themselves cannot completely eliminate the problem." Accord Matsuda, supra note
13, at 2322 ("A legal response to racist speech is a statement that victims of racism are valued
members of our polity.").
189. See Report of Annenberg Workshop, supra note 156, at 2. The Annenberg Report stated
that: "The adoption of restrictions on derogatory speech.... may... give some symbolic support
and reassurance to the victims of such communication. It is, however, ... of dubious effectiveness,
even symbolically, in improving intergroup relationships. Indeed, such a response may lead to a
backlash or a perception of official heavy-handedness."
190. Professor Walter Dellinger tellingly made this point about another proposed exception to
the first amendment of an ostensibly limited nature-for physical desecration of the U.S. flag:
A MODEST PROPOSAL?
Recently, the Supreme Court ringingly reaffirmed the core principle that
a neutral commitment to free speech should trump competing symbolic
concerns. In United States v. Eichman, which invalidated the Flag Pro-
tection Act of 1989, the Court declared:
Government may create national symbols, promote them, and en-
courage their respectful treatment. But the Flag Protection Act goes
well beyond this by criminally proscribing expressive conduct because
of its likely communicative impact.
We are aware that desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to
many. But the same might be said, for example, of virulent ethnic and
religious epithets, vulgar repudiations of the draft, and scurrilous car-
icatures. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amend-
ment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreea-
ble." Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very freedom that
makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering. 191
II. PROFESSOR LAWRENCE'S CONCEPTION OF REGULABLE RACIST
SPEECH ENDANGERS FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES
The preceding discussion of relevant constitutional doctrine points
to several problems with the Stanford regulations, as well as other regula-
tions adopted or advocated by other universities. As previously ex-
plained,1 92 the Stanford regulations violate the cardinal principles that
speech restrictions must be content- and viewpoint-neutral. Moreover,
although these regulations purportedly incorporate the fighting words
doctrine,1 93 they in fact go well beyond the narrow bounds that the Court
has imposed on that doctrine, and, as the University of Michigan exam-
ple demonstrates, they threaten to chill protected speech.
What would this proposed act of constitutional revision do to the moral legitimacy of the
stance our Constitution has taken (and will continue to take) in defense of expression that
offends many Americans as deeply as flag burning offends the great majority of us?...
Once we have quickly passed the Twenty-seventh amendment to protect the sensibilities of
those who revere the flag, what do we say to those who are particularly offended by, but
must continue to tolerate, the burning of crosses by hooded members of the Ku Klux Klan,
a brazen reminder of the era of lynching and terror? And what do we say to those who find
themselves silenced and marginalized by sexualized (but not constitutionally "obscene")
portrayals of women? What enduring Constitutional principle will remain unimpaired that
will legitimately surmount these claims ... ?
Hearings on Measures to Protect the Physical Integrity of the American Flag, Before the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 553 (1989) (statement of Walter Dellinger).
191. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409-10 (1990) (footnote omitted).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 104-12.
193. See Stanford Code and Comment, supra note 24, at 1.
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A. The Proposed Regulations Would Not Pass Constitutional
Muster 1 94
1. The Regulations Exceed the Bounds of the Fighting Words Doc-
trine. As discussed above, 95 the fighting words doctrine is fraught with
constitutional problems. As a result, it either has been abrogated sub
silentio or probably should be. In any event, even assuming that the doc-
trine is still good law, it has been severely circumscribed by Supreme
Court rulings. Because those limits are necessitated by free speech prin-
ciples, they must be strictly enforced. Professor Gard's thorough study
of the law in this area summarizes the Court's limitations on the fighting
words doctrine:
The offending language (1) must constitute a personally abusive
epithet, (2) must be addressed in a face-to-face manner, (3) must be
directed to a specific individual and be descriptive of that individual,
and (4) must be uttered under such circumstances that the words have
a direct tendency to cause an immediate violent response by the aver-
age recipient. If any of these four elements is absent, the doctrine may
not justifiably be invoked as a rationale for the suppression of the
expression. 196
The operative language of the Stanford code provides:
Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilifica-
tion if it:
a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of
individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion,
sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin; and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults
or stigmatizes; and
c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal symbols.
In the context of discriminatory harassment by personal vilification,
insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal symbols are those "which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite to an immediate
breach of the peace," and which are commonly understood to convey
direct and visceral hatred or contempt for human beings on the basis
of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or na-
tional and ethnic origin. 197
A comparison of the Stanford code to the Supreme Court's four cri-
teria for constitutinal fighting words restrictions reveals that the code
clearly does not satisfy one of the Court's criteria, and it may not satisfy
the other three. Most importantly, as outlined above, since Gooding v.
194. As a private institution, Stanford University is not directly bound by first amendment
standards. However, many private academic institutions make policy choices to adhere to standards
that are consistent with their notions of academic freedom.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 116-51.
196. Gard, supra note 130, at 563-64.
197. Stanford Code and Comments, supra note 24.
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Wilson the Court consistently has invalidated fighting words definitions
that refer only to the content of words. Instead, it has insisted that these
words must be evaluated contextually, to assess whether they are likely
to cause an imminent breach of the peace under the circumstances in
which they are uttered. Yet, the Stanford code punishes words which are
commonly understood to convey" group-based hatred. 198 By proscribing
certain words, without considering their context, the Stanford code vio-
lates Gard's fourth criterion, and for that reason alone falls afoul of the
first amendment.
The Stanford code also may fail to satisfy the Court's strict parame-
ters for the fighting words doctrine in other respects. First, it does not
expressly require that the prohibited speech "must constitute a person-
ally abusive epithet," the first criterion in Professor Gard's list. Based on
his analysis of cases that address the fighting words doctrine, Professor
Gard concluded that "the utterance must constitute an extremely pro-
vocative personal insult"1 99 in order to comport with free speech
principles.2°°
Although the Stanford code may comply with the Court's second
and third requirements, by prescribing that the prohibited speech be "ad-
dressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or stig-
matizes," both of these elements have been construed so strictly that they
may not be satisfied by this provision. Some judicial rulings indicate that
the second requirement, the face-to-face element, "is not satisfied by
mere technical physical presence, but contemplates an extremely close
physical proximity. ' 201 The third requirement has been interpreted to
mean that "the offensive words must be descriptive of aparticular person
and addressed to that person. '202 The Stanford code does not require
that the prohibited words describe the individual to whom they are ad-
dressed. Instead, under the Stanford code, the words may convey hatred
for broad groups of people.
198. Id. (emphasis added). Compare the University of Connecticut's rule, supra note 177 (defin-
ing fighting words as those "which ... are, in the context used... inherently likely to provoke an
immediate violent reaction") (emphasis added).
199. Gard, supra note 130, at 536.
200. See also id at 541 ("The importance of the content-focused personally abusive epithet ele-
ment cannot be overestimated.... In essence it guarantees that the expression of ideas, no matter
how offensive or distasteful, will be afforded constitutional protection.").
201. Id. at 559 (citing In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 420 (Minn. 1978)) (when alleged fighting
words were spoken "from more than fifteen feet away rather than eye-to-eye, there was no reason-
able likelihood that they would tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"); Garvey v. State,
537 S.W.2d 709, 710 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975) (face-to-face requirement was not met when defend-
ant, while driving past police station, shouted "sooey" at police officer).
202. Gard, supra note 130, at 561 (emphasis added).
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2. The Regulations Will Chill Protected Speech. Beyond its facial
problems of violating neutrality principles and fighting words limitations,
the Stanford code also will dampen academic discourse. This inevitable
outcome is indicated by the experience under the University of Michigan
hate speech regulation.20 3
203. That regulation provided that, in certain "[e]ducational and academic centers," individuals
were subject to discipline for:
Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis
of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that... [i]nvolves an express
or implied threat to... or has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering
with an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored
extra-curricular activities or personal safety ....
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (quoting The University of
Michigan Policy on Discriminatory Harrassment (adopted April 14, 1988)). As originally adopted
and implemented, the regulation also sanctioned speech that "[c]reates an intimidating, hostile, or
demeaning environment for educational pursuits, employment or participation in University spon-
sored extra-curricular activities." Id. After the regulation was legally challenged, however, the Uni-
versity announced that it was withdrawing that section on the grounds that "a need exists for further
explanation and clarification" of it. Id. (quoting University of Michigan Public Announcement,
August 22, 1989).
The Michigan rule was in effect for more than a year, and documents concerning its enforce-
ment were produced during the litigation that ultimately led to its invalidation on first amendment
grounds.
Professor Lawrence contends that it is unfair to judge the Stanford code in light of the experi.
ence under the Michigan rule, arguing that the latter was "clearly overbroad," and asserting that "it
is difficult to believe that anyone at the University of Michigan Law School was consulted in draft-
ing" it. Lawrence, at 477 n.161 & 478 n.162.
It is ironic that, in this particular context, Professor Lawrence seeks to focus the debate solely
on the Stanford code. As previously observed, see supra note 27, throughout his article, he repeat-
edly defends alternative hate speech regulations that are not only broader than Stanford's but also
broader than Michigan's. Moreover, his proffered rationales would justify sweeping prohibitions.
See infra Part III. Therefore, perhaps Professor Lawrence should not be so quick to protest that the
Michigan code was "obviously overbroad." Lawrence, at 478 n.162.
In any event, the record documents that the University did consult with law school faculty
members, as well as university counsel and other lawyers. The University also received comments
from numerous other individuals and groups, including the ACLU, in its drafting process. See
Letter from Henry W. Saad (counsel to University in Doe litigation) to Honorable Avern Cohn, at 2
(Aug. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Saad letter] (available from author). Saad wrote that:
[University of Michigan] President Fleming also consulted with internationally recognized
constitutional scholar and Dean of The University of Michigan Law School, Lee Bollinger,
and internationally recognized labor/civil rights expert and former Dean of the University
of Michigan Law School, Theodore St. Antoine, regarding drafting of the Policy and re-
viewed the final draft with them.
See also Grano, supra note 8, at 9 ("President Fleming [said] that the university's lawyers and three
of his colleagues from the law school, including First Amendment expert Dean Lee Bollinger, be-
lieved the proposed approach to be sound." Although the University believed the approach to be
constitutional, "various individuals and organizations, including the American Civil Liberties
Union, voiced objections on constitutional grounds to the provisions regulating speech.") Id. The
Michigan ACLU affiliate "supported the concept [of regulating verbal harassment] with suggestions
for improvement." See Regents of the University of Michigan, Minutes of March 1988 Meeting, at
19 (March 17, 1988) [hereinafter Michigan Regents' Minutes] (available from author). Therefore,
Professor Lawrence's unsubstantiated assertion that the ACLU and "[t]raditional civil liberties law-
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Even though the Michigan regulation was in some respects broader
than its Stanford counterpart,204 the latter rule also suffers from facial
overbreadth and ambiguity.20 5 One of the key terms in the Stanford reg-
ulation, the term "stigmatize," also was contained in the Michigan regu-
lation and specifically was ruled unconstitutionally vague.20 6
Accordingly, the Stanford code appears to be as constitutionally suspect
as the Michigan rule, contrary to Professor Lawrence's assumption. As
discussed in the preceding section, all the alternative theories that have
been offered-the fighting words doctrine, the intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort, and group defamation-also pose significant
threats to free speech principles.20 7
In Doe v. University of Michigan,208 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the University of Michi-
gan's anti-hate speech policy violated the first amendment because, as
applied, it was overbroad 209 and impermissibly vague. 210 The court con-
yers typically have elected to stand by" while universities draft clearly unconstitutional rules, Law-
rence, at 477, is directly belied by the Michigan experience. For further refutation of this
undocumented generalization, see infra notes 353-55 and accompanying text.
Following the Doe ruling, the University of Michigan did not, as Professor Lawrence suggests,
"say to the black students, 'We tried to help you but the courts just won't let us do it."' Lawrence,
at 477 n.161. Rather, promptly after the Doe decision, the University adopted an interim policy that
was more sensitive to free speech concerns; the new policy has not been challenged by the ACLU or
any other party. See Policy Statement: The University of Michigan Interim Policy on Discrimina-
tion and Discriminatory Conduct by Students in the University Environment (available from au-
thor). See also supra note 177 (during Doe litigation, ACLU suggested alternative policy language
that might withstand constitutional scrutiny). More importantly, the University is working on a
comprehensive educational program to deal with racist attitudes and to instill in students a multi-
cultural perspective. Telephone interview with Elsa Cole, General Counsel, University of Michigan
(August 22, 1990).
204. See supra note 61.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 195-202. See also Cohen letter (May 1, 1989), supra
note 188. Cohen wrote that: "Given the ambiguities-ambiguities I believe to be inevitable-the
question arises whether the proposed rule, even with amendments, will chill dialogue as speakers try
to avoid the danger zone."
206. See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867. Another term that is central to the Stanford code, "harass-
ment," see supra text accompanying note 197, also has been held to be unconstitutionally vague. See
Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 433, 436 (2d Cir. 1988) (in invalidating statute that prohibited "har-
ass[ment] of persons "engaged in the lawful taking of wildlife," court noted that "harass" "can mean
anything").
207. See supra text accompanying notes 116-75.
208. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
209. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) (regulation of speech will be unconsti-
tutionally overbroad if it "reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct") (cit-
ing Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)).
210. In particular, the term "stigmatize," also used in the Stanford code, specifically was held to
be unconstitutionally vague. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is enforced especially strictly in the first amendment context.
See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499; Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
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cluded that during the year when the policy was in effect, the University
"consistently applied" it "to reach protected speech. 211 Moreover, be-
cause of the policy's vagueness, the court concluded that it did not give
adequate notice of which particular expressions would be prohibited and
which protected.212 Consequently, the policy deterred members of the
university community from engaging in protected expression for fear it
might be sanctioned. This "chilling effect" of any hate speech regulation
is particularly problematic in the academic environment, given the spe-
cial importance of a free and robust exchange of ideas.213
Moreover, the judge who ultimately found the Michigan rule uncon-
stitutional did not share Professor Lawrence's opinion that it was
"poorly drafted and obviously overbroad." 214 To the contrary, his opin-
ion expressly noted that he would not have found the rule unconstitu-
tionally overbroad merely based on its language. Rather, he found it
unconstitutional in light of the enforcement record.215 These findings
prove the relevance of the Michigan case not only to the Stanford situa-
tion, but also to all other campus hate speech regulations. Regardless of
how carefully these rules are drafted, they inevitably are vague and un-
avoidably invest officials with substantial discretion in the enforcement
process; thus, such regulations exert a chilling effect on speech beyond
their literal bounds.
In the recent wave of college crackdowns on racist and other forms
of hate speech, examples abound of attempts to censor speech conveying
ideas that clearly play a legitimate role in academic discourse, although
some of us might find them wrongheaded or even odious. For example,
the University of Michigan's anti-hate speech policy could justify attacks
on author Salman Rushdie because his book, The Satanic Verses, 21 6 was
offensive to Muslims.21 7
211. See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 865. The court cited the following examples of protected speech
which had been subjected to the policy: a statement by a graduate student in the School of Social
Work, in a research class, expressing his belief that homosexuality was a disease and that he intended
to develop a counseling plan for changing gay clients to straight, id.; the reading of an allegedly
homophobic limerick, which ridiculed a well-known athlete for his presumed sexual orientation, by a
student in the School of Business Administration during a class public-speaking exercise, id.; and a
statement by a student during an orientation session of a preclinical dentistry class, widely regarded
as especially difficult, that he had heard that minorities had a hard time in the course and that they
were not treated fairly, id. at 865-66.
212. See id. at 867.
213. See supra note 88.
214. Lawrence, at 478 n.162.
215. See Id.
216. S. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1988).
217. See Statement of the Washtenaw County Branch, American Civil Liberties Union, on the
University of Michigan Policy "Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment by Students in the
University Environment" 6 (May 25, 1989).
[Vol. 1990:484
A MODEST PROPOSAL?
Such incidents are not aberrational. Any anti-hate speech rule ines-
capably entails some vagueness, due to the inherent imprecision of key
words and concepts common to all such proposed rules. For example,
most regulations employ one or more of the following terms: "demean-
ing," "disparaging," "harassing, .... hostile, .... insulting," "intimidating,"
and "stigmatizing." 218 Therefore, there is real danger that even a nar-
rowly crafted rule will deter some expression that should be pro-
tected219-- especially in the university environment. 220 In particular,
such a rule probably will "add to the silence" on "gut issues" about ra-
cism, sexism, and other forms of bias that already impede interracial and
other intergroup dialogues. 22'
Other examples of academic discourse that have been labeled censurable as hate speech include
the following: a group of students complained that a faculty member had created a hostile atmos-
phere by quoting racist comments originally made at the turn of the century, even though the profes-
sor said that was not his intention, see id. at 4; another group of students contended that the former
students' complaint about the professor had itself created a hostile atmosphere, see id. at 5; a law
student suggested that judicial decisions reflecting adverse stereotypes about blacks should not be
studied in law school courses, see Shaw, Caveat Emptor, N.Y.L. Sch. Rep., Apr. 1989, at 3; a Jewish
professor was penalized for suggesting to his black students that they should celebrate the anniver-
sary of their ancestors' liberation from slavery under the thirteenth amendment, just as Jews cele-
brate their ancestors' liberation from slavery during Passover, see Hentoff, Campus Court-Martial,
Wash. Post, Dec. 15, 1988, at A25, col. 2; students complained about a professor's statement that
black students are not sufficiently critical of human rights violations by black African governments,
see McKinley, Minority Students Walk Out Over a Teacher's Remarks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1989, at
B3, col. 5.
218. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding unduly
vague the terms "stigmatize," "victimize, ..... threat' to an individual's academic efforts," and "inter-
fering with an individual's academic efforts"). Although Professor Lawrence protests that the Mich-
igan regulation was "clearly overbroad," Lawrence, at 478 n.162, and hence cannot fairly be
compared to the Stanford code, a key term in the latter is "stigmatize," which the Doe court held to
be unconstitutionally vague. See supra text accompanying note 210. See also supra note 206 (citing
decision holding the term "harass" to be unconstitutionally vague).
219. Regarding the chilling effect of a University of Connecticut anti-hate-speech rule utilizing
some of these terms, see Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 9-10 & n.10, Wu v. University of Conn., No. Civ. H-89-649 PCD (D. Conn. Jan. 25,
1990) (submitted by ACLU). In its brief, the ACLU stated that:
Given [the rule's] ambiguities, a ... student could plausibly fear prosecution for voicing an
opinion that members of the Unification Church... are "cultists"; that Zionists are "impe-
rialists" or that Palestinians are "terrorists"; that evangelical ministers are "hustlers" and
their followers are "dupes"; or that homosexuals are "sick." Most ironically of all, a ho-
mosexual rights activist could perhaps be prosecuted for declaring that Catholics are "big-
ots" if they follow their Church's teaching that homosexuality is a sin .... Similarly, a
black activist student leader might reasonably hesitate to characterize other black students,
who are deemed insufficiently supportive of black causes, as "Uncle Toms" ....
220. See Cohen Letter (May 1, 1989), supra note 188.
221. Id. See also Letter from Pierre Bierre, research computer scientist in the Neuropsychology
Laboratory of the departments of Psychiatry and Psychology, to George Parker, Chair of the Stu-
dent Conduct Legislative Council, Stanford University (Mar. 16, 1989), reprinted in Stanford Univ.
Campus Rep., Mar. 22, 1989, at 20 ("As any conflict counselor knows, the first step to resolve
conflicts is to get people to open up and share unedited gut feelings, however irrational they may
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Additionally, it must be recognized that silencing certain expres-
sions may be tantamount to silencing certain ideas.22 As the plaintiff in
Doe v. Michigan argued:
[T]he policy... is an official statement that at the University of Michi-
gan, some arguments will no longer be tolerated. Rather than en-
courage her maturing students to question each other's beliefs on such
diverse and controversial issues as the proper role of women in society,
the merits of particular religions, or the moral propriety of homosexu-
ality, the University has decided that it must protect its students from
what it considers to be "unenlightened" ideas. In so doing, the Uni-
versity has established a secular orthodoxy by implying, among other
things, that homosexuality is morally acceptable, [and] that... femi-
nism [is] superior to the traditional view of women .... 223
The Michigan plaintiff was victimized directly by the "pall of ortho-
doxy"224 that the University's anti-hate speech policy cast over the cam-
pus. As a graduate student specializing in behavioral psychology, he felt
that the rule deterred him from classroom discussion of theories that
some psychological differences among racial groups and between the
sexes are related to biological differences, for fear of being charged with
racial or sexual harassment.22 5
In addition to their chilling effect on the ideas and expressions of
university community members, policies that bar hate speech could en-
gender broader forms of censorship. As noted by Professor William Co-
hen of Stanford Law School, an anti-hate speech rule such as the one
adopted by his university "purports to create a personal right to be free
from involuntary exposure to any form of expression that gives certain
kinds of offense." Therefore, he explains, such a rule "could become a
sword to challenge assigned readings in courses, the showing of films on
campus, or the message of certain speakers. '226
seem, and the second step is to remove the listening 'blocks' that prevent the other side from hearing
those feelings.").
222. As Justice Harlan observed in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971), "[w]e cannot
indulge in the facile assumption that one can forbid a particular word without also running the
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."
223. Affidavit of John Doe in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at para.
14, Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (No. 89-71683) [hereinafter Doe
Affidavit].
224. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See also West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), which declared that:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
225. See Doe Affidavit, supra note 223, at paras. 7-I1.
226. Cohen letter (March 10, 1989), supra note 170. Professor Cohen cited the following exam-
ples of potential censorship under this construction: a challenge by evangelical Christians to the film
The Last Temptation of Christ (Barbara De Fina, released by Universal and Cineplex Odeon Films
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B. The Proposed Regulations Would Endanger Fundamental Free
Speech Principles
The various proposed campus hate speech regulations, including the
Stanford code that Professor Lawrence endorses, are inconsistent with
current Supreme Court doctrine prescribing permissible limits on speech.
More importantly, they jeopardize basic free speech principles. Whereas
certain conduct may be regulable, speech that advocates such conduct is
not, and speech may not be regulated on the basis of its content, even if
many of us strongly disagree with-or are repelled by-that content.
1. Protection of Speech Advocating Regulable Conduct. Civil lib-
ertarians, scholars, and judges consistently have distinguished between
speech advocating unlawful conduct and the unlawful conduct itself.227
Although this distinction has been drawn in numerous different factual
settings, the fundamental underlying issues always are the same. For ex-
ample, within recent years, some pro-choice activists have urged civil lib-
ertarians and courts to make an exception to free speech principles in
order to restrain the expressive conduct of anti-abortion activists. In-
stead, civil libertarians have persuaded courts to prohibit assaults, block-
ages of clinic entrances, trespasses, and other illegal conduct by anti-
choice activists. 228 Similarly, civil libertarians and courts229 have re-
jected pleas by some feminists to censor pornography that reflects sexist
attitudes. 230 Instead, civil libertarians have renewed their efforts to per-
1988); a challenge by blacks to D.W. Griffith's film The Birth of a Nation (Epoch Producing Corpo-
ration 1915); or a speech by Professor Shockley on racial differences.
227. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456-57 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The line
between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be... subject to regulation is
the line between ideas and overt acts."); see also A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 74 (ACLU did not
represent American Nazis and Nazi sympathizers prosecuted under Smith Act during World War
II, because defendants appeared to be enemy agents who had committed overt acts helpful to
Germany).
228. Compare S. WALKER, supra note 16, at 349 (discussing ACLU representation of anti-abor-
tion demonstrators) with National Abortion Fed'n v. Operation Rescue, No. CV 89-1181 AWT
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1989) (holding anti-abortion demonstrators in contempt for violating order
previously obtained by Southern California ACLU to protect abortion clinics and patients from
assaults and other illegal conduct).
229. In American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 334 (7th Cir.), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001
(1985), the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Seventh Circuit ruling invalidating an ordinance
based upon model legislation drafted by feminist pro-censorship leaders Andrea Dworkin and Cath-
arine MacKinnon.
230. See generally A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981) (pornogra-
phy is not mere expression but method of domination of women); MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985) (same). Some feminists reject the notion
that censoring pornography advances women's equality; they believe, to the contrary, that censoring
pornography perpetuates archaic stereotypes about women. See Strossen, The Convergence of Femi-
nist and Civil Liberties Principles in the Pornography Debate (Book Review), 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 201
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suade courts and legislatures to invalidate sexist actions.23' A decade
ago, civil libertarians and several courts-including the Supreme
Court-rejected the plea of Holocaust survivors in Skokie, Illinois to
prohibit neo-Nazis from demonstrating. 232 Instead, civil libertarians suc-
cessfully have lobbied for the enactment and enforcement of laws against
anti-Semitic vandalism and other hate-inspired conduct. 233
A pervasive weakness in Professor Lawrence's analysis is his elision
of the distinction between racist speech, on the one hand, and racist con-
duct, on the other.234 It is certainly true that racist speech, like other
speech, may have some causal connection to conduct. As Justice Holmes
observed, "[e]very idea is an incitement" to action.235 However, as Jus-
tice Holmes also noted, to protect speech that advocates conduct you
oppose does not "indicate that you think the speech impotent,... or that
you do not care wholeheartedly for the result. '236 Rather, this protec-
tion is based on the critical distinction between speech that has a direct
and immediate link to unlawful conduct and all other speech, which has
less direct and immediate links. In Holmes' immortal words:
[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expres-
sion of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,
unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
required to save the country .... Only the emergency that makes it
immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time
warrants making any exception to the sweeping command, "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 237
Justice Holmes' stirring phrases were penned in dissenting opinions.
However, the Court enshrined his view as the law of the land in 1969, in
(1987) (reviewing WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP (V. Burstyn ed. 1985)) (book demonstrates false-
ness of dichotomy between feminist and civil libertarian principles, since goal of both is society in
which individuals are treated justly).
231. For a description of ACLU efforts to combat sex discrimination, see Gale & Strossen, supra
note 19, at 168-84.
232. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. I1l.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 I1. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21
(1978).
233. See Letter from Morton Halperin to author, at 2 (Feb. 5, 1990) (ACLU strongly supported
federal legislation directing FBI to gather statistics on hate crimes) (available from author).
234. See Lawrence, at 438-44. See, e.g., id. at 440 n.42 ("racist conduct amounts to speech"); id.
at 441 ("Brown's declaration that segregation is unconstitutional amounts to a regulation of the
message of white supremacy."); id. at 443 n.58 ("I want to stress the complete overlap of the idea
and practice of racism."); id. at 444 ("[Tihe Court recognized the inseparability of idea and practice
in the institution of slavery."); id. at 446 ("Brown mandates the abolition of racist speech."); id. at
463 ("Brown is a case about group defamation.").
235. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
236. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 630-31.
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Brandenburg v. Ohio. 238 In a unanimous opinion overturning the con-
viction of a Ku Klux Klansman for an anti-black and anti-Semitic
speech, the Court said that the first amendment does "not permit a state
to forbid.., advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion and is likely to incite or produce such action. '239
It is impossible to draw a bright line between speech and conduct.
It also may be difficult to determine whether certain speech has a suffi-
ciently tight nexus to conduct to justify regulating that speech. Professor
Lawrence, however, abandons the attempt to make any such distinctions
at all. He treats even the most extreme, blatant discriminatory conduct
as speech, including slavery itself.24° Although undoubtedly harmful,
the utterance of disparaging remarks cannot be equated fairly with the
systematic denial of all rights to a group of human beings.241 Professor
Lawrence recognizes this and appropriately chides anyone who insists
that all racist conduct that includes an expressive component should be
treated alike-namely, as protected speech.242 However, Professor Law-
rence himself engages in precisely the same kind of oversimplification
when he suggests that all conduct with an expressive component-which,
in his view, includes all racist conduct and all racist speech 243-should
be treated alike, namely, as unprotected speech. Those of us who reject
either extreme as unreasonably rigid should join forces in undertaking
the essential, albeit difficult, task of line-drawing.244
2. Proscription on Content-Based Speech Regulations.
a. The indivisibility of free speech. It is important to place the
current debate about campus racist speech in the context of earlier efforts
to censor other forms of hate speech, including sexist and anti-Semitic
238. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
239. Id. at 447.
240. See supra note 234.
241. Slavery, as well as de jure segregation and other phenomena that Professor Lawrence as-
similates to hate speech by students or faculty members, also are distinguishable on the additional
ground that the former emanated from the government, and the latter from private individuals.
Regarding the significance of this distinction, see infra text accompanying notes 299-321.
242. See Lawrence, at 438, 449, 457, 461, 473-74, 476.
243. See id. at 438-49.
244. Indeed, Professor Lawrence himself emphasizes that he advocates regulating only a narrow
class of racist speech. See id. at 435-36, 450 n.82, 458,472. Therefore, he apparently recognizes that
his equation between racist speech and racist conduct-whatever theoretical appeal it might have-
is not relevant to the task of deciding which subset of racist speech should be restricted. However,
while rejecting the speech/conduct line between protected and unprotected expressive activity, he
offers no other. For a further discussion of this issue in the particular context of Professor Law-
rence's argument that Brown v. Board of Education sanctions regulating racist speech, see infra text
accompanying notes 289-98.
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speech.245 Such a broadened perspective suggests that consistent princi-
ples should be applied each time the issue resurfaces in any guise. Every
person may find one particular type of speech especially odious and one
message that most sorely tests his or her dedication to free speech values.
But for each person who would exclude racist speech from the general
proscription against content-based speech regulations, recent experience
shows that there is another who would make such an exception only for
anti-choice speech, another who would make it only for sexist speech,
another who would make it only for anti-Semitic speech, another who
would make it only for flag desecration, and so on.
The recognition that there is no principled basis for curbing speech
expressing some particular ideas is reflected in the time-honored prohibi-
tion on any content-based 246 or viewpoint-based 247 regulations. As
stated by Professor Tribe, "If the Constitution forces government to al-
low people to march, speak and write in favor of peace, brotherhood, and
justice, then it must also require government to allow them to advocate
hatred, racism, and even genocide." 248
The position stated by Professor Tribe is not just the traditional civil
libertarian view, but it also is the law of the land. The courts consistently
have agreed with civil libertarian claims that the first amendment pro-
tects the right to engage in racist and other forms of hate speech.2 49 Why
is this so, and should it be so? Professor Lawrence rightly urges us to
take a fresh look at this issue, no matter how well-settled it is as a matter
of law. I have taken that invitation seriously and reflected long and hard
upon his thought-provoking article and the questions it presents. Having
done so, however, I conclude that the courts and traditional civil libertar-
ians are correct in steadfastly rejecting laws that create additional new
exceptions to free speech protections for racist expression.
245. See supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
246. See, eg., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."). Courts will sustain a content-based speech regulation
only where the government can prove that it "is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981). This
stringent showing can rarely be made. See, eg., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) (statute
prohibiting peaceful picketing in residential neighborhoods not narrowly tailored enough to promote
State's asserted interests in (1) promoting privacy of home, and (2) providing special treatment for
labor).
247. See supra quote accompanying note 1.
248. L. TRIBE, supra note 58, § 12-8, at 838 n.17.
249. Justice Holmes enunciated this position in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654
(1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively
calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those
who agree with us, but freedom for the thought that we hate.").
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One longstanding rationale for the view that speech must be pro-
tected, regardless of its content, is the belief that we need a free market-
place of ideas, open even to the most odious and offensive ideas and
expressions, 250 because truth ultimately will triumph in an unrestricted
marketplace. 251 The marketplace metaphor is subject to some criticism,
as Professor Lawrence notes.252 Nevertheless, the marketplace of ideas
does sometimes work to improve society: This has been particularly true
with regard to promotion of racial equality. 25 3 Moreover, there are
other, independently sufficient, rationales for the content-neutral protec-
tion even of hate speech. Another important, more recently articulated,
rationale is that freedom of expression promotes individual autonomy
and dignity.254 Professor Lawrence himself endorses an additional the-
ory for the protection of racist speech, a view which recently was ad-
vanced by Dean Lee Bollinger: Free speech reinforces our society's
commitment to tolerance and to combating racist ideas.255
Although the foregoing theories may be acceptable in general, one
might ask why they do not permit exceptions for racist speech. Racism
in America is unique in important respects. For most of our country's
history, racism was enshrined legally through slavery or de jure discrimi-
nation. The post-Civil War constitutional amendments guaranteed racial
equality. More recently, all branches and levels of the government have
250. See, eg., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (refers to a
"'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks.' The language of the political arena... is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact"
(quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))). The Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed that the first amendment does not allow authorities to "prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533,
2544 (1989) (invalidating conviction for burning United States flag to express idea).
251. In a widely quoted dissent, Justice Holmes championed this rationale for free speech as
"the theory of our Constitution":
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (free expression "will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry
and more perfect polity"); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
252. See infra text accompanying notes 416-21.
253. See infra text accompanying notes 429-36.
254. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24 ("[No other approach [than protecting free speech] would com-
port with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.");
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974) (freedom of expression permits and encourages individual's exercise of
autonomy).
255. See Lawrence, at 436.
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sought to implement these constitutional guarantees by outlawing any
vestiges of state-sponsored, as well as many forms of private, racial dis-
crimination. Given our nation's special obligation to eradicate the
"badges and incidents" of the formerly government-sanctioned institu-
tions of racism, is it not appropriate to make broader exceptions than
usual to free speech doctrines for racist speech? As Professor Rodney
Smolla has noted, "Racist speech is arguably different in kind from other
offensive speech, because the elimination of racism is itself enshrined in
our Constitution as a public value of the highest order. '256
The American commitment to eradicate racial discrimination is re-
inforced by a parallel international commitment, as expressed in such
documents as the United Nations Charter,257 the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,258 and the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.259 Moreover, the United
States is apparently alone in the world community in sheltering racist
speech. Both under international agreements 2 6° and under the domestic
law of many other countries261 racist speech is outlawed.
In light of the universal condemnation of racial discrimination and
the world-wide regulation of racist speech, it certainly is tempting to con-
sider excepting racist speech from first amendment protection. Episodes
of racist speech, such as those cited by Professor Lawrence and others,
make a full commitment to free speech at times seem painful and diffi-
cult. Civil libertarians find such speech abhorrent, given our dedication
to eradicating racial discrimination and other forms of bigotry. But ex-
perience has confirmed the truth of the indivisibility principle articulated
above: History demonstrates that if the freedom of speech is weakened
for one person, group, or message, then it is no longer there for others.2 62
The free speech victories that civil libertarians have won in the context of
defending the right to express racist and other anti-civil libertarian
256. R. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN OPEN CULTURE (tentative title, forthcoming).
257. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
258. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 2, 7, 16, G.A. Res. 217 (III), 9 U.N. GAOR
(3d Sess. pt. 1) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
259. Opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
260. For example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, id. art. 4(a), requires states to "declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination
of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, [and] incitement to racial discrimination."
261. See Kretzmer, Free Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 499-506 (1987) (review-
ing European anti-hate speech laws).
262. See supra text accompanying note 1. As Thomas Paine wrote during our country's forma-
tive period: "He that would make his own liberty secure, must guard even his enemy from oppres-
sion, for if he violates this duty, he establishes a precedent that will reach himself." (quoted in
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHY THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION DEFENDS
FREE SPEECH FOR RACISTS AND TOTALITARIANS 2 (n.d.) [hereinafter ACLU pamphlet]).
536 [Vol. 1990:484
A MODEST PROPOSAL?
messages have been used to protect speech proclaiming anti-racist and
pro-civil libertarian messages. For example, in 1949, the ACLU de-
fended the right of Father Terminiello, a suspended Catholic priest, to
give a racist speech in Chicago. The Supreme Court agreed with that
position in a decision that became a landmark in free speech history.
263
Time and again during the 1960s and 1970s, the ACLU and other civil
rights groups were able to defend free speech rights for civil rights dem-
onstrators by relying on the Terminiello decision.
264
b. The slippery slope dangers of banning racist speech. To attempt
to craft free speech exceptions only for racist speech would create a sig-
nificant risk of a slide down the proverbial "slippery slope." To be sure,
lawyers and judges are capable of-indeed, especially trained in-draw-
ing distinctions between similar situations. Therefore, I agree with Pro-
fessor Lawrence and other critics of the absolutist position 265 that
slippery slope dangers should not be exaggerated. It is probably hyper-
bole to contend that if we ever stepped off the mountaintop where all
speech is protected regardless of its content, then inevitably we would
end up in the abyss where the government controls all our words. 266 On
the other hand, critics of absolutism should not minimize the real danger:
We would have a difficult time limiting our descent to a single downward
step by attempting to prohibit only racist expression on campus.267 Ap-
plicable rules and supporting rationales would need to be crafted care-
fully to distinguish this type of speech from others.
First, we must think hard about the groups that should be protected.
Should we regulate speech aimed only at racial and ethnic groups, as the
University of Texas is considering?268 Or should we also bar insults of
religious groups, women, gays and lesbians, individuals with disabilities,
Vietnam War veterans, and so on, as do the rules adopted by Stanford
and the University of Michigan? As the committee that formulated the
263. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (ACLU appeared amicus curiae); see also Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (upholding free speech rights of Ku Klux Klan
leader represented by ACLU).
264. See, eg., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 135 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552
(1965). See also infra text accompanying notes 423-28 (discussing important role which first amend-
ment rights played in the civil rights movement).
265. See Minow, On Neutrality, Equality & Tolerance: New Norms for a Decade of Distinction,
CHANGE, Jan./Feb. 1990, at 17.
266. As Professor Lawrence notes, see C. Lawrence, Presentation at ACLU Biennial Confer-
ence, supra note t, at 20 n.42, the Court has long upheld certain content-based speech regulations,
such as those governing obscenity, without eviscerating all free speech rights.
267. Professor Lawrence recognizes this danger. See Lawrence, at 458 & n.106 (general societal
tolerance for suppressing speech would pose dangerous precedent for speech of all dissenters, even
without case law).
268. See University of Texas Report, supra note 115, at 10.
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University of Texas's proposed rule pointed out, each category requires a
separate evaluation, since each "raise[s] different policy and legal con-
cerns. ' 269 Therefore, we should not play fast and loose with the first
amendment by casually expanding the categories of proscribed hate
speech.
Second, we must carefully define proscribable harassing speech to
avoid encompassing the important expression that inevitably is endan-
gered by any hate speech restriction. Censorial consequences could re-
sult from many proposed or adopted university policies, including the
Stanford code, which sanctions speech intended to "insult or stigmatize"
on the basis of race or other prohibited grounds. For example, certain
feminists suggest that all heterosexual sex is rape because heterosexual
men are aggressors who operate in a cultural climate of pervasive sexism
and violence against women.270 Aren't these feminists insulting or stig-
matizing heterosexual men on the basis of their sex and sexual orienta-
tion? And how about a Holocaust survivor who blames all ("Aryan")
Germans for their collaboration during World War II? Doesn't this in-
sinuation insult or stigmatize on the basis of national and ethnic origin?
And surely we can think of numerous other examples that would have to
give us pause.
The difficulty of formulating limited, clear definitions of prohibited
hate speech, that do not encompass valuable contributions to societal dis-
course, is underscored by the seemingly intractable ambiguities in vari-
ous campus rules.271 Even proponents of campus hate speech regulations
recognize their inevitable ambiguities and contextualized applications, 272
with the result that the individuals who enforce them must have substan-
tial discretion to draw distinctions based upon the particular facts and
circumstances involved in any given case. Professor Richard Delgado,
an early advocate of rules proscribing hate speech, acknowledged that
the offensiveness of even such a traditionally insulting epithet as "nigger"
would depend on the context in which it was uttered, since it could be a
term of affection when exchanged between friends.273 The imprecise na-
269. Id.
270. See Duggan, Hunter & Vance, False Promises Feminist Antipornography Legislation in the
U.S., in WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP 130, 134, 138-39, 146-47 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985); Snitow,
Retrenchment Versus Transformation: The Politics of the Antipornography Movement, in id. at 118.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 206-21.
272. See Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2373.
273. Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling,
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 179-80 (1982). According to Professor Delgado,
[Ain epithet such as "You damn nigger" would almost always be found actionable, as it is
highly insulting and highly racial .... Boy," directed at a young black male, might be
actionable, depending on the speaker's intent, the hearer's understanding, and whether a
reasonable person would consider it a racial insult in the particular context. "Hey, nig.
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ture of racist speech regulations is underscored further by the fact that
even their proponents are unsure or disagree as to their applicability in
particular situations. 274
Once we acknowledge the substantial discretion that anti-hate
speech rules will vest in those who enforce them, then we are ceding to
the government the power to pick and choose whose words to protect
and whose to punish. Such discretionary governmental power is funda-
mentally antithetical to the free speech guarantee. Once the government
is allowed to punish any speech based upon its content, free expression
exists only for those with power.
c. The content-neutrality principle reflects sensitivity to hate speech s
hurtful power. Contrary to Professor Lawrence's apparent assump-
tion,275 the conclusion that free speech protections must remain indivisi-
ble, even for racist speech, has nothing to do with insensitivity to the
feelings of minority group members who are vilified by hate speech and
suffer acutely from it. Traditional civil libertarians recognize the power
of words to inflict psychic and even physical wounds.276 For example,
precisely because the ACLU both acknowledges the power of speech and
defends the exercise of that power even by those who express anti-civil
libertarian ideas, the ACLU expressly dissociates itself from such ideas
and makes it a priority to combat them through counterspeech and ac-
tion.277 Nor are traditional civil libertarians unconcerned with the rights
of hate speech victims, as Professor Lawrence implies.278 To the con-
ger," spoken affectionately between black persons and used as a greeting, would not be
actionable. An insult such as "You dumb honkey," directed at a white person, could be
actionable.., but only in the unusual situations where the plaintiff would suffer harm from
such an insult.
Id.
274. For example, during a discussion about the University of Wisconsin rule regulating hate
speech, even advocates of the rule disagreed as to whether it would (or should) apply to the following
hypothetical situation: A white student sits down next to a black student and says, "I want you to
know that I'm a racist and hate the idea of blacks being here at the university," but does not use any
racist epithet. Telephone interview with Eunice Edgar, Executive Director of ACLU of Wisconsin
(Nov. 14, 1989). See also Gottlieb, supra note 4 (Professor Thomas Grey, who drafted Stanford
code, "said his rule probably wouldn't apply to one of the most publicized racial incidents at Stan-
ford, when a white student left on a black student's door a poster of Beethoven drawn as a black
caricature.") (emphasis added).
275. See Lawrence, at 458-59.
276. See Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2336 ("Victims of vicious hate propaganda have experienced
physiological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut, rapid pulse rate and
difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and
suicide.").
277. See supra note 53 (quoting relevant ACLU policy).
278. See Lawrence, at 448, 456, 458, 478.
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trary, civil libertarians champion the rights of all individuals to live in a
society untainted by racism and other forms of bias.279
I was appalled by Professor Lawrence's account of the vicious racist
vilification to which his sister's family recently was subjected.2 80 This
account powerfully demonstrates that the old nursery rhyme is wrong:
Maybe words are different from sticks and stones insofar as they cannot
literally break our bones, but words can and do hurt-brutally.
Two prominent defenders of content-neutral protection for hate
speech have described painful personal experiences as victims of such
speech. I refer to Stanford Law Professor Gerald Gunther, who was a
leading opponent of the proposed Stanford code which Professor Law-
rence advocates,281 and Aryeh Neier, who as Executive Director of the
ACLU during the Skokie episode vigorously championed the free speech
rights of racists and anti-Semites. 282 Far from opposing censorship de-
spite the suffering they personally experienced as a result of hate speech,
Messrs. Gunther283 and Neier284 oppose censorship precisely because of
279. For ACLU policies opposing racism and other types of bias, see supra notes 11 & 15 and
Appendix; for ACLU efforts to combat discrimination, see supra note 16 and infra text accompany-
ing notes 336-55.
280. See Lawrence, at 460. It should be stressed, however, that this expression would not be
encompassed by either the Stanford code or Professor Lawrence's variation on it. See supra notes
205-06.
281. See Letter from Professor Gerald Gunther to Professor George Parker, Chair of the Stu-
dent Conduct Legislative Council, Stanford University (Mar. 10, 1989), reprinted in Stanford Univ.
Campus Rep., Mar. 15, 1989, at 17 [hereinafter Gunther letter (March 10, 1989)]. Gunther wrote
that:
[L]est it be said that I unduly slight the pain imposed by expressions of racial or religious
hatred let me add that I have suffered that pain. I empathize with others who have, and I
rest my deep belief in the principles of the First Amendment in part on my own
experiences.
I received my elementary education in a public school in a very small town in Nazi
Germany. I was subjected to vehement anti-Semitic remarks, from my teacher, my class-
mates and others. "Judensau" (Jew pig) was far from the harshest.
282. See A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 2-3 (recounting his childhood as a Jew in Hitler's Ger-
many, his narrow escape from the Nazi death camps, and the extermination of almost all his rela-
tives, beyond his immediate family, during World War II).
283. Professor Gunther stated that:
My own experiences have certainly not led me to be insensitive to the myriad pains offen-
sive speech can and often does impose. But the lesson I have drawn from my childhood in
Nazi Germany and my happier adult life in this country is the need to walk the sometimes
difficult path of denouncing the bigots' hateful ideas with all my power yet at the same time
challenging any community's attempt to suppress hateful ideas by force of law.
Gunther letter (March Ip, 1989), supra note 281.
284. Aryeh Neier, reflecting on his role in the Skokie incident, recalled that:
The most frequently repeated line of all in the many letters about Skokie that I received
was: "How can you, a Jew, defend freedom for Nazis?".... The response I made... most
often began with a question: "How can I, a Jew, refuse to defend freedom, even for Nazis?
..." Because we Jews are uniquely vulnerable, I believe we can win only brief respite from
persecution in a society in which encounters are settled by power. As a Jew, therefore... I
want restraints placed on power .... I want restraints which prohibit those in power from
interfering with my right to speak, my right to publish, or my right to gather with others
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these personal experiences. The justification for not outlawing "words
that wound" 285 is not based on a failure to recognize the injurious poten-
tial of words. The refusal to ban words is due precisely to our under-
standing both of how very powerful they are and of the critical role they
play in our democratic society.286
III. PROFESSOR LAWRENCE'S RATIONALES FOR REGULATING
RACIST SPEECH WOULD JUSTIFY SWEEPING PROHIBITIONS,
CONTRARY TO FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES
Although Professor Lawrence actually advocates regulating only a
relatively narrow category of racist speech, his rationales could be as-
serted to justify broader rules. Indeed, he himself appears to recognize
that, if accepted, his approach could lead to outlawing all racist speech,
as well as other forms of hate speech. 28 7 Since many universities and
individuals now advocate broader-ranging regulations-and since Profes-
sor Lawrence also endorses restrictions that have a "considerably
broader reach" than the Stanford code28 8-it is important to consider the
problems with Professor Lawrence's more expansive rationales. His gen-
eral theories about racist speech entail substantial departures from tradi-
tional civil libertarian and constitutional law positions.
A. Brown and Other Cases Invalidating Governmental Racist Conduct
Do Not Justify Regulating Non-Governmental Racist Speech
Professor Lawrence intriguingly posits that Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 289 Bob Jones University v. United States, 290 and other civil rights
cases justify regulation of private racist speech. 291 The problem with
drawing an analogy between all of these cases and the subject at hand is
that the cases involved either government speech, as opposed to speech
who also feel threatened.... To defend myself, I must restrain power with freedom, even if
the temporary beneficiaries are the enemies of freedom.
A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 4-5.
285. See Delgado, supra note 273, at 133.
286. See Gale & Strossen, supra note 19, at 171. In their article, the authors stated that:
We know that free speech poses great personal and societal risks, and that the risks are
borne, unfairly and disproportionately, by individuals and groups that any just and hu-
mane society would single out instead for respect, compassion, help, and even reparation
for past wrongs. But we also know that racism, sexism, and silence have combined too
often to form an unholy trinity in the history of oppression in the United States.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
288. Lawrence, at 456. See also supra note 27.
289. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
290. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
291. See Lawrence, at 438-49.
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by private individuals, or conduct, as opposed to speech.292 Indeed,
Brown itself is distinguishable on both grounds.
1. The Speech/Conduct Distinction. First, the governmental de-
fendant in Brown-the Topeka, Kansas Board of Education-was not
simply saying that blacks are inferior. Rather, it was treating them as
inferior through pervasive patterns of conduct, by maintaining systems
and structures of segregated public schools. To be sure, a by-product of
the challenged conduct was a message, but that message was only inci-
dental. Saying that black children are unfit to attend school with whites
is materially distinguishable from legally prohibiting them from doing so,
despite the fact that the legal prohibition may convey the former
message.
Professor Lawrence's point proves too much. If incidental messages
could transform conduct into speech, then the distinction between speech
and conduct would disappear completely, because all conduct conveys a
message. To take an extreme example, a racially motivated lynching ex-
presses the murderer's hatred or contempt for his victim. But the clearly
unlawful act is not protected from punishment by virtue of the incidental
message it conveys. And the converse also is true. Just because the gov-
ernment may suppress particular hate messages that are the by-product
of unlawful conduct, it does not follow that it may suppress all hate
messages. Those messages not tightly linked to conduct must still be
protected.293
Professor Lawrence's argument is not advanced by his unexception-
able observation that all human activity may be described both as
"speech" and as "conduct." All speech entails some activity (e.g., the act
of talking) and all conduct expresses some message.294 First, this fact
does not justify treating any speech-conduct as unprotected; second, it
does not justify eliminating protection from the particular class of
speech-conduct that Professor Lawrence deems regulable.
The fact that there is no clear distinction between speech and con-
duct does not necessarily warrant limiting the scope of protected speech-
conduct;295 instead, the lack of a clear distinction could as logically war-
292. Regarding the significance of this distinction, see supra text accompanying notes 234-41.
293. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
294. See Lawrence, at 440 n.43.
295. For example, as Professor Lawrence observes, id., John Hart Ely has described all commu-
nicative behavior as "100% action and 100% expression." Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482,
1495-96 (1975). This does not lead Professor Ely, however, to conclude that all speech should be
regulated. Nor does it lead him to conclude that the speech/conduct distinction is irrelevant to first
amendment analysis. Rather, he suggests that, in evaluating the constitutionality of a government
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rant expanding the scope of protection. Although one could argue-as
does Professor Lawrence-that some speech is tantamount to conduct
and should therefore be regulated, one could also argue that some con-
duct is tantamount to speech and therefore should not be regulated.
This latter approach has characterized a* line of Supreme Court decisions
that protect various forms of conduct, ranging from labor picketing296 to
burning the American flag, 297 as "symbolic speech."
The absence of a clear distinction between speech and conduct also
does not support Professor Lawrence's particular concept of regulable
racist speech. Even assuming that his wholesale abandonment of the
traditional distinction is warranted with respect to racist words and
deeds, Professor Lawrence himself apparently concedes that this still
would not justify the regulation of all racist words. To the contrary, he
advocates regulating only a limited class of such words. But if Professor
Lawrence does not draw the line between regulable and non-regulable
racist speech on the basis of the speech/conduct dichotomy, on what
basis does he draw that line? He does not offer a clear limiting principle
regulation of certain conduct, the analytical focus should not be on whether that conduct should be
classified as "speech" or "action." Instead, he urges, the relevant inquiry should be whether the
regulation is aimed at the expressive aspect of such conduct. If so, it is presumptively unconstitu-
tional; if not, it is presumptively constitutional. Id. at 1496-97. This is the analysis that the Court
enunciated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968) (upholding statute that criminal-
ized the destruction of draft cards where governmental interest was limited to the noncommunica-
tive aspect of defendant's conduct).
Under the Ely-O'Brien analysis, Brown does not involve the regulation of the expressive aspect
of speech-conduct. Under the O'Brien test, as Professor Ely paraphrased it, "[t]he critical question
... [is] whether the harm that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact that the
defendant is communicating.., or rather would arise even if the defendant's conduct had no com-
municative significance whatsoever." Ely, supra, at 1497. Analysis reveals that school segregation
would be invalidated apart from its communicative significance.
One can imagine situations in which the act of requiring schools to be racially segregated did
not convey the message of white supremacy which Professor Lawrence views as the central meaning
of school segregation. See Lawrence, at 441, 462-64. Yet Brown surely would hold that such segre-
gated schools violate the equal protection clause. For example, a black student who had been raised
in a different culture marked by black supremacy, and then moved to the U.S. and attended a ra-
cially segregated school, might well interpret school segregation as conveying the message of white
inferiority. Would Brown not demand that this student should nonetheless attend a desegregated
school? As another example, a community might come to view racial diversity much the way it
regards religious diversity, so that the choice to attend a religiously segregated school would be
viewed as conveying no more stigmatizing a message than the choice to attend a religiously segre-
gated school. Would Brown not insist, nevertheless, that no public schools could be racially segre-
gated, even if the option of attending them was completely voluntary? See Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (rejected "freedom-of-choice" plan for desegregation).
296. See, eg., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (peaceful picketing to publicize labor
dispute is constitutionally protected free speech).
297. See United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409-18 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct.
2533, 2539 (1989) (Flag burning is "conduct sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to
implicate the first amendment.").
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for distinguishing the racist speech that should be regulated from the
entire corpus of racist speech, which he views as conduct, and hence pre-
sumptively regulable under the speech/conduct approach. 298
2. The Private Action/State Action Distinction. Even if Brown in-
volved only a governmental message of racism, without any attendant
conduct, that case still would be distinguishable in a crucial way from a
private individual's conveyance of the same message. Under the post-
Civil War constitutional amendments, the government is committed to
eradicating all badges and incidents of slavery, including racial discrimi-
nation. Consistent with the paramount importance of this obligation, the
Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause bars the govern-
ment from loaning textbooks to racially discriminatory private
schools, 299 even though the Court had held previously that the establish-
ment clause does not bar the government from loaning textbooks to pri-
vate religious schools. 3°° In this respect, the government's constitutional
duty to dissociate itself from racism is even greater than its constitutional
duty to dissociate itself from religion.301 The government's supreme obli-
gation to counter racism clearly is incompatible with racist speech
promulgated by the government itself. Private individuals have no com-
parable duty.
Professor Mari Matsuda has argued that the government's failure to
punish private hate speech could be viewed as state action insofar as this
failure conveys a message that the state tolerates such speech.302 Because
the Court construes the establishment clause as prohibiting government
298. The fact that Professor Lawrence also rejects the state action doctrine as a limiting princi-
ple on government's regulatory power further expands the range of speech that he would allow to be
restricted. See Lawrence, at 444-49.
Scholars constantly grapple with the complex problems of how to separate regulable from non-
regulable speech. For recent efforts, see C. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
(1989); K. GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989); H. KALVEN, JR.,
A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988); F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH:
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). Yet I am unaware of any that provide a more coherent basic
approach than the Court's current general framework: A government regulation aimed at speech or
expressive conduct is presumptively unconstitutional unless "it furthers an important... govern-
mental interest ... [that] is unrelated to the suppression of free expression ... [and] the incidental
restriction on .... First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). If speech is integrally interrelated
with, or incites, violent or otherwise unlawful conduct, government regulation would be permitted
under the O'Brien formulation. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
299. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 471 (1973).
300. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
301. See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 470 ("However narrow may be the channel of permissible state
aid to sectarian schools .... it permits a greater degree of state assistance than may be given to
private schools which engage in discriminatory practices.").
302. See Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2378-79.
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action that conveys a message of state support for religion, 30 3 establish-
ment clause cases constitute instructive precedents for evaluating Profes-
sor Matsuda's argument.3°4  In the analogous establishment clause
context, the Court repeatedly has held that the government's neutral tol-
erance and protection of private religious expression, along with all other
expression, does not convey a message that the government endorses reli-
gion.305 In its 1990 decision in Board of Education of Westside Commu-
nity Schools v. Mergens,306 the Court expressly reaffirmed the crucial
distinction between government and private speech, in the establishment
clause context, in terms fully applicable to the racist speech controversy.
The Court declared, "[T]here is a crucial difference between government
speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exer-
cise Clauses protect. ' 30 7 Paraphrasing this language and applying it to
the campus hate speech context, one could say, "There is a crucial differ-
ence between government speech endorsing racism, which the Equal Pro-
tection Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing racism, which the
Free Speech Clause protects."
In light of the government's special duty to dissociate itself from
racism, one might try to distinguish private religious speech from private
racist speech-much as the Court distinguished textbook loans to ra-
cially discriminatory private schools from the same kind of loans to pri-
vate religious schools.308 However, the direct, tangible, explicit
government support of racially discriminatory schools through textbook
lending programs is critically different from the indirect, intangible, im-
plicit government support allegedly lent to racist conduct by the govern-
ment's failure to outlaw private racist speech.309
303. See, eg., County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3101 (1989) (establishment clause
inquiry is whether government is "conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred").
304. Professor Lawrence also suggests the- analogy between establishment clause doctrine and
the law governing race discrimination. See Lawrence, at 447 ("for over three hundred years, racist
speech has been the liturgy of America's leading established religion, the religion of racism").
305. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (interpreting Equal Access Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988), which prohibits public secondary schools from denying meeting space
to religious and other clubs on the basis of speech content, expresses neutrality towards religion);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271-72 (1981) (when university has created a forum generally
open to student groups, its content-based exclusion of religious speech violates principle that regula-
tion should be content-neutral).
306. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
307. Id. at 2372 (emphasis added).
308. See supra text accompanying notes 299-300.
309. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466 (1973) (state may not grant "tangible financial
aid.., if [it] has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination");
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Professor Lawrence makes a telling point when he says that our gov-
ernment never has repudiated the group libels it perpetrated for years
against blacks and that it is insufficient for the government simply to
cease uttering those libels.310 One approach for promoting racial equal-
ity, which is consistent with free speech, is to urge the government to
proclaim anti-racist messages.31
Professor Lawrence also makes the persuasive point that there is no
absolute distinction between state and private action in the racist sphere,
insofar as private acts of discrimination (as well as government acts) also
are unlawful.3 12 This point, however, raises the other distinction dis-
cussed above-the distinction between words and conduct. Civil liber-
tarians vigorously support the civil rights laws that make private
discriminatory acts illegal, 313 but that is a far cry from making private
speech illegal. The Bob Jones case, upon which Professor Lawrence seeks
to rely,3 14 illustrates these distinctions. What was objectionable there
was the government conduct that supported and endorsed the private
racist conduct-namely, the government's making of financial contribu-
tions, through the tax system, to racially discriminatory private educa-
tional institutions. Moreover, even if a private university could be
prohibited from taking discriminatory actions-in the case of Bob Jones
University, barring interracial marriage and dating-it still could not be
prohibited from advocating such actions. The ACLU amicus brief in the
Bob Jones case315 made precisely these points in countering the Univer-
sity's claim that withdrawing its tax benefits would violate its first
amendment rights. The ACLU argued,316 and the Court agreed, 317 that
the University was still free to urge its students not to engage in interra-
id at 467 (state must not give "significant aid" to racially discriminatory private institutions); id. at
469 (discriminatory private schools may not receive "material aid" from state).
310. Lawrence, at 447.
311. See infra text accompanying notes 397.402.
312. See Lawrence, at 449.
313. See infra text accompanying notes 338-55 (outlining ACLU's efforts to combat racism).
The ACLU joined an amicus brief filed by a coalition of civil rights organizations in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), endorsing the Court's earlier interpretation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) as outlawing private race discrimination, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 173 (1976) (section 1981 reaches private acts of discrimination).
314. See Lawrence, at 449.
315. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish Committee, Amici
Curiae in support of Affirmance at 37-38, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
(Nos. 81-3, 81-1).
316. Professor Strossen was counsel of record for the ACLU and the American Jewish Commit-
tee, amici curiae, advocating government denial of tax benefits to racially discriminatory educational
institutions.
317. See Bob Jones 461 U.S. at 603-04 ("Denial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial
impact on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from observ-
ing their religious tenets."). Accord Runyon, 427 U.S. at 177 (42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) forbids pri-
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cial marriage or dating, and this was as far as its first amendment rights
extended. Prohibited racist acts are no different from other prohibited
acts. The government may punish the acts, but it may not punish words
that advocate or endorse them.
The other cases upon which Professor Lawrence premises his argu-
ment also do not authorize the regulation of private racist speech. For
example, he attempts to analogize private racist speech to a local govern-
ment's financing of allegedly "private" segregated (all-white) schools, af-
ter the government had closed down public schools in defiance of
desegregation orders.318 Lawrence misreads these cases as standing for
the proposition "that the defamatory message of segregation would not
be insulated from constitutional proscription simply because the speaker
was a non-government entity. '319 Another example is provided by
Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board, in which the Supreme
Court held that the governmental financing of segregated schools consti-
tuted prohibited state action.320 In contrast, had individual school dis-
trict residents urged their government to undertake such action, or
expressed this opinion to black residents, that would have constituted
protected private speech. 32'
B. The Non-Intellectual Content of Some Racist Speech Does Not
Justify its Prohibition
In addition to his principal argument that private racist speech can
be regulated because it is indistinguishable from governmental racist con-
duct, Professor Lawrence offers a second justification. He contends that
"[a] defining attribute of speech is that it appeals first to the mind of the
hearer who can evaluate its truth or persuasiveness, '322 and that because
certain racist speech lacks this quality, it should not be viewed as speech.
This position is inconsistent with fundamental free speech values.
vate, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admission based on race, but such
schools remain free "to inculcate whatever values and standards they deem desirable.").
318. See Lawrence, at 448 & n.75.
319. Id. at 448.
320. 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
321. Equally unpersuasive is Professor Lawrence's attempted reliance on cases upholding
prohibitions upon race-designated advertisements for employees, home sales, and rentals, see Law-
rence, at 449 & n.81, 464 n.123. As the Supreme Court ruled, in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973), these advertisements constituted integral elements of
the prohibited discriminatory conduct-i.e., refusing to hire women. Id at 388-89. Therefore, these
advertisements fit within the general category of speech that may be regulated on the ground that it
constitutes an essential element of an unlawful act. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
322. Lawrence. at 452 n.87.
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Lawrence's argument overlooks the teachings of such landmark
Supreme Court decisions as Terminiello v. Chicago 323 and Cohen v. Cali-
fornia,324 which hold that protectible speech often appeals to the emo-
tions as well as the mind. As early as 1948, the Court recognized that
first amendment protection is not restricted to the "exposition of
ideas. ' 325 As Justice Douglas declared in a celebrated passage in
Terminiello:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challeng-
ing. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why
freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected
against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far
above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. There is no room
under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative
would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or
dominant political or community groups. 326
Justice Harlan327 echoed this theme in Cohen when he explained
that protectible expression
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explica-
tion, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are
often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We
cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that
emotive function which practically speaking, may often be the more im-
portant element of the overall message sought to be communicated. 328
323. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
324. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
325. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (reversing conviction for selling crime
magazines under statute prohibiting publication of "stories of... bloodshed, lust or crime" as ob-
scene, id. at 508). The Court concluded that expression devoid of "ideas," but with entertainment
value, was protected, because "[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for
the protection of that basic [first amendment] right .... What is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine." Id. at 510.
326. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4-5 (citations omitted). For a very different view, compare Law-
rence, at 438 ("Regulations that require civility of discourse in certain designated forums are not
incursions on intellectual and political debate.").
327. It is noteworthy that these two ringing endorsements of constitutional protection for offen-
sive, provocative speech were written by Justices at opposite ends of the Court's ideological spec-
trum. The agreement on this issue between Justice Douglas, a noted liberal, and Justice Harlan, a
respected conservative, indicates that their views represent a solidly entrenched consensus about free
speech tenets.
328. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added). Professor Tribe eloquently described how Cohen
supports a more generous vision of protectible speech than just the intellectually oriented speech that
Professor Lawrence would protect: "Justice Harlan's opinion for the majority [in Cohen] implicitly
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Together, Terminiello and Cohen recognize that speech often ex-
presses the speaker's emotions and appeals to the audience's emotions.
This generalization applies not only to the ugly words of racist vitupera-
tion, but also to the beautiful words of poetry. Indeed, much indisputa-
bly valuable language, as well as expressive conduct, has the intention
and effect of appealing not directly or not only to the mind. Such lan-
guage also seeks to and does engage the audience's emotions. If emotion-
provoking discourse were denied protected status, then much political
speech-which is usually viewed as being at the core of first amendment
protection-would fall outside the protected realm. The Court in Termi-
niello and Cohen rejected the restricted first amendment paradigm of "a
sedate assembly of speakers who calmly discussed the issues of the day
and became ultimately persuaded by the logic of one of the competing
positions. '329 Professor Lawrence reveals his narrower view when he
asks, "[A]re racial insults ideas? Do they encourage wide-open de-
bate?" 330 In light of the Terminiello-Cohen line of cases, Professor Law-
rence wrongly implies that a negative response to these questions should
remove racial insults from the domain of protected speech. Professor
Lawrence also incorrectly implies that the response to these questions
should be negative. Racial insults convey ideas of racial supremacy and
inferiority. Objectionable and discredited as these ideas may be, they are
ideas nonetheless. 331
IV. PROHIBITING RACIST SPEECH WOULD NOT EFFECTIVELY
COUNTER, AND COULD EVEN AGGRAVATE, THE
UNDERLYING PROBLEM OF RACISM
A. Civil Libertarians Should Continue to Make Combating Racism a
Priority
Despite Professor Lawrence's proffered justifications for regulating a
broader spectrum of racist speech, he in fact advocates regulating only a
limited category of speech.332 Thus, even Professor Lawrence's views of
rejected the hoary dichotomy between reason and desire that so often constricts the reach of the first
amendment." L. TRIBE, supra note 58, § 12-1 at 787-88.
329. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 18 (1974). Compare Lawrence, at 452 ("The racial invective is experienced as
a blow, not a proffered idea, and... it is unlikely that dialogue will follow.").
330. Lawrence, at 463 n. 119.
331. Professor Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2360, acknowledged that racist speech conveys an idea
when she stated that, "Racial supremacy is one of the ideas we have collectively and internationally
considered and rejected." (emphasis added). Professor Lawrence recognized the same point when he
quoted this sentence from Matsuda. Lawrence, at 463 n. 119.
332. See Lawrence, at 435-36, 450 & n.82, 458 & nn.105-06.
Vol. 1990:484]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
regulable speech, although broader than those of the Supreme Court or
traditional civil libertarians, would allow most racist speech on campus.
I do not think it is worth spending a great deal of time debating the
fine points of specific rules or their particular applications to achieve
what necessarily will be only marginal differences in the amount of racist
insults that can be sanctioned. The larger problems of racist attitudes
and conduct--of which all these words are symptoms-would remain.
Those who share the dual goals of promoting racial equality and protect-
ing free speech must concentrate on countering racial discrimination,
rather than on defining the particular narrow subset of racist slurs that
constitutionally might be regulable.
I welcome Professor Lawrence's encouragement to civil libertarians
to "engage actively in speech and action that resists and counters the
racist ideas the first amendment protects. ' 333 But Professor Lawrence
need not urge traditional civil libertarians to "put[ ] at least as much
effort and as many resources into fighting for the victims of racism as we
put into protecting the rights of racists. ' 334 The ACLU, for example,
puts far more effort and resources into assisting the victims of racism
than into defending the rights of racists.
Although ACLU cases involving the Ku Klux Klan and other racist
speakers often generate a disproportionate amount of publicity, they con-
stitute only a tiny fraction of the ACLU's caseload. In the recent past,
the ACLU has handled about six cases a year advocating the free speech
rights of white supremacists, out of a total of more than six thousand
cases, 335 and these white supremacist cases rarely consume significant re-
sources. 336 Moreover, the resources the ACLU does expend to protect
hatemongers' first amendment rights are well-invested. They ultimately
preserve not only civil liberties, but also our democratic system, for the
benefit of all. 337
333. Id. at 480.
334. C. Lawrence, Presentation at ACLU Biennial Conference, see supra note t, at 30.
335. Less than one-tenth of one percent of the ACLU's cases involve the defense of groups that
might be labeled white supremacists. See ACLU pamphlet, supra note 262, at 10.
336. See A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 148 (free speech cases rarely involve factual disputes and
therefore can be litigated relatively inexpensively).
337. Aryeh Neier persuasively drew this conclusion with respect to the ACLU's defense of the
American Nazi Party's right to demonstrate in Skokie:
[When it was all over no one had been persuaded to join [the Nazis]. They had dissemi-
nated their message and it had been rejected.
Why did the Nazi message fall on such deaf ears? Revolutionaries and advocates of
destruction attract followers readily when the society they wish to overturn loses legiti-
macy. Understanding this process, revolutionaries try to provoke the government into us-
ing repressive measures. They rejoice, as the American Nazis did, when their rights are
denied to them; they count on repression to win them sympathizers.
In confronting the Nazis, however, American democracy did not lose, but preserved
its legitimacy ....
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The ACLU has devoted substantial resources to the struggle against
racism.338 The ACLU backed the civil rights movement in its early
years, working with lawyers from the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP) to plan the attack on segrega-
tion. In 1931, the ACLU published Black Justice, a comprehensive
report on legalized racism. 339 Although the ACLU initially was not in-
volved in the infamous Scottsboro cases-in which seven young black
men were convicted of raping two white women after sham trials before
an all-white jury-an ACLU attorney argued and won the first of these
cases to reach the Supreme Court.340
During World War II, the ACLU sponsored a challenge to the seg-
regated draft and organized the Committee Against Racial Discrimina-
tion.3 41 In the 1950s, the ACLU successfully challenged state laws that
made it a crime for a white woman to bear a child she had conceived
with a black father.342 In the 1960s, the ACLU provided funds and law-
yers to defend civil rights activists, and since then it has lobbied exten-
sively for civil rights legislation.343
The ACLU's Voting Rights Project has helped to empower black
voters throughout the southern United States, facilitating the election of
The judges who devoted so much attention to the Nazis, the police departments that
paid so much overtime, and the American Civil Liberties Union, which lost a half-million
dollars in membership income as a consequence of its defense, used their time and money
well. They defeated the Nazis by preserving the legitimacy of American democracy.
Id. at 170-71.
338. This paragraph, and the accompanying footnotes, are drawn substantially from Gale &
Strossen, supra note 19, at 164, 170-71, 175-76.
339. See S. WALKER, supra note 16, at 88-90.
340. See id. at 91. See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (conviction reversed
because of denial of adequate counsel at trial).
341. See S. WALKER, supra note 16, at 162-66.
342. See American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Women's Rights Report (Spring 1980) (avail-
able from author).
343. See S. WALKER, supra note 16, at 162-63, 262-70. See also Memorandum from Morton H.
Halperin and Wade Henderson to ACLU Executive Committee (Feb. 22, 1990) (available from au-
thor). The ACLU's legislative office played a key role in lobbying for such major civil rights legisla-
tion as the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.), Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.
and 42 U.S.C.), and renewal of Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96
Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 1973aa-6 (1988)); it also took the lead in
opposing various constitutional amendments and bills which would have restricted civil rights, in-
cluding court stripping proposals; during the most recent legislative session it helped to draft and
lobbied for numerous pieces of civil rights legislation, including the Racial Justice Act, S. 1696, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), H.R. 4618, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), which would prohibit imposition of
the death penalty in a racially discriminatory manner, and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), H.R.4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (veto message read to Senate,
136 CONG. REC. S16562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990)), which would overturn several recent Supreme
Court decisions constricting civil rights remedies.
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hundreds of black officials.344 The ACLU also maintains several other
special "Projects" whose constituents or clients are predominantly
black-for example, the National Prison Project, the Capital Punishment
Project, and the Children's Rights Project. For the past several years,
the ACLU's national legal department has focused on civil liberties is-
sues related to race and poverty.3 45 In 1988, ACLU President Norman
Dorsen appointed a special commission to oversee and coordinate the
national ACLU's multiple efforts to combat racial discrimination.3 46 In
addition, state and local-level branches of the ACLU consistently allo-
cate substantial resources to civil rights cases.347
As indicated by both policy 348 and action, the ACLU is committed
to eradicating racial discrimination on campus as an essential step to-
ward its larger goal of eliminating racial discrimination from society at
large.349 For example, ACLU leaders have corresponded and met with
university officials to recommend measures that universities could imple-
ment to combat campus racism, consistent with both equality and free
speech values.350 In the same vein, ACLU officials have worked for the
implementation of educational programs designed to counter racist atti-
tudes among college students, 35 1 as well as younger students.3 5 2 Addi-
344. See S. WALKER, supra note 16, at 356-57.
345. See powell, Memorandum, supra note 16.
346. See ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 11, at Policy No. 312b, 389b.
347. For example, the Southern California ACLU (ACLU-SC) successfully challenged school
and housing segregation and miscegenation laws as early as 1946. See S. WALKER, supra note 16, at
239. The ACLU-SC initiated and provided lead counsel for the major school desegregation cases in
Los Angeles and Pasadena, which spanned more than two decades. See the cases that culminated in
Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424 (1976); Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606
(1963).
348. See supra note 11 and Appendix.
349. See supra note 15.
350. See, eg., Rowan, "Apartheid" on U.S. Campuses, North America Syndicate, Press Release
(June 28, 1989) (describes such proposals made by Ira Glasser, ACLU Executive Director); Letter
from Ira Glasser to university presidents (July 12, 1989) (available from author).
351. See generally responses to survey of ACLU affiliates regarding efforts to promote diversity
(June 15, 1990) [hereinafter ACLU Survey] (available from author). The following responses are of
particular interest: Response of Massachusetts affiliate, at 3 (offering programs for dealing with
racism on university campuses); Response of New Hampshire affiliate, at 3 (planning forum on
campus hate speech and racism); Response of North Carolina affiliate, at 3 (seeking funding for
project to counter underlying causes of campus hate speech); Response of Northern California affili-
ate, at 4 (working in coalition to develop program to educate undergraduates about value of affirma-
tive action).
352. See, eg., ACLU Survey, supra note 351, Response of Arkansas affiliate, at 3 (working with
coalition on developing programs for reducing racial tensions in high schools); Response of Colorado
affiliate, at 3 (worked closely with minority groups to deal with racial incidents in schools); Response
of Kentucky affiliate, at 3 (organized community and expert testimony on racism in public schools);
Response of Massachusetts affiliate, at 3 (developed programs on racism for schools, held student-
teacher conference on racism, and conducted summer institute for teachers on racism); Response of
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tionally, ACLU representatives have participated in universities'
deliberations about whether to adopt anti-hate-speech rules, and if so,
how to frame them.35 3 Representatives of the ACLU also have organ-
ized investigations of racist incidents at specific campuses, for purposes
of advising university officials how to counter those problems.354 Fur-
thermore, ACLU officials have organized and participated in protests of
racist incidents, both on campus and more generally.
355
In light of these efforts, Professor Lawrence's suggestion that "the
call for fighting racist attitudes and practices rather than speech [is] 'just
a lot of cheap talk' "356 is a cheap shot. In particular, it is noteworthy
that the ACLU affiliates that have brought lawsuits challenging campus
hate speech regulations also have undertaken specific efforts to counter
New York affiliate, at 3 (NYCLU official designed and co-teaches course at public high school about
roots of racism and has trained other bi-racial teams to teach this course at other high schools
throughout New York City); Response of Oregon affiliate, at 3 (working with Portland School Dis-
trict officials to include study of racism in curriculum). See also Goodstein, Warding Off Intolerance
in a Brooklyn School, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1990, at A3, col. I (describes ACLU program to teach
about racism in public schools).
353. See, e.g., Mayers, ACLU May Ask Court to Halt UW's Anti-Racism Proposal, Wisconsin
State J., July 11, 1989, B1, col. I (Wisconsin ACLU affiliate recommended specific changes to pro-
posed rules and said that if changes were adopted, ACLU would not make facial challenge to them,
but rather "would wait and see how the rules are working"); Michigan Regents' Minutes, supra note
203, at 19 (March 17, 1988) (at public hearing on proposed regulations, Michigan ACLU affiliate
supported concept of discriminatory harassment policy but made suggestions for improving specific
proposal); see also Appendix to Judgment, Wu v. University of Conn., No. Civ. H-89-649 PCD (D.
Conn. Jan. 25, 1990) (Connecticut ACLU affiliate recommended specific language that was substi-
tuted for University of Connecticut's anti-hate-speech rule, pursuant to agreement settling lawsuit).
354. See, eg., ACLU Survey, supra note 351, Response of Wisconsin affiliate, at 3 (ACLU Wis-
consin affiliate worked in coalition with black student organizations and other minority organiza-
tions for purposes of conducting state-wide investigation of racism on campus, including through use
of public hearings, and making recommendations of appropriate responses to campus officials).
Compare Lawrence, at 478 ("In the view of minority delegates [to the 1989 ACLU Biennial Confer-
ence], hearings should be held on university campuses where the incidence and nature of the injury
of racist speech could be carefully documented and responses that were least restrictive of protected
speech could be recommended.... But this approach.., was rejected.").
355. For recent examples, see, e.g., Smothers, New Coalition Condemns Howard Beach Assaults,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1986, at B4, col. 2. Smothers wrote that:
The executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, Norman Siegel, an orga-
nizer of the New Civil Rights coalition, said it was a multi-racial effort to "let everyone
know unequivocally that we will not tolerate incidents of racial bigotry or a climate that
fosters anything but racial equality and harmony in our city."
See also ACLU Survey, supra note 351, Response of New Jersey affiliate, at 3 (co-sponsored March
Against Racism in Newark during spring of 1990); Response of New York affiliate, at 3 (as co-
founder of New York City Civil Rights Coalition, affiliate has organized and participated in marches
and rallies against racism). In contrast, Lawrence argues without citing sources that "[t]hose who
raise their voices in protest against public sanctions of racist speech have not organized private
protests against the voices of racism. . . . [T]raditional civil libertarians have been conspicuous
largely in their absence from ... group expressions of condemnation [of racism]." Lawrence, at 476-
77.
356. Lawrence, at 480 n.166.
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campus and societal racism. 35 7 Moreover, the charge of "cheap talk"
more appropriately might be leveled at those who focus their attention
on hate speech regulations. Such regulations may appear to provide a
relatively inexpensive "quick fix," but racist speech is only one symptom
of the pervasive problem of racism, and this underlying problem will not
be solved by banning one of its symptoms.
B. Punishing Racist Speech Would Not Effectively Counter Racism
Parts II and III of this Article emphasized the principled reasons,
arising from first amendment theory, for concluding that racist speech
should receive the same protection as other offensive speech. This con-
clusion also is supported by pragmatic or strategic considerations con-
cerning the efficacious pursuit of equality goals. Not only would rules
censoring racist speech fail to reduce racial bias, but they might even
undermine that goal.
First, there is no persuasive psychological evidence that punishment
for name-calling changes deeply held attitudes. To the contrary, psycho-
logical studies show that censored speech becomes more appealing and
persuasive to many listeners merely by virtue of the censorship.358
Nor is there any empirical evidence, from the countries that do out-
law racist speech, that censorship is an effective means to counter racism.
For example, Great Britain began to prohibit racist defamation in
357. The three affiliates that have challenged university hate speech rules are located in Connect-
icut, Michigan, and Wisconsin. See supra note 17. All three are engaged in ongoing efforts to
counter race discrimination. See ACLU Survey, supra note 351, Response of Connecticut affiliate,
at 3 (it is currently producing videotape and teacher's guide, dealing with equality, for secondary
school teachers, for statewide distribution free or at a nominal charge; it also is initiating the devel-
opment and institution of curriculum on bigotry for elementary schools statewide); Response of
Michigan affiliate, at Attachment C (summarizes recent and upcoming litigation, legislative pro-
gram, and public education efforts regarding racial discrimination and prejudice); id. at Attachment
C (it won favorable settlement in case brought on behalf of two black University of Michigan gradu-
ate students who were asked to leave an all-white suburb where they were conducting research);
Response of Wisconsin affiliate, at 3 (it organized and is working with coalition of civil rights groups
to investigate and recommend University's response to campus racial incidents); id. at Appendix
("In March, 1988, the [Wisconsin affiliate] decided to devote the majority of the organization's re-
sources to protecting the civil rights of racial minorities and the poor."); id. at Appendix (summa-
rizes current activities of affiliate's "Poverty, Race and Civil Liberties Project").
Compare Lawrence, at 480 ("When the ACLU enters the debate by challenging the University
of Michigan's efforts to provide a safe harbor for its [minority] students . . . . we should not be
surprised that non-white students feel abandoned.").
358. See Brock, Erotic Materials: A Commodity Theory Analysis ofAvailability and Desirability,
in I TECHNICAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM'N ON OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY 131, 132 (1971);
Tannenbaum, Emotional Arousal As a Mediator of Communication Effects, in 8 TECHNICAL REPORT
OF THE U.S. COMM'N ON OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY 326-56 (1971); Worchel & Arnold, The
Effects of Censorship and Attractiveness of the Censor on Attitudinal Change, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 365 (1973).
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1965. 359 A quarter century later, this law has had no discernible adverse
impact on the National Front and other neo-Nazi groups active in Brit-
ain.360 As discussed above,361 it is impossible to draw narrow regulations
that precisely specify the particular words and contexts that should lead
to sanctions. Fact-bound determinations are required. For this reason,
authorities have great discretion in determining precisely which speakers
and which words to punish. Consequently, even vicious racist epithets
have gone unpunished under the British law.362 Moreover, even if actual
or threatened enforcement of the law has deterred some overt racist in-
sults, that enforcement has had no effect on more subtle, but nevertheless
clear, signals of racism.363 Some observers believe that racism is even
more pervasive in Britain than in the United States.364
C. Banning Racist Speech Could Aggravate Racism
For several reasons banning the symptom of racist speech may com-
pound the underlying problem of racism. Professor Lawrence sets up a
false dichotomy when he urges us to balance equality goals against free
speech goals. Just as he observes that free speech concerns should be
weighed on the pro-regulation, as well as the anti-regulation, side of the
balance, 365 he should recognize that equality concerns weigh on the anti-
regulation, as well as the pro-regulation, side.3 66
359. See infra text accompanying notes 367-70 for discussion of the Race Relations Act, 1965,
ch. 73.
360. See A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 154-55.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 218-21.
362. See Lasson, Racism in Great Britain: Drawing the Line on Free Speech, 7 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 161, 166, 171-73 (1987) (Democratic National Party Chairman Kingsley Read was
tried under Race Relations Act in 1978 for referring in a public speech to "niggers, wogs, and
coons," and for commenting on an Asian who had been killed in a race riot, "One down, a million to
go." The judge instructed the jury that Read's words were not in themselves unlawful, and the jury
acquitted Read.).
363. See id (in response to anti-hate speech laws, contemporary racist publications tend to be
more cautiously worded). See also A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 155 (National Front speakers substi-
tute code words, such as attacks on immigration and calls for law and order, for explicit racist
references).
364. For example, a 1988 article in the New York Times discussed the many incidents of violence
against blacks and Asians in London and quoted Paul Boateng, one of the four minority members of
the 650-member House of Commons, as follows:
[This] violence is linked to the deeper patterns of prejudice in a society in which racist
behavior is more socially acceptable than in the United States.... We should not underes-
timate the degree to which greed and racism have become legitimate in Britain .... [T]he
basic difference between the United States and Britain is that no one in America questions
the concept of the black American. In Britain we still have not won the argument of
whether it is possible to be black and British.
Raines, London Police Faulted as Racial Attacks Soar, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
365. See Lawrence, at 458.
366. In a passage cited by Professor Lawrence, see id. at 446 n.66, Professor Michelman recog-
nizes this point with respect to the analogous debate over whether pornography should be regulated.
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The first reason that laws censoring racist speech may undermine
the goal of combating racism flows from the discretion such laws inevita-
bly vest in prosecutors, judges, and the other individuals who implement
them. One ironic, even tragic, result of this discretion is that members of
minority groups themselves-the very people whom the law is intended
to protect-are likely targets of punishment. For example, among the
first individuals prosecuted under the British Race Relations Act of
1965367 were black power leaders.368 Their overtly racist messages un-
doubtedly expressed legitimate anger at real discrimination, yet the stat-
ute drew no such fine lines, nor could any similar statute possibly do so.
Rather than curbing speech offensive to minorities, this British law in-
stead has been regularly used to curb the speech of blacks, trade union-
ists, and anti-nuclear activists.369 In perhaps the ultimate irony, this
statute, which was intended to restrain the neo-Nazi National Front, in-
stead has barred expression by the Anti-Nazi League.370
The British experience is not unique. History teaches us that anti-
hate speech laws regularly have been used to oppress racial and other
minorities. For example, none of the anti-Semites who were responsible
for arousing France against Captain Alfred Dreyfus were ever prose-
cuted for group libel. But Emile Zola was prosecuted for libeling the
French clergy and military in his "J'Accuse," and he had to flee to Eng-
land to escape punishment.371 Additionally, closer to home, the very
doctrines that Professor Lawrence invokes to justify regulating campus
hate speech-for example, the fighting words doctrine, upon which he
See Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Por-
nography Regulations, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291, 307 (1989) (state should weigh "the infringements of
liberty and equal protection" that would result from regulating pornography against "the infringe-
ments ofliberty and equal protection" that would result from non-regulation) (emphasis added). See
also infra note 396 (feminists have argued that regulating pornography would violate equal protec-
tion clause and discriminate against women).
367. In 1965, Parliament adopted the Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, which criminalized the
intentional incitement of racial hatred. The Act was amended in 1976 to eliminate the intent re-
quirement of proving intent. The amended law made it an offense to distribute literature or to use
words likely to stir up hatred against any racial group. In 1986, Parliament enacted the Public
Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, which was designed to further ease the prosecution's evidentiary burden in
proving incitement to racial hatred. It criminalizes conduct which is either likely or intended to "stir
up" racial hatred. See Lasson, supra note 362, at 166, 171-73.
368. See Lasson, supra note 362, at 169.
369. See A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 153-55.
370. See id. at 157.
371. See ACLU pamphlet, supra note 262, at 8-9. See also Stein, History Against Free Speech:
The New German Law Against the "Auschwitz"-and Other-"Lies," 85 MICH. L. REv. 277 (1986),
Stein argues that although there was an article in the German Criminal Code in 1871 that punished
offenses against personal honor,
[T]he German Supreme Court . . . consistently refused to apply this article to insults
against Jews as a group-although it gave the benefit of its protection to such groups as
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chiefly relies-are particularly threatening to the speech of racial and
political minorities. 372
The general lesson that rules banning hate speech will be used to
punish minority group members has proven true in the specific context of
campus hate speech regulations. In 1974, in a move aimed at the Na-
tional Front, the British National Union of Students (NUS) adopted a
resolution that representatives of "openly racist and fascist organiza-
tions" were to be prevented from speaking on college campuses "by
whatever means necessary (including disruption of the meeting)." 373 A
substantial motivation for the rule had been to stem an increase in cam-
pus anti-Semitism. Ironically, however, following the United Nations'
cue,3 74 some British students deemed Zionism a form of racism beyond
the bounds of permitted discussion. Accordingly, in 1975 British stu-
dents invoked the NUS resolution to disrupt speeches by Israelis and
Zionists, including the Israeli ambassador to England. The intended tar-
get of the NUS resolution, the National Front, applauded this result.
However, the NUS itself became disenchanted by this and other unin-
tended consequences of its resolution and repealed it in 1977.375
The British experience under its campus anti-hate speech rule paral-
lels the experience in the United States under the one such rule that has
led to a judicial decision. During the approximately one year that the
University of Michigan rule was in effect, there were more than twenty
cases of whites charging blacks with racist speech. 376 More importantly,
the only two instances in which the rule was invoked to sanction racist
speech (as opposed to sexist and other forms of hate speech) involved the
punishment of speech by or on behalf of black students. 377 Additionally,
the only student who was subjected to a full-fledged disciplinary hearing
"Germans living in Prussian provinces, large landowners, all Christian clerics, German
officers, and Prussian troops who fought in Belgium and Northern France."
Id. at 286 (quoting P. Paepcke, Antisemitismus und Strafrecht 164 (dissertation, Albert-Ludwigs-
Universitit Freiburg i. Br., 1962)) (footnotes omitted).
372. See supra text accompanying notes 137-46 (fighting words), 52-53 (intentional infliction of
emotional distress) & 174-75 (group defamation).
373. A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 155-56.
374. See G.A. Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 83, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
375. See Neier, supra note 63, at 156. Some conservatives who were "very far from being Fas-
cists" also were barred from speaking under the NUS resolution. Id.
376. See Gottlieb, supra note 4.
377. See Plaintiff's Exhibit Submitted in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Doe
v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (No. 89-CV-71683-DT) (black student
used term "white trash" in conversation with white student); id. at 5 (at beginning of preclinical
dentistry course, recognized as difficult, faculty member led small group discussion, designed to
"identify concerns of students"; dental student said that he had heard, from his minority roommate,
that minorities have a difficult time in the course and were not treated fairly; the faculty member,
who was black, complained that the student was accusing her of racism).
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under the Michigan rule was a black student accused of homophobic and
sexist expression.3 78 In seeking clemency from the sanctions imposed fol-
lowing this hearing, the student asserted he had been singled out because
of his race and his political views.379 Others who were punished for hate
speech under the Michigan rule included several Jewish students accused
of engaging in anti-Semitic expression 380 and an Asian-American student
accused of making an anti-black comment.38' Likewise, the student who
recently brought a lawsuit challenging the University of Connecticut's
hate speech policy, under which she had been penalized for an allegedly
homophobic remark, was Asian-American. 38 2 She claimed that, among
the other students who had engaged in similar expression, she had been
singled out for punishment because of her ethnic background.38 3
Professor Lawrence himself recognizes that rules regulating racist
speech might backfire and be invoked disproportionately against blacks
and other traditionally oppressed groups. Indeed, he charges that other
university rules already are used to silence anti-racist, but not racist,
speakers.3 84 Professor Lawrence proposes to avoid this danger by ex-
cluding from the rule's protection "persons who were vilified on the basis
of their membership in dominant majority groups. ' 38 5 Even putting
aside the fatal first amendment flaws in such a radical departure from
378. See id at 6 (social work student was charged with saying in class that homosexuality is an
illness that needs to be cured and that he had developed a model to move gay men and lesbians
toward a heterosexual orientation; he also was charged with sexual harassment against particular
women).
379. See letter to James J. Duderstadt, President, University of Michigan, from a student (whose
name and signature were deleted from the copy produced during litigation, to protect the student's
privacy) (May 23, 1989), reprinted in Plaintiff's Exhibit Submitted in Support of Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction, Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 852. The student claimed that:
[Tihe charges were pretexual [sic] and a coverup for vindictiveness based on my refusal to
support any radical movements.... Moreover, these few students knew that a black stu-
dent would have no chance of wining [sic] a favorable decision against such charges. These
charges will haunt me for the rest of my life .... [T]hey will be used against me to prevent
me from becoming a certified Social Worker ....
380. See id. at 1-2 (students wrote graffiti, including swastika, on classroom blackboard, and said
they intended it as a practical joke).
381. See id. at 2-3 (his allegedly offensive remark was the question why black people feel dis-
criminated against; after being charged, he explained that he was attempting to complain that black
students in his dormitory tended to socialize together, with the result that he felt socially isolated).
382. See Wu v. University of Conn. (No. Civ. H89-649 PCD) (D. Conn. 1989); see also Black
Talks Prompt Protest and Complaint. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1989, § 1, at 67, col. I (first complaint
filed under Trinity College's new racial harassment policy was against black speaker sponsored by
black student organization, Black-Power Serves Itself).
383. Letter from Martin Margulies, of Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, to author, at 5 (Jan.
23, 1990) (available from author).
384. See Lawrence, at 466 (noting "cruel irony" in Stanford's refusal to punish white students
for hanging racist poster in dormitory, while punishing black students who engaged in peaceful sit-in
to protest that refusal).
385. Id. at 450 n.82.
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content- and viewpoint-neutrality principles, 386 the proposed exception
would create far more problems of equality and enforceability than it
would solve.3 87
A second reason why censorship of racist speech actually may sub-
vert, rather than promote, the goal of eradicating racism is that such
censorship measures often have the effect of glorifying racist speakers.
Efforts at suppression result in racist speakers receiving attention and
publicity which they otherwise would not have garnered. As previously
noted, psychological studies reveal that whenever the government at-
tempts to censor speech, the censored speech-for that very reason-
becomes more appealing to many people.388 Still worse, when pitted
against the government, racist speakers may appear as martyrs or even
heroes.
Advocates of hate speech regulations do not seem to realize that
their own attempts to suppress speech increase public interest in the ideas
they are trying to stamp out. Thus, Professor Lawrence wrongly sug-
gests that the ACLU's defense of hatemongers' free speech rights "makes
heroes out of bigots";3 89 in actuality, experience demonstrates that it is
the attempt to suppress racist speech that has this effect, not the attempt
to protect such speech. 390
There is a third reason why laws that proscribe racist speech could
well undermine goals of reducing bigotry. As Professor Lawrence recog-
386. See supra text accompanying notes 105-14.
387. Just one such problem is how "dominant majority groups" would be defined. Would they
be defined in the context of the particular academic community-for example, at Howard Law
School, blacks would probably fit this definition, and at Cardozo Law School, Jews would-or in the
context of the larger society?
This definitional problem is compounded by the fact that Professor Lawrence would require a
ranking of the relative dominance or subordination of various groups. During an oral defense of this
proposal, at Duke University School of Law on January 27, 1990, Professor Lawrence "clarified"
that it would prohibit a white woman from disparaging a black or gay man, but not a white, hetero-
sexual man. Professor Lawrence did not explain whether these outcomes would differ if the female
speaker were lesbian. See also Cohen, On Harassment, ACADEMIC QUESTIONS, Spring 1990, at 23,
29 (criticizing proposition that campus hate speech regulations should be applied differentially to
various groups, depending on their societal status). Cohen stated that:
Even if there were moral and intellectual substance to the distinction between subordinate
and nonsubordinate groups, the theoretical and operational barriers to determining the
membership and privileges of these groups seem insurmountable. The better rule is for the
university to remain agnostic, and treat all its members as individuals and equals.
388. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
389. Lawrence, at 438; accord id. at 436, 480.
390. For example, when the American Nazi Party finally was allowed to march in Illinois in
1978, following the government's and Anti-Defamation League's attempts to prevent this demon-
stration, 2000 onlookers watched the 20 Nazis demonstrate. See A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 169.
And throughout the protracted litigation that the Nazis predictably won, the case received extensive
media attention all over the country. See id. at 8. The event probably would have received little if
any attention had the Village of Skokie simply allowed the Nazis to demonstrate in the first place.
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nizes, given the overriding importance of free speech in our society, any
speech regulation must be narrowly drafted. 391 Therefore, it can affect
only the most blatant, crudest forms of racism. The more subtle, and
hence potentially more invidious, racist expressions will survive. Virtu-
ally all would agree that no law could possibly eliminate all racist speech,
let alone racism itself. If the marketplace of ideas cannot be trusted to
winnow out the hateful, then there is no reason to believe that censorship
will do so. The most it could possibly achieve would be to drive some
racist thought and expression underground, where it would be more diffi-
cult to respond to such speech and the underlying attitudes it ex-
presses.392 The British experience confirms this prediction.393
The positive effect of racist speech-in terms of making society
aware of and mobilizing its opposition to the evils of racism-are illus-
trated by the wave of campus racist incidents now under discussion.
Ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtedly have
had the beneficial result of raising public consciousness about the under-
lying societal problem of racism. If these expressions had been chilled by
virtue of university sanctions, then it is doubtful that there would be such
widespread discussion on campuses, let alone more generally, about the
real problem of racism. 394 Consequently, society would be less mobilized
to attack this problem. Past experience confirms that the public airing of
racist and other forms of hate speech catalyzes communal efforts to re-
dress the bigotry that underlies such expression and to stave off any dis-
criminatory conduct that might follow from it.39 5
391. See Lawrence, at 435, 450 n.82, 458 & n.105, 481.
392. See A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 158 (noting that, in British context, it is far more danger-
ous when a major party such as the Conservative Party engages in racist politics, even though it uses
polite language, than when a minor party attracts attention through ugly racist epithets).
393. See supra text accompanying notes 367-75. See also Lasson, supra note 362, at 170. The
Lasson article stated that:
[A] major effect of [the British anti-hate-speech] act has been to leave certain organizations
with but two choices: to restrict their circulation to the members of a specific club, or to be
more careful in their language. However, although this seems a positive development, it is
possible that provocatively racist messages, by being concealed in genteel, and outwardly
acceptable language, could be disseminated to an even larger number of people--thereby
promoting more racial ill-will rather than decreasing such feelings.
394. See infra notes 404-07 and accompanying text.
395. See S. WALKER, supra note 16, at 59-62 (the ACLU's content-neutral defense of free speech
permitted the Ku Klux Klan-which in the 1920s dominated many state legislatures, played a major
role at the 1924 natiqnal Democratic convention, and staged a massive march on Washington,
D.C.-to diminish its own influence by exposing its vicious plans to public view). See also A.
NEIER, supra note 63, at 34. Neier stated that:
The Nazis deter the expression of anti-Semitism in forms that might be more palatable to
the American public and, therefore, more threatening to the Jews. Other anti-Semites
must impose restraints on themselves for fear of being bracketed with the almost univer-
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Banning racist speech could undermine the goal of combating ra-
cism for additional reasons. Some black scholars and activists maintain
that an anti-racist speech policy may perpetuate a paternalistic view of
minority groups, suggesting that they are incapable of defending them-
selves against biased expressions. 396 Additionally, an anti-hate speech
policy stultifies the candid intergroup dialogue concerning racism and
other forms of bias that constitutes an essential precondition for reducing
discrimination. In a related vein, education, free discussion, and the air-
ing of misunderstandings and failures of sensitivity are more likely to
promote positive intergroup relations than are legal battles. The rules
barring hate speech will continue to generate litigation and other forms
of controversy that will exacerbate intergroup tensions. Finally, the cen-
sorship approach is diversionary. It makes it easier for communities to
avoid coming to grips with less convenient and more expensive, but
ultimately more meaningful, approaches for combating racial
discrimination.
sally hated Nazis. A strong Nazi movement would be a great danger to Jews in the United
States; a weak Nazi movement with no potential for growth has its uses.
Similarly, the speech of anti-pornography feminists has had a discernible impact on public percep-
tions, as well as public policy, concerning the connection between gender discrimination and pornog-
raphy. If the censorship strategy had driven anti-female pornography from public view, this impact
may well have been lessened. For example, a major public education and lobbying tool employed by
Women Against Pornography is the display of anti-female pornographic images. Ironically, such
displays would be prohibited under censorship legislation proposed by some feminist pornography
opponents. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
396. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 5 (quote from Alan Keyes criticizing the Stanford
code); see also supra text accompanying note 10 (quote from Michael Meyers).
Similarly, while some feminists have advocated the regulation of pornography, arguing that
regulation would promote women's equality, see, e.g., A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POS-
SESSING WOMEN (1981), other feminists have argued that regulation would hinder that goal. See,
e.g., Hunter & Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et al., in American
Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69 (1988) (arguing that anti-pornography
ordinance suppresses constitutionally protected speech in a manner particularly detrimental to
women, and unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of sex and reinforces sexist stereotypes).
The arguments made by this latter group of feminists appear in large part applicable to regulations of
racist speech, as well. See, e.g., id. at 122. Hunter and Law stated that:
The [Indianapolis] ordinance presumes women as a class (and only women) are
subordinated by virtually any sexually explicit image. ...
Such assumptions reinforce and perpetuate central sexist stereotypes; they weaken,
rather than enhance, women's struggles to free themselves of archaic notions of gender
roles.... In treating women as a special class, [this ordinance] repeats the-error of earlier
protectionist legislation which gave women no significant benefits and denied their
equality.
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V. MEANS CONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT CAN
PROMOTE RACIAL EQUALITY MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN
CAN CENSORSHIP
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the time-honored principle
that the appropriate response to speech conveying ideas that we reject or
find offensive is not to censor such speech, but rather to exercise our own
speech rights. In Texas v. Johnson,397 the Court urged this counter-
speech strategy upon the many Americans who are deeply offended by
the burning of their country's flag: "The way to preserve the flag's spe-
cial role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters.
It is to persuade them that they are wrong. ' 398 In addition to persua-
sion, the types of private expressive conduct that could be invoked in
response to racist speech include censure and boycotts. 399
In the context of countering racism on campus, the strategy of in-
creasing speech-rather than decreasing it-not only would be consistent
with first amendment principles, but also would be more effective in ad-
vancing equality goals. All government agencies and officers, including
state university officials, should condemn slavery, de jure segregation,
and other racist institutions that the government formerly supported.
State university and other government officials also should affirmatively
endorse equality principles. Furthermore, these government representa-
tives should condemn racist ideas expressed by private speakers. 4°°0 In
the same vein, private individuals and groups should exercise their first
amendment rights by speaking out against racism. Traditional civil liber-
tarians have exercised their own speech rights in this fashion 4 and also
397. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
398. Id. at 2567.
399. See Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2358 n.201 (cites recent exchanges among American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee, B'nai B'rith International, and other organizations which effec-
tively remedied ethnically derogatory expressions).
400. See Bok, supra note 6, at 6. In response to a letter demeaning women that a student club
had circulated, Derek Bok, President of Harvard University, argued that this letter should not be
suppressed. He then issued the following public criticism of the letter:
The wording of the letter was so extreme and derogatory to women that I wanted to com-
municate my disapproval publicly, if only to make sure that no one could gain the false
impression that the Harvard administration harbored any sympathy or complacency to-
ward the tone and substance of the letter. Such action does not infringe on free speech.
Indeed, statements of disagreement are part and parcel of the open debate that freedom of
speech is meant to encourage; the right to condemn a point of view is as protected as the
right to express it. Of course, I recognize that even verbal disapproval by persons in posi-
tions of authority may have inhibiting effects on students. Nevertheless, this possibility is
not sufficient to outweigh the need for officials to speak out on matters of significance to the
community-provided, of course, that they take no action to penalize the speech of others.
401. For recent examples, see supra note 355. In contrast, Lawrence claims, without support,
that "[t]hose who raise their voices in protest against public sanctions of racist speech have not
organized private protests against the voices of racism .... Traditional civil libertarians have been
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have defended the first amendment freedoms of others who have done
80.
40 2
In addition to the preceding measures, which could be implemented
on a society-wide basis, other measures would be especially suited to the
academic setting. First, regardless of the legal limitations on rules bar-
ring hate speech, universities should encourage members of their com-
munities voluntarily to restrain the form of their expression in light of
the feelings and concerns of various minority groups.40 3 Universities
could facilitate voluntary self-restraint by providing training in commu-
nications, information about diverse cultural perspectives, and other edu-
cation designed to promote intergroup understanding. Members of both
minority and majority groups should be encouraged to be mutually re-
spectful. Individuals who violate these norms of civility should not be
subject to any disciplinary action, but instead should be counseled. 4 4
These educational efforts should be extended to members of the faculty
and administration, as well as students. Of course, universities must vigi-
lantly ensure that even voluntary limits on the manner of academic dis-
course do not chill its content.
conspicuous largely in their absence from ...group expressions of condemnation [of racism]."
Lawrence, at 476-77.
402. See, e.g., A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 170 (Illinois ACLU, which had represented neo-Nazi
group seeking to demonstrate, also assisted anti-Nazi groups in securing their first amendment rights
to counter-demonstrate). Professor Lawrence asserts, without supporting authorities, that "[w]hen
racial minorities or other victims of hate speech hold counter-demonstrations ... civil libertarians
often accuse them of private censorship, of seeking to silence opposing points of view." Lawrence, at
477. This unsubstantiated generalization is at odds with the relevant ACLU policy, which protects
"[h]eckling or any other interruption of a speaker, as a form of speech or expression," unless it is so
"extreme... that [it] effectively prevents the speaker from speaking or the audience from hearing."
ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 11, at Policy No. 44.
It should be noted that the above-quoted policy is yet another example, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 52-77, of the ACLU's recognition that expressive conduct should not be deemed abso-
lutely protected by the first amendment just because it is verbal in form. See id. (counterspeech that
effectively prevents speaker from speaking or audience from hearing "cannot be classified as pro-
tected speech even though it is verbal in form. It has the same effect, in preventing communication,
as acts of physical force.").
403. See University of Texas Report, supra note 115, at 4. The Report admonishes students and
faculty that:
[W]hatever the legal boundaries of free speech, the members of an educational community
should voluntarily adopt standards of civility and good taste that reflect mutual respect,
understanding, and sensitivity among its diverse racial, ethnic, and cultural groups. In
particular, members of the faculty represent The University and have a special role and
position of authority with respect to students. They should treat students with respect and
should be sensitive to the impact of their words and opinions on them.
404. See, e.g., Report of Annenberg Workshop, supra note 156, at 2. The Annenberg Workshop
concluded that:
[M]any... [incidents of derogatory communicative behavior on campus] are so entwined
with the expression of political, religious or social points of view that they should not
trigger any disciplinary response at all, or are in a sufficiently gray area ... that the re-
sponse of an educational institution should be counselling rather than punishment ....
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In addition to the foregoing measures, universities also should create
forums in which controversial race-related issues and ideas could be dis-
cussed in a candid but constructive way. Another possibility would be
for universities to encourage students to receive education in the history
of racism and the civil rights movement in the United States and an ex-
posure to the culture and traditions of racial and ethnic groups other
than their own. Consistent with free speech tenets, these courses must
allow all faculty and students to express their own views and must not
degenerate into "reeducation camps." 405
The proposed measures for eliminating racism on campus are con-
sistent not only with American constitutional norms of free speech and
equality, but also with internationally recognized human rights. For ex-
ample, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that indi-
viduals have a right to receive, and states have an obligation to provide,
education which "promote[s] understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all nations, racial or religious groups. ' '40 6
If universities adopt narrowly framed rules that regulate racist ex-
pression, then these rules should constitute one element of a broader pro-
gram that includes the more positive, direct strategies outlined above.
Many universities appear to be responding constructively to the recent
upsurge in campus hate speech incidents by adopting some of the meas-
ures suggested here.40 7 This development demonstrates the positive im-
pact of racist speech, in terms of galvanizing community efforts to
counter the underlying attitudes it expresses.
405. See generally Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism " Proposed Stan-
dards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OHlo ST. LJ.
333, 383 (1986) (listing characteristics of a non-indoctrinating mode of instruction).
406. Universal Declaration, supra note 258, at art. 26(2). Accord art. 13(1), International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
407. See, e.g., CARNEGIE FOUND. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 32 ("The University of
Minnesota requires that all students take at least two courses on different American cultures. Mt.
Holyoke and Tufts University have a similar requirement. The University of California, Berkeley,
Faculty Senate recently ruled that all undergraduates must take at least one course in American
Cultures."). The University of Texas Report, supra note 115, at 23-25, in addition to recommending
a rule that punishes certain racist expressions, see supra note 152, recommends that the University of
Texas take the following additional steps to promote intergroup relations: orientation for all new
students should include sensitivity sessions to reduce misunderstanding among different cultural
groups; student extracurricular programs on multiculturalism should be expanded; all faculty, as
well as other university employees, should participate in seminars about how to exercise their re-
sponsibilities in a multicultural academic setting; degree programs should require courses that foster
an understanding of the responsibilities of living in a multicultural community, nation, and world;
the entire curriculum should be reexamined from this perspective, and the form and content of
particular courses should be restructured where necessary; consideration should be given to includ-
ing required courses that deal with the social sciences and the arts with respect to people of different
cultural backgrounds.
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It is particularly important to devise anti-racism strategies consis-
tent with the first amendment because racial and other minority groups
ultimately have far more to lose than to gain through a weakened free
speech guarantee. History has demonstrated that minorities have been
among the chief beneficiaries of a vigorous free speech safeguard. 4°8
Professor Lawrence offers two rebuttals to the proposition that
blacks are (on balance) benefited rather than hurt by a strong free speech
guarantee. First, he notes that "[t]he first amendment coexisted with
slavery."' 4 9 It is undeniable that, until the Union won the Civil War, not
only the first amendment, but also all of the Constitution's provisions
guaranteeing liberty, coexisted with the total negation of liberty through
the institution of slavery. It also is true, however, that the free speech
guarantees of the federal Constitution and some state constitutions al-
lowed abolitionists to advocate the end of slavery.410 Moreover, it must
be recalled that until the 1930s, the first amendment provided no protec-
tion whatsoever against speech or press restrictions enacted by state or
local governments. 411 Further, although the first amendment from its
adoption provided theoretical protection against actions by the national
government, in practice it was not enforced judicially until the latter half
of the 20th century. Not until 1965 did the Supreme Court initially exer-
cise its power-which it had recognized 162 years earlier 4 2 -to invali-
date unconstitutional congressional statutes in the first amendment
408. See A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 5-7. Neier stated that:
It is a matter of self-interest. The oppressed are the victims of power. If they are to end
their oppression, they must either win freedom or take power themselves....
Jews and friends of Jews may hold power in Skokie, but they do not hold power in the
rest of the country. Nor will they ever. The Jews in Skokie require restraints on power to
guard themselves. Keeping a few Nazis off the streets of Skokie will serve Jews poorly if it
means that the freedoms to speak, publish, or assemble any place in the United States are
thereby weakened....
It is dangerous to let the Nazis have their say. But it is more dangerous by far to
destroy the laws that deny anyone the power to silence Jews if Jews should need to cry out
to each other and to the world for succor.
409. Lawrence, at 466.
410. See M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 30-32 (1986).
411. Along with other provisions in the Bill of Rights, the first amendment did not purport to
constrain state or local governments, but rather limited only the federal government. See Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Not until 1931 did the Supreme Court hold that the four-
teenth amendment (ratified in 1868) made the first amendment's free speech and press clauses bind-
ing on the states. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931). See also Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) (suggested in dicta that first amendment might be binding on states). Therefore,
for general reasons of federalism, throughout much of U.S. history, the first amendment protected
no speech against violations by state and local governments; it necessarily coexisted not only with
slavery, but also with whatever other limitations states or local governments chose to impose on the
speech and other rights of their citizens.
412. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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context. 413 Thus, under the Espionage Act of 1918 and similar state stat-
utes, numerous individuals were punished for expressing unpopular
political opinions. The first amendment did not prevent these laws from
contributing to "the gravest period of political repression in American
history." 414
In short, although slavery coexisted with the theoretical guarantees
enunciated in the first amendment, slavery did not coexist with the judi-
cially enforceable version of those guarantees that emerged only after
World War I. We never can know how much more quickly and peace-
fully the anti-slavery forces might have prevailed if free speech and press,
as well as other rights, had been judicially protected against violations by
all levels of government earlier in our history. That robust freedoms of
speech and press ultimately might have threatened slavery is suggested
by southern states' passage of laws limiting these freedoms, in an effort to
undermine the abolitionist cause.415
The second basis for Professor Lawrence's lack of "faith in free
speech as the most important vehicle for liberation" 41 6 is the notion that
"equality [is] a precondition to free speech. '417 Professor Lawrence
maintains that racism devalues the ideas of non-whites and of anti-racism
in the marketplace of ideas.418 Like the economic market, the ideological
market sometimes works to improve society,419 but not always.4 20 Odi-
ous ideas, such as the idea of black inferiority, will not necessarily be
driven from the marketplace. Therefore, the marketplace rationale alone
might not justify free speech for racist thoughts.421 But that rationale
does not stand alone.
413. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 58,
§ 1-2, at 4 n.8 ("[S]uccessful invocation of the Bill of Rights to protect from Congress what would
today be called 'civil rights' or 'civil liberties' dates from the 1950's.").
414. A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 110 (noting, for example, that Rose Pastor Stokes received a
ten-year prison sentence for saying, "I am for the people and the government is for the profiteers,"
and that socialist leader Eugene V. Debs and Congressman Victor Berger went to prison for similar
remarks; similarly, a man in Minnesota received a prison sentence for saying to volunteer knitters,
"No soldier ever sees these socks.").
415. See M. CURTIS, supra note 410, at 40.
416. Lawrence, at 466.
417. Id. at 467.
418. See id. at 470.
419. See A. NEIER, supra note 63, at 170 (Although Nazis had received national press attention
during 16 months of Skokie controversy, they gained no new adherents; "It]hey had disseminated
their message and it [was] rejected."); S. WALKER, supra note 16, at 59-62 (Ku Klux Klan's exercise
of free speech rights led to decline in Klan's influence, which had been significant during 1920s).
420. This paragraph, the following paragraph, and the accompanying footnotes, are drawn in
large part from Gale & Strossen, supra note 19, at 174-76.
421. For criticisms of this metaphor, see Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech. 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978); Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
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The civil libertarian and judicial defense of racist speech also is
based on the knowledge that censors have stifled the voices of oppressed
persons and groups far more often than those of their oppressors.422
Censorship traditionally has been the tool of people who seek to
subordinate minorities, not those who seek to liberate them. As Profes-
sor Kalven has shown, the civil rights movement of the 1960s depended
upon free speech principles.4 23 These principles allowed protestors to
carry their messages to audiences who found such messages highly offen-
sive and threatening to their most deeply cherished views of themselves
and their way of life. Equating civil rights activists with Communists,
subversives, and criminals, government officials mounted inquisitions
against the NAACP, seeking compulsory disclosure of its membership
lists and endangering the members' jobs and lives.424 Only strong princi-
ples of free speech and association could-and did-protect the drive for
desegregation.425 Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote his historic letter from a
Birmingham jail,426 but the Birmingham parade ordinance that King and
other demonstrators had violated eventually was declared an unconstitu-
tional invasion of their free speech rights.427 Moreover, the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which these demonstrators championed, did become law.428
The more disruptive forms of protest, which Professor Lawrence
credits with having been more effective 29-such as marches, sit-ins, and
422. See, eg., L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 6 (1985) (describing historical English
system whereby "It]he manuscript of any work intended for publication had to be submitted to royal
officials empowered to censor objectionable passages .... Anything published without an imprima-
tur was criminal."); Dorsen, supra note 72, at 133 (discusses public attempts to censor the messages
of Vietnam protestors, civil rights activists and labor unions); Strossen, supra note 230, at 220-22
(discusses the danger of government censorship of pornography being used to suppress any messages
that are inconsistent with the personal value judgments of the government officials).
423. See H. KALVEN supra note 133, at 4 (looks "at the impact of the [civil rights movement] on
... free speech .... trace[s] connections between civil rights and civil liberties"); see also id. at 6
("[A]s a thumbnail summary of the last two or three decades of speech issues in the Supreme Court,
we may come to see the Negro as winning back for us the freedoms the Communists seemed to have
lost for us.").
424. T. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63, at 181-82,
468-69 (1988). See also K. O'REILLY, "RACIAL MATTERS": THE FBI's SECRET FILE ON BLACK
AMERICA, 1960-72, at 125-55 (1989) (describing the FBI's attempt to link Martin Luther King, Jr.
and other leaders of the civil rights movement with communism).
425. For Supreme Court decisions protecting the NAACP against forced disclosure of its mem-
bership lists, see Louisiana ex rel Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
426. M. L. KING, Letter From Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 76 (1964). For a
description of the circumstances in which the letter was written, see T. BRANCH, supra note 424, at
737-44.
427. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
428. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in Title 28, § 1447; Title 42,
§§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988)).
429. See Lawrence, at 466 & n.129.
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kneel-ins-were especially dependent on generous judicial constructions
of the free speech guarantee.430 Notably, many of these protective inter-
pretations initially had been formulated in cases brought on behalf of
anti-civil rights demonstrators. Similarly, the insulting and often racist
language that more militant black activists hurled at police officers and
other government officials also was protected under the same principles
and precedents. 431
The foregoing history does not prove conclusively that free speech is
an essential precondition for equality, as some respected political philoso-
phers have argued.432 But it does belie Professor Lawrence's theory that
430. See S. WALKER, supra note 16, at 241. The author states that, "after 1960, the sit-ins and
other forms of increasingly militant protest depended on new definitions of First Amendment
rights.... [Tihe early civil rights movement depended on the First Amendment. As Georgetown
University Law School professor Eleanor Holmes Norton later put it, 'There was always the First.'"
(quoting from interview).
The record does not support Professor Lawrence's assertion that "the disruption that renders
this speech effective usually causes it to be considered undeserving of first amendment protection."
Lawrence, at 467. First, some of the authorities he cites in support of this generalization involved
demonstrations that were accompanied by violence-including violence that "seemed to emanate
from the protestors"-and not just disruption. Id. at 467 n.130. It would be ironic if Professor
Lawrence, who accuses traditional civil libertarians of being too absolutist in defending free speech,
would be even more absolutist by suggesting that violent expressive conduct should be protected.
If one focuses on expressive conduct that "disrupt[ed] business as usual," id. at 466, but was not
accompanied by protestor violence, one finds a consistent line of Supreme Court cases sheltering
such conduct under the first amendment. See, eg., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886 (1982) (protected nonviolent elements of black citizens' boycott of white merchants to press for
civil rights goals, although boycott caused substantial economic losses); Edwards v, South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963) (reversed breach of breach of peace convictions of 187 civil rights protesters who
had demonstrated on state capitol grounds, although there was evidence that some sidewalks had
been blocked during demonstration). See also Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (in reversing
disorderly conduct convictions for civil rights demonstrators who failed to disperse upon police or-
der, Court refused to consider evidence that hostile crowd of 1,000 spectators was growing unman-
ageable); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550 (1965) (reversed breach of peace convictions of civil
rights demonstrators, despite local officials' claims that spectator violence was imminent, where
there were 100 to 300 "muttering" spectators).
431. See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (during political meeting in university chapel,
appellant, a Black Panther, had referred to specific policemen as "mother-fucking fascist pig cops";
Supreme Court summarily vacated conviction under law which it found unconstitutionally over-
broad); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972) (where appellant, a black demonstrator, had
made several threatening statements to police officers, including "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you,"
Court reversed conviction under law which it found unconstitutionally overbroad); see also Lewis v.
New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (where police officer said to young suspect, "Get your black ass in
the goddam car," and suspect's mother responded, "You god damn mother fucking police-I am
going to [the Superintendent of Police] about this," lower courts upheld mother's conviction on
fighting words doctrine, but the Supreme Court reversed).
432. See, eg., Beck, Liberty and Equality, 10 IDEALISTIC STUD. 24, 36 (1980) (liberty is "more
basic" than equality); Machan, Equality's Dependence on Liberty, in 2 EQUALITY & FREEDOM 663,
664-65 (G. Dorsey ed. 1977); Raphael, Tensions Between the Goals of Equality and Freedom, in id.
at 543, 555 ("Freedom appears to be a greater value than equality."). For the contrary view (i.e.,
that equality is the source of all rights and liberties), see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
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equality is an essential precondition for free speech.433 Moreover, this
history demonstrates the symbiotic interrelationship between free speech
and equality, which parallels the relationship between civil liberties and
civil rights more generally.434 Both sets of aims must be pursued simul-
taneously because the pursuit of each aids the realization of the other.
The mutual interdependence of equality and liberty was forcefully de-
scribed by Professor Karst:
[T]he constitutional values of equality and liberty are fundamentally
linked by the notion that equal access to certain institutions and serv-
ices is a prime component of any meaningful liberty. ,This link is re-
flected in the language of egalitarian movements. The civil rights
movement of the 1960s, for example, marched under the banner of
"Freedom" even though its chief objective was equal access-to the
vote, to education, to housing, even to lunch counters. "Liberation" is
today a theme of more than rhetorical significance in egalitarian causes
such as the women's movement.435
CONCLUSION
Some traditional civil libertarians may agree with Professor Law-
rence that a university rule banning a narrowly defined class of assault-
ive, harassing racist expression might comport with first amendment
principles and make a symbolic contribution to the racial equality man-
dated by the fourteenth amendment. However, Professor Lawrence and
other members of the academic community who advocate such steps
must recognize that educators have a special responsibility to avoid the
danger posed by focusing on symbols that obscure the real underlying
issues.
The recent exploitation of the American flag as a symbol of patriot-
ism, to distort the true nature of that concept, serves as a sobering re-
minder of this risk. Joseph S. Murphy, Chancellor of The City
University of New York, recently offered lessons for educators from the
flag-related controversies. His cautionary words apply even more
powerfully to the campus hate speech controversy, since the general re-
sponsibility of academics to call for an honest and direct discourse about
compelling societal problems is especially great within our own
communities:
As educators, we should be somewhat concerned [about the manipula-
tion of such symbols as the flag for partisan political purposes]. At our
273-74 (1977); Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164, 165-66 (1958). But see Hart, Between
Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 845-46 (1979) (criticizing Dworkin's view that all liber-
ties derive from principle of equality).
433. See Lawrence, at 467.
434. See Gale & Strossen, supra note 19, at 184-86.
435. Karst, supra note 141, at 43-44.
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best, we convey ideas in their full complexity, with ample appreciation
of the ambiguity that attaches to most important concepts. We use
symbols, but we do so to illuminate, not to obscure .... The real
question is how we use our position in the university and in society to
steer national discourse away from an obsessive fixation on the trivial
representation of ideas, and toward a proper focus on the underlying
conflicts that define our era.436
An exaggerated concern with racist speech creates a risk of elevating
symbols over substance in two problematic respects. First, it may divert
our attention from the causes of racism to its symptoms. Second, a focus
on the hateful message conveyed by particular speech may distort our
view of fundamental neutral principles applicable to our system of free
expression generally. We should not let the racist veneer in which ex-
pression is cloaked obscure our recognition of how important free expres-
sion is and of how effectively it has advanced racial equality.
436. Murphy, Opinion, The Supreme Court Flag-Burning Decision: The Symbol Versus the Real-
ity, HIGHER EDUC. & NAT'L AFF., Sept. 25, 1989, at 5.
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APPENDIX: ACLU POLICY STATEMENT
FREE SPEECH AND BIAS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 437
Preamble
The significant increase in reported incidents of racism and other
forms of bias at colleges and universities is a matter of profound concern
to the ACLU. Some have proposed that racism, sexism, homophobia
and other such biases on campus must be addressed in whole or in part
by restrictions on speech. The alternative to such restrictions, it is said,
is to permit such bias to go unremedied and to subject the targets of such
bias to a loss of equal educational opportunity. The ACLU rejects both
these alternatives and reaffirms its traditional and unequivocal commit-
ment both to free speech and to equal opportunity.
Policy
1. Freedom of thought and expression are indispensable to the pursuit
of knowledge and the dialogue and dispute that characterize meaningful
education. All members of the academic community have the right to
hold and to express views that others may find repugnant, offensive, or
emotionally distressing. The ACLU opposes all campus regulations
which interfere with the freedom of professors, students and administra-
tors to teach, learn, discuss and debate or to express ideas, opinions or
feelings in classroom, public or private discourse.438
2. The ACLU has opposed and will continue to oppose and challenge
disciplinary codes that reach beyond permissible boundaries into the
realm of protected speech, even when those codes are directed at the
problem of bias on campus. 439
3. This policy does not prohibit colleges and universities from enacting
disciplinary codes aimed at restricting acts of harassment, intimidation
and invasion of privacy. 440 The fact that words may be used in connec-
tion with otherwise actionable conduct does not immunize such conduct
437. Adopted by ACLU National Board of Directors, without dissent, on October 13, 1990.
438. See generally ACLU Policy Nos. 60, 63, 65, 71.
439. The ACLU to date has opposed overbroad student speech codes adopted by the University
of Connecticut, University of Michigan and University of Wisconsin and the University of
California.
440. Although "harassment", "intimidation", and "invasion of privacy" are imprecise terms
susceptible of impermissibly overbroad application, each term defines a type of conduct which is
legally proscribed in many jurisdictions when directed at a specific individual or individuals and
when intended to frighten, coerce, or unreasonably harry or intrude upon its target. Threatening
telephone calls to a minority student's dormitory room, for example, would be proscribable conduct
under the terms of this policy. Expressive behavior which has no other effect than to create an
unpleasant learning environment, however, would not be the proper subject of regulation. See also
Policy No. 316.
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from appropriate regulation. 441 As always, however, great care must be
taken to avoid applying such provisions overbroadly to protected expres-
sion. The ACLU will continue to review such college codes and their
application in specific situations on a case-by-case basis under the princi-
ples set forth in this policy and in Policy 72.44 2
4. All students have the right to participate fully in the educational pro-
cess on a nondiscriminatory basis. Colleges and universities have an af-
firmative obligation to combat racism, sexism, homophobia, and other
forms of bias, and a responsibility to provide equal opportunities through
education. To address these responsibilities and obligations, the ACLU
advocates the following actions by colleges and universities:
(a) to utilize every opportunity to communicate through its adminis-
trators, faculty, and students its commitment to the elimination of all
forms of bigotry on campus;
(b) to develop comprehensive plans aimed at reducing prejudice, re-
sponding promptly to incidents of bigotry and discriminatory harass-
ment, and protecting students from any such further incidents;
(c) to pursue vigorously efforts to attract enough minorities, women
and members of other historically disadvantaged groups as students,
faculty members and administrators to alleviate isolation and to ensure
real integration and diversity in academic life;
(d) to offer and consider whether to require all students to take
courses in the history and meaning of prejudiuce, including racism,
sexism, and other forms of invidious discrimination; 443
(e) to establish new-student orientation programs and continuing
counseling programs that enable students of different races, sexes, reli-
gions, and sexual orientations to learn to live with each other outside
the classroom;
(f) to review and, where appropriate, revise course offerings as well
as extracurricular programs in order to recognize the contributions of
those whose art, music, literature and learning have been insufficiently
reflected in the curriculum of many American colleges and
universities;
(g) to address the question of defacto segregation in dormitories and
other university facilities; and
(h) to take such other steps as are consistent with the goal of ensur-
ing that all students have an equal opportunity to do their best work
and to participate fully in campus life.
441. For example, intimidating phone calls, threats of attack, extortion and blackmail are unpro-
tected forms of conduct which include an element of verbal or written expression.
442. In determining whether a university disciplinary code impermissibly restricts protected
speech, there must be a searching analysis both of the language of the code and the manner in which
it is applied. Many factors, which are heavily fact-oriented, must be considered, including time,
place, pattern of conduct and, where relevant, the existence of an authority relationship between
speaker and target.
443. All courses and programs must be taught consistent with the principles prescribed in
ACLU Policy 60.
[V/ol. 1990:484
Vol. 1990:484] A MODEST PROPOSAL? 573
This policy is issued in connection with, and is intended as an inter-
pretation and enhancement of, the binding resolution on racist speech
adopted at the 1989 Biennial Conference. That resolution provides:
The ACLU should undertake educational activities to counter inci-
dents of racist, sexist, anti-semitic, and homophobic behavior (includ-
ing speech) on school campuses and should encourage school
administrators to speak out vigorously against such incidents. At the
same time the ACLU should undertake educational activities to
counter efforts to limit or punish speech on university campuses.
